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International criminal justice can have intended and unintended impact on the 
legitimacy of quasi-state entities (QSEs). ‘Quasi-state entity’ is a novel concept 
introduced to distinguish actors in statehood conflicts that aspire to statehood, 
fulfil statehood functions to a greater or lesser degree, including, notably, the 
capacity and willingness to employ organised, restrained coercive violence, but 
which lack the status of sovereign statehood. QSEs overlap with, but are 
importantly and conceptually distinct from, nationalist movements, de facto 
states and rebels or insurgents. Legitimacy is a prerequisite for success, both 
for QSEs and for state entities. The legitimacy of an entity, its institutions and 
actions, in a certain constituency, at a certain moment, is difficult to ascertain, 
in its positive form. Legitimacy is best gauged by its actual or potential 
absence, at moments where an entity faces legitimacy crises, and where impact 
can be gauged through empirical observation of behaviour and in changing 
narratives and counter-narratives of legitimacy. International criminal 
procedures present direct legitimacy challenges for QSEs and (or) their 
adversaries. Legitimacy crises reveal both intended and unintended effects of 
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CHAPTER I.                                                                         
INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) issued a warrant of arrest for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir; the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) could finally 
start proceedings against Ratko Mladić, the former leader of the Bosnian Serb 
military, after his arrest, in May 2011; and in May 2012, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) sentenced former Liberian President Charles Taylor to 50 
years imprisonment. These high profile cases were only some of the most 
visible examples of international criminal prosecutions. But, they illustrate that 
over the last two decades international criminal justice went from existing only 
as a memory of ‘Nuremberg’ and ‘Tokyo’, to being firmly established. 
Between 1946 and 1993, no international mechanisms existed to prosecute 
violations of international criminal law. By 2013 there were ad hoc tribunals, 
hybrid tribunals, and a permanent International Criminal Court to prosecute 
and punish those individuals most responsible for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide.1 In the 21st century, when the world is confronted 
                                                      
1 Ad hoc tribunals are established to prosecute crimes committed in a specific territory, 
during a specific conflict, or during a specific time, for instance the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Hybrid tribunals are also established on 
an ad hoc basis, but combine international and domestic approaches towards prosecution, 
like for instance the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia. The ICC is a permanent international criminal court, and is 
established to prosecute individuals for acts of Genocide, crimes against humanity, and 




with the most heinous atrocities, calls for the perpetrators to be ‘sent to The 
Hague’ can be widely heard.2 This in itself does not mean that international 
criminal justice has a deterrent effect. However, it illustrates how international 
criminal procedures have become part of the discourse around war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, and that people have certain 
expectations of international criminal justice, including that there should be – 
and will be – an effort to bring justice to bear. 
The enormous progress made since the ICTY was founded in 1993-4 also gave 
rise to increased expectations of international criminal justice. Yet, the same 
high-profile cases that illustrate the successes and symbolise the promise 
international criminal tribunals hold for the future, also demonstrate the 
performance problems and shortcomings of international criminal procedures. 
Despite the high hopes for international criminal courts, and the extensive 
research that has been done on the effects of international criminal justice, it 
remains difficult to gauge what the effects of prosecuting and punishing 
individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are on 
conduct in contemporary conflict, or the course of international peace and 
security. Law is not an exact science and the outcomes of legal proceedings do 
not lend themselves to exact quantitative measuring or precise predictions. 
However, that does not mean it is impossible to see the structural impact of 
international criminal justice on the way contemporary war is waged. In 
particular, in this dissertation, I investigate the possibility that at least some 





effect of international criminal justice can be detected in legitimacy crises, 
where the main actors in contemporary armed conflict are confronted with 
international criminal procedures, One assumed effect, deterrence, has 
seemingly not worked on leaders – at least in openly observable ways that 
mean they refrained from leading, organising, or allowing the commission of 
atrocities. Yet, this is only one possible effect. Others might occur – and James 
Gow has provided one example in his compelling argument that Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milosevic did a volte face in his conflict with NATO and campaign 
of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 in response to his being indicted by the 
ICTY.3 However, while that conclusion is linked to an empirical assessment of 
the outcome of that conflict, it is not linked to a broader conceptual 
understanding of the conditions for success (and, by contrast, failure) in 
contemporary armed conflict – legitimacy. It does, however, suggest that there 
might be value in pursuing analysis of international criminal justice on 
legitimacy, the essential condition for success in contemporary armed conflict. 
While it might be fruitful to investigate the impact of international criminal 
justice on leaders of states, equally, it should be noted, as Rupert Smith (among 
others) does, that a chief characteristic of contemporary armed conflict is the 
presence of non-state actors, whether this means coalitions of states, sub-state 
insurgencies, or transnational terrorist movements.4 Further, as Smith, Gow, 
and others maintain, legitimacy is not only the most vital quality for success in 
                                                      
3 J. Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes, London: 
Hurst and Co., 2003, pp. 295-7. 





contemporary armed conflict, but, it is even more so for non-state actors than it 
is for states. Given that the formal possession of sovereign statehood provides 
initial capital in legitimacy struggles, and that the acquiring of legitimacy and 
the conversion of this into formal international recognition of that legitimacy – 
and its translation into sovereign statehood is the most difficult challenge 
facing non-state actors seeking to revise the statehood status quo.5 There is 
good reason, therefore, to explore the impact of international criminal justice 
on non-state actors, and on one type of non-state actor, in particular: quasi-state 
entities – a term that is explained below and developed later in the dissertation. 
All of this gives rise to the question: what is the impact of international 
criminal justice on the legitimacy of quasi-state entities? Before proceeding to 
set out more fully the contexts that give rise to this question and the broad 
assumptions underpinning it, it is necessary, first, to define the key concepts on 
which the whole project rests and which are core assumptions (also developed 
subsequently) in the question posed. 
 
                                                      
5 Legitimacy, legitimacy as success, and the challenges QSEs face when attempting to change 





CONCEPTS: QUASI-STATE ENTITIES; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE; CRITICAL LEGITIMACY. 
The novel concept of quasi-state entities, international criminal justice, and 
legitimacy, are the key concepts this dissertation will focus on. In this 
dissertation the conjunction between the three, is unravelled, and put back 
together in order to be able to notice the impact of international criminal 
justice. Naturally, the nature and meaning of these concepts will be explained 
in detail below, however, for the sake of clarity, they will be discussed and 
defined briefly here. First, it is surprisingly difficult to articulate 
comprehensively what is understood by 'international criminal justice'.6 What 
is meant here by ‘international criminal justice’ is the system of practices and 
institutions that were founded internationally to hold responsible and punish 
individuals for violations of (international) criminal law; the system of 
international criminal courts and tribunals. But, in a broader sense, 
international criminal justice ‘describes the response of the international 
community – and other communities to mass atrocity’.7 International criminal 
proceedings before international criminal courts constitute only one of the 
mechanisms that aim to right moral wrongs and injustices caused by the most 
terrible atrocities. 
                                                      
6 G. Boas, ‘What’s in a Word: The Nature and Meaning of International Criminal Justice’, 
in G. Boas, W.A. Schabas and M.P. Scharf (eds.), International Criminal Justice: 





This dissertation introduces the term quasi-state entity, or QSE, clearly to 
define the main subject of this study, to describe the nature and characteristics 
of QSEs. Non-state entities that are parties to contemporary conflict are usually 
defined by what they lack; statehood. They are called, rebels, insurgents, or 
freedom fighters, but what these actors have in common is that the goals they 
attain all have to do with ‘statehood’, whether these involve changing the 
borders of an existing state, its ethnic make up, or system. They not only aspire 
to change the state, but they often carry out functions usually associated with 
the state. These entities develop state-like institutions; provide services usually 
associated with statehood; operate in a state centred environment; and in many 
ways behave like states. In this dissertation I argue that a more appropriate 
term to capture this type of actor or entity would therefore be ‘quasi-state 
entities’ or QSEs.8 While a QSE is a non-state actor, not all non-state actors are 
QSEs, and while a nationalist movement might be a QSE, not all QSEs are 
nationalist movements, and not all nationalist movements are QSEs. De facto 
states are QSEs, those entities striving to challenge the statehood status quo, 
but have not (yet) established a more or less functioning de facto state may also 
be a QSE. QSEs may be organised around nationalist goals, religion, a liguistic 
group, ethnicity, or another common goal, QSEs might want to secede, seek 
autonomy, challenge the make-up of a state, or the system of a state. But, while 
this is true of all nationalist political movements, the distinction setting QSEs 
apart is that they seek to develop and to the extent that they possibly can, 
                                                      
8 For a more detailed explanation of the term ‘quasi-state entity’and how this concept 




practically take forms of social organisation and action that can normally be 
equated with a state – the provision of public and social goods, from security to 
education and welfare, exactly the same qualities that are absent where states 
are weak and failing.9 In this sense, as will be seen later, Hezbollah is a 
quintessential QSE, as it provides state functions within a state, building 
support, but never seeking either to take over the state (Lebanon) directly, or to 
create a separate state carved from Lebanon. 
In this dissertation, it is argued not only that we should call these actors quasi-
state entities when  they have alreadyaccomplished de facto statehood, but  also 
to label thoseentities whose aspirations revolve around statehood, and that 
provide services usually associated with the state as QSEs. Whether they are 
well on their way towards full statehood and run a de facto state, or whether 
they are stuck in a stalemate, in which they retain some of the characteristics 
usually associated with statehood, or whether they are in the middle of a 
struggle for statehood, or changing a state. It is suggested here that the term 
embraces aspect of statehood, short of official statehood; that the objective of 
achieving statehood, combined with fulfilling certain functions, usually 
associated with statehood, such as the provision of public goods and services. 
‘Legitimacy’, as a word and as a concept, is used in divergent ways, in 
different contexts and situations, sometimes with differing definitions attached 
                                                      
9 See: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, 
pp. 2-3, 237-243.  I. William Zartman (ed.) Collapsed States: The Disintegration and 




to it, and, hardly ever, is the meaning attached to the word explained by the 
people using the term, at least, not in a manner such a critical concept merits. 
At times, to somewhat obscure the substance of the term might even be 
preferred by those who use ‘legitimacy’ in their discourse. But, that does not 
mean the concept is without substance. Moreover, in contrast to its use in the 
political arena, for the purpose at hand, a clear definition is preferable, or even 
necessary. Literally, ‘legitimacy’ refers to the condition of being within the 
law, and older definitions all revolve around law or right, often to base a claim 
to power on.10 However, as used by modern social scientists, definitions of 
‘legitimacy’ all revolve around belief or opinion. Professional definitions are, 
for instance, that legitimacy ‘involves the capacity of the system to engender 
and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society’.11 They often build on Weberian tradition 
describing legitimacy as ‘the degree to which institutions are valued for 
themselves and considered right and proper’.12 Legitimacy is described in 
relation to the ‘quality of ‘oughtness’ that is perceived by the public to inhere 
in a political regime’.13 The notions of legitimacy and legitimacy crisis will be 
discussed in detail below, for now it suffices that when the word ‘legitimacy’ is 
used, it refers to, what Suchman calls, ‘a generalized perception or assumption 
                                                      
10 J.H. Schaar, ‘Legitimacy in the Modern State', in W. Connolly (ed.) Legitimacy and the 
State, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, p. 108. 
11 S. M. Lipset, Political Man, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960, p. 77. 
12 R. Bierstedt, ‘Legitimacy’, in: J. Gould and W. L Kolb (eds.) Dictionary of the Social 
Sciences, New York: The Free Press, 1964, p. 386. 
13 R. M. Merelman, ‘Learning and Legitimacy’, The American Political Science Review, 




that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’.14  
Legitimacy, especially in its positive form, is hard to measure. In order to 
gauge how, and how far, international criminal justice influences legitimacy, to 
see its workings, and how and when it is lost and gained, one has to interpret 
the signals of legitimacy crisis. Therefore in this dissertation I will use a 
‘critical legitimacy’ approach (discussed below in Chapter 2?). It will asses 
those moments when the legitimacy of an entity, its actions or institutions, is 
challenged or withdrawn, at the same moment that it is needed most in a 
certain group or constituency. 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
In order to gauge the effects of international criminal justice, merely looking at 
international courts, their jurisdiction, and the norms of international criminal 
law that they apply does not suffice. The wider environment crimes in which 
crimes are committed has to be considered, as well as the nature of the entities 
in whose name armed force is used and those crimes are committed, and how 
these entities operate in the international system. In what would be his last 
work, Thinking the Twentieth Century, Tony Judt remarked that: ‘The problem 
with historical events which are intricately interwoven is that, the better to 
                                                      
14 M. C. Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, The 




understand their constituent elements, we have to pull them apart’.15 But, he 
continues that: ‘[I]n order to see the story in its plenitude, you have to inter-
weave those elements back together again’.16 The same applies to 
understanding the impact of international criminal justice. The constituent 
elements have to be pulled apart, yet, they have to be woven back together with 
all the elements that together form the environment in which international 
criminal justice develops and operates. By looking at the wider international 
political environment in which the actors in contemporary armed conflict have 
to operate, and by assessing legitimacy in various constituencies of the entities 
in whose name crimes under international law are committed, the impact of 
international criminal justice can be seen.  
International criminal justice could only develop because the international 
political environment changed. It was not coincidental that mechanisms of 
international criminal justice emerged in the wake of the abrupt end of the Cold 
War. The labels attached to the changes in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, a ‘new world order’, ‘the end of history’, a ‘clash of 
civilizations’, all express an understanding that the end of the bipolar world 
marked the beginning of a new era in world politics.17 Similarly, the timing of 
                                                      
15 T. Judt with T. Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century, London: William Heinemann, 
2012, p. 43. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Among others, Mikhail Gorbacheov and George H.W. Bush professed a ‘new world 
order’. M. Gorbachev, Speech at the 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, 7 December 
1988. G. H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf 




Anne-Marie Slaughter’s call for a ‘dual agenda’, integrating the study of 
international relations and international law, was no coincidence either. As she 
described in 1993: ‘International legal rules, procedures, and organizations are 
more visible and arguably more effective than at any time since 1945’.18 The 
early 1990s witnessed profound changes in the roles of, and interactions 
between, states, non-state actors, and supranational organisations. But, the end 
of the Cold War also revealed changes in the ways in which war is waged, and 
the nature of the main actors in armed conflict.19 These transformations in the 
international order and the nature of armed conflict had a catalyst effect on the 
emergence of international criminal justice. Because these developments are 
intrinsically interwoven with the rise of international criminal justice, they 
should be studied in conjunction with each other. One of the most notable 
changes that became clearly visible in the 1990s is the changed position of 
non-state entities in the international community and their role in armed 
                                                                                                                                                
P. Huntington coined ‘The end of history’ and a ‘clash of civilizations’, respectively. F. 
Fukuyama, The End of History? The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. F. 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. S.P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. S.P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996.  
18 A.M. Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 87, no. 2, 1993, pp. 205-239, at 
p. 205. 
19 The early 1990s revealed the full extent of the changes in contemporary warfare rather 
than spurned spawning them. See; R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 
Modern World, London: Penguin Books, 2005. T.X. Hammes, The Sling and The Stone: 




conflict.20 Both Cold War blocs had repressed nationalist, secessionist, ethnic, 
and religious fundamentalist sentiments and conflicts, and when that structure 
collapsed, latent conflicts emerged and many of the movements built on these 
sentiments gained ground and momentum.21 The parallel conflicts fought 
during the Cold War had already revealed a trend towards internal conflicts 
fought not for a strategic victory, to take, hold or destroy something with 
military means, but for the will of the people, and the in the 1990s the 
proliferation of belligerents in armed conflict that challenged the state, and 
their ability to employ armed force, was fully revealed.22 The non-state entities 
in these conflicts cover a wide range of organisations or entities, with widely 
diverging goals. As stated above, they are built around ethnicity, a national 
goal, religion or another shared identity, and they can be labelled as rebels, 
insurgents, freedom fighters or secessionists. But, these entities are all, and 
primarily, defined by the fact that they are competing with the sovereign state 
over statehood functions.  
While the world changed in many ways in the aftermath of the Cold War, the 
international community firmly remained one of, and dominated by, sovereign 
states. Sovereign states however, that are not always capable of providing all 
                                                      
20 M. van Creveld, ‘Through the Glass Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War’, 
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2000, pp. 25-44, at pp. 39-40. Smith, The Utility of 
Force, p. 269, 301-5.  
21 D.L. Cingranelli and D.L. Richards, ‘Respect for Human Rights after the End of the 
Cold War’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 5, 1999, pp. 511-534 at p. 511. Smith, 
The Utility of Force, p. 267. 




the functions and services usually associated with that status. Where a state is 
weak, other non-state entities can take over some, or virtually all, of those 
statehood functions. In these conflicts over statehood, the belligerents may no 
longer have the structured relationship states had while fighting each other in 
interstate war. So many rules and paradigms of war and international relations 
may no longer be applicable in these conflicts.23 But, the state remains of 
central importance and ‘as such, a quasi state and structure position emerged’ 
in these conflicts, or as the outcome of these conflicts.24  
In these statehood conflicts, human rights violations are by no means 
uncommon. Sometimes they are part of the strategy of one or more parties to a 
conflict, or even inherent to their aims.25 To attain their (statehood) goals QSEs 
sometimes commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide, as 
do their state adversaries in order to maintain the status quo. Atrocities in war 
are nothing new, but now they are committed in a time in which, as Rupert 
Smith describes it, force is judged by its morality and legality.26 In the early 
1990s, when the UN Security Council for the first time since its inception had 
the opportunity to act, satellite-television networks made it possible to 
broadcast mass murder almost real-time into the living rooms of Western 
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audiences. This led to what Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld called ‘a 
shift from concern to condemnation’ in the thinking on human rights 
violations.27 
The first modern international criminal courts were established during, or in the 
direct aftermath of some of the ‘most heinous crimes’ that ‘shocked the 
conscience of humanity’. These were atrocities that the international 
community, despite the newfound agreement in the UN Security Council, had 
been unable or unwilling to prevent. These courts were given as one of their 
primary justification the aim to prevent similar atrocities in the future by 
ending impunity. Yet, despite the ongoing attention of scholars and numerous 
studies into the effects of international tribunals, it remains unclear how far, if 
at all, international criminal justice can be successful in attaining its goals of 
stopping and preventing human rights violations.28 As with domestic criminal 
justice, the general preventive effect of international criminal justice is 
extremely hard to determine. No government will make a statement that it 
abandoned plans for genocide because its members are afraid of going to The 
Hague; no rebel leader will admit he renounced human rights violations out of 
fear for the (not so) long arm of international criminal justice; and no guerrilla 
army will acknowledge it could no longer find fighters, or shelter among the 
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population, due to the internalisation of the norms of international criminal law 
among the people among whom it fights. Typically, no one even admits to 
thinking about committing human rights violations, let alone admitting that 
international justice deterred them. But that does not mean that the (possibility 
of) prosecution by international courts has no influence on either the conduct of 
potential offenders, or the capacity to be successful of the organisations in 
whose name these crimes are committed.29 
By holding individuals responsible, international criminal justice aims to 
influence the conduct of individual potential perpetrators. But it also aims to 
have a preventive effect on the entities in whose name crimes are committed. 
Although crimes under international law are neither exclusively committed 
within the context of armed conflict, nor necessarily committed in a joint 
criminal enterprise, they usually are. International tribunals generally focus on 
those crimes that are committed in armed conflict and in the name of an 
organised group or entity.30 Because of their potential impact, and justifications 
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for international criminal justice, it is appropriate to look at the impact 
proceedings have, or could have, on the conduct of entities ordering political 
violence and armed force. International proceedings might impact on both 
entities under control of the state, and those that are not, QSEs – whose 
increasing role in armed conflict played an instrumental role in the rise of 
international criminal justice. International criminal justice might even have 
more influence on the conduct of QSEs, – as opposed to that of states.  
To be successful, those entities ordering the use of armed force need to 
establish and maintain legitimacy for their actions and institutions.31 They have 
to do so primarily within their core constituencies, but parties in conflict also 
need to influence the core constituencies of their opponents, and ultimately 
they also have to create and maintain some legitimacy in the various 
constituencies that together make up the international community. The effect 
international criminal justice can have on the capacity of entities successfully 
to claim legitimacy is significant. It is a function of the impact of changing 
discourse. To gauge how, and how far, international criminal justice influences 
legitimacy, one can assess critical legitimacy moments, those moments when 
the legitimacy of an entity, its actions or institutions, is challenged in a certain 
group or constituency. By analysing whether international criminal justice 
creates critical legitimacy moments, and by assessing the ability of state-, 
quasi-state-, and supra-national entities to overcome such crises resulting from 
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international criminal justice, one can detect the impact international criminal 
courts and their procedures might have on the capacity of entities to reach their 
aims.  
Every ‘system of authority’ attempts to establish and to cultivate belief in its 
legitimacy.32 QSEs, like state entities, need the ability to create and maintain 
legitimacy in order to be successful in attaining their goals.33 But, unlike states, 
QSEs have to engage in this constant process of legitimation while operating 
on the sidelines of the international system of sovereign states. They lack the 
formal bases of legitimacy sovereign states usually can rely on. At the very 
least, QSEs lack the basis of recognition as a sovereign state among equals, 
and, typically, they are not eligible for membership of intergovernmental 
organisations and other forums in which state representatives meet and consult 
each other.34 The individual leaders and operatives of QSEs, however, are 
subject to international criminal justice. This dissertation looks at how this 
system, which aims to influence the behaviour of all potential violators of 
international criminal justice, whether connected to the state or not, influences 
the legitimacy of actors in armed conflicts. It is argued that when judgement is 
passed over the legality of conduct in conflict, this has an impact on the 
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legitimacy of the aims and actions of the QSE, or State, these individuals 
represent, at least, in some of the key constituencies involved. 
The process of providing legitimisation for the use of armed force is central to 
contemporary armed conflict, and so, for the entity that is ordering the use of 
force, whether that entity is a state government, or any other type of 
organisation. To be successful in contemporary warfare, the idea that superior 
will (when properly deployed) can defeat greater economic and military power 
is still central. But, victory can only be achieved by superior use of all available 
networks and effectively deployed force to send the desired messages to the 
multiple constituencies relevant in the conflict.35 More important, the 
multidimensional character of contemporary armed conflict makes the most 
judicious use and deployment of force central to successfully ensuring 
legitimacy for the use of armed force and for the organisation itself.36 
The concept of legitimacy is complicated, and its existence, in a certain 
constituency, and at a certain time, is is extremely hard to gauge positively. 
The effects of international criminal justice are equally hard to predict and 
measure. However, where legitimacy and international criminal justice come 
together, they both become more tangible. In this dissertation, I argue that 
legitimacy is a prerequisite for QSE success, and I explore where and when 
international criminal justice influences the capabilities of QSEs to create and 
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maintain legitimacy in certain constituencies. It can be expected that legitimacy 
crises will typically have a discernible effect on the conduct of QSEs and their 
legitimising narratives.37 It is, therefore, likely that it is in changes, whether in 
actions or narratives, in crises that the influence of international criminal 
justice can be discerned. Consequently, by focusing on legitimacy crises that 
are the result of the application of international criminal law by an international 
tribunal, and by analysing how, or if, these crises were overcome, this 
dissertation seeks to answer the question: What is the impact of international 
criminal justice on the capacity of quasi-state entities to maintain and create 
legitimacy for their actions and institutions?  In the remainder of this 
dissertation, I argue that international criminal justice can present critical 
challenges that affect the legitimacy of quasi-state entities, directly or 
indirectly, thereby affecting their prospects of success. By assessing the 
influence of international criminal justice on the capacity of some of the most 
important actors in contemporary armed conflict, QSEs, to create and maintain 
legitimacy, a prerequisite for their success, I argue that it is possible to 
distinguish the systematic impact of international tribunals on the outcomes of 
armed conflicts. In order to do so, this dissertation will assess three different 
QSEs, in three different conflicts, in relation to three different international 
judicial bodies. These foci of investigation have been chosen precisely because 
they serve to explore the effects of three different international courts or 
tribunals on three different conflicts: Kosovo’s KLA and the ICTY, Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah and the STL, and Mali’s MNLA and the ICC. 
                                                      




FRAMEWORK AND METHODS  
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the influence of international criminal 
justice on the capacity of QSEs to create and maintain legitimacy. This is a 
process that is difficult to analyse, or even to prove its existence. However, as I 
will argue, there are ways to overcome these problems. First, the effectiveness 
of international criminal justice is very hard to gauge, whether it is approached 
from the perspective of special prevention, general prevention, or retribution. 
Many scholars tried to determine the effects of international criminal justice 
on, for instance, post-conflict state building, or whether international 
prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is working 
towards the prevention of these crimes. However, very few studies reached 
conclusive answers.38 Some argue that no conclusions can be reached because 
one cannot ‘prove the state of mind of a perpetrator of these crimes’.39 If 
conclusions are reached at all, they are usually very cautious, Theodor Meron, 
for instance, concludes that: ‘There is some evidence, albeit anecdotal and 
uncertain, that the ad hoc tribunals and the prospects for the establishment of 
the ICC have had some deterrent effect on violations’.40 Secondly, the 
legitimacy of an entity, its institutions and actions, among a certain group and 
at a certain moment, is equally hard to determine, especially in its positive 
form. Legitimacy is not a constant. It is not a static concept but a constantly 
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changing ‘perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate’.41 This quality, or phenomenon, which is the outcome 
of the process of legitimation, in which claims of legitimacy are either accepted 
or rejected by a certain constituency at a certain point in time, is very hard to 
distinguish.42  
In the following chapter, I argue that, although both the effects of international 
criminal justice and the impact on legitimisation are very hard to gauge 
independently, it is possible to detect both the intended and unintended effects 
of international criminal justice on the capacities of QSEs by researching 
legitimacy crises, the point where international criminal justice and legitimacy 
come together. Therefore, the main tool used to assess the influence of 
international criminal justice on the legitimacy of QSEs will be interpretation 
of legitimacy crises, or critical legitimacy moments. Building on Jürgen 
Habermas, I shall use a critical legitimacy theory. Habermas describes that 
legitimacy crises can best be discerned at ‘the moment crisis management 
fails’.43 This signifies a ‘turning point’ when there are fewer means available to 
overcome the crisis and adapt, than there are possibilities for problem 
solving.44  
Taking a ‘critical legitimacy’ approach, to bring to light the impact of 
international criminal justice, the legitimating capacities of QSEs have to be 
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described, the constituencies they need to influence distinguished, and 
legitimacy crises recognised. David Beetham pointed out that evidence of 
legitimacy has to be interpreted carefully and on occasion may prove 
contradictory, but that the evidence is available to be seen in the public 
domain, and not in the ‘private recesses of people’s minds’.45 This is not to say 
this evidence will always be easy to find. Legitimacy in its positive form is 
extremely difficult to distinguish: it is best seen when and where it is 
questioned.46 Therefore, in order to learn something about legitimacy, its 
workings, and how and when it is lost and gained, one has to interpret the 
signals of legitimacy crisis.  
The focus of this dissertation is on how legitimacy crises resulting from 
international criminal justice affect QSEs. When state-entities opposed to QSEs 
face a legitimacy crisis provoked by international criminal justice, this has to 
be taken into account. Legitimacy is not a zero sum game. But, when one 
narrative loses its attractiveness in a certain group, the entity offering an 
alternative narrative will, typically, gain legitimacy. Changing QSE narratives 
and actions, that pre-empt the expected effects of international criminal justice, 
cannot be disregarded. When an entity finds itself in a spiral of legitimacy 
crisis, it loses the capability simultaneously to engage in the process of 
legitimation in all relevant constituencies. Yet, it may be able to bolster belief 
in its legitimacy in one group, while losing it in another. Therefore, choices for 
narratives aimed at one group in which legitimacy is sought, rather than at 
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another group, could tell us something about the effect of international criminal 
justice. Finally, one has to keep in mind that international criminal justice is 
only one of myriad factors within and beyond the control of QSEs that could 
affect their legitimating capacity. Legitimacy crises caused by factors other 
than international criminal justice are not the primary focus of this dissertation, 
but, where relevant for the explanation of the workings of legitimacy and the 
influence of international criminal justice on it, will be addressed.  
Legitimacy depends on narratives. These legitimising narratives are aimed at 
various constituencies in which legitimacy is sought and in order to be 
successful they have to fit existing beliefs and the experiences of any given 
group.47 Due to the rise of modern mass media and the Internet, and in the 
increasingly interconnected world technology created, every group that can, or 
must be influenced is increasingly subject to the same messages.48 The 
messages and actions that constitute those narratives, and their counter-
narratives, can usually be found in the public domain. When narratives are no 
longer accepted, competing narratives start to prevail, or it can be seen that the 
legitimacy of an entity, its actions or institutions are severely questioned in 
certain groups. It is in those critical moments that the indicators of legitimacy 
can be detected. However, in an interconnected world, the same message will 
be available and often reach various audiences, making it harder – and 
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sometimes impossible – to send different legitimating messages to different 
audiences simultaneously.  
The interpretation of messages and actions, and how far these narratives will be 
accepted (and are successful in creating and maintaining legitimacy), will 
differ among different groups and at different times. The different impact 
narratives have on different groups, not in the least, are the result of the fact 
that pre-existing ideas, beliefs and experiences of various constituencies differ. 
Yet, it is hard to put one’s finger on exactly why a claim to legitimacy is 
accepted. At most one can hope to be able to determine whether claims are 
accepted, although it is easier to see when they are not, or are no longer, 
accepted. It is important to consider the pre-existing ideas and experiences of a 
particular constituency, in order to place legitimating narratives in perspective 
or, rather, place the same narrative in different perspectives. One should look at 
the aim of narratives, what the entity seeking legitimacy expected would be the 
outcome of their actions and statements. This should lead to understanding of 
the effect that the narratives provided by QSEs, their antagonists and various 
relevant third parties have on different constituencies, and also, ultimately, by 
looking at the use and impact of international criminal justice narratives 
provided by international tribunals and others, and the critical legitimacy 
challenges that result from them, to understanding the impact of these 




THE THESIS  
In this dissertation, I will assess the empirical evidence of behavioural change 
and the changing capabilities of one type of actor, QSEs, under the influence of 
one factor, international criminal justice, in order to make the impact of 
international criminal justice on QSEs visible. Consequently, the aim of this 
dissertation is not to try to gauge the effectiveness of international mechanisms 
to prosecute war crimes per se. The primary aim here is not to assess how far 
international criminal tribunals can be justified in terms of their stated aims, 
whether the purpose of their establishment was retribution, general prevention, 
or special prevention. This dissertation will discuss some of the contingent 
effects of international criminal justice and international judicial intervention, 
especially on the justifications of the use of armed force. I will focus on the 
consequences of proceedings, on empirical evidence of the effects of 
international criminal justice, in particular, on the legitimating capabilities of 
QSEs. However, assessing the effect of international criminal justice on QSEs 
might be able to tell us something about the wider implications of international 
criminal justice and its potential to reach its aims and justifications. Close 
assessment of both international criminal justice and QSEs is relevant to 
understanding contemporary conflict. Changes in the field of international 
criminal justice and the role of quasi-state entities in the international system 
give rise both to philosophical questions and to practical issues regarding the 
nexus of law and politics. Changing notions of sovereignty, nations and 
statehood will, therefore, be discussed. In this dissertation, I will show that, 




and the involvement of entities that are best described as ‘quasi-state entities’, 
developments were heavily influenced by the changing political reality after 
the end of the Cold War, and that these developments are interconnected. 
Studying international law and international relations together is as relevant 
today, as it was in 1993, when Anne-Marie Slaughter proclaimed that the ‘two 
disciplines that study the laws of state behaviour [should] seek to learn from 
one another’.49 When Slaughter called for international law and international 
politics to be studied together, she referred to what we would now call 
‘classical’ international law – the law that governs the relationships, rights, and 
responsibilities of states.50 It was only a month after the publication of her 
‘Dual Agenda’ that the ICTY was established, marking the beginning of the re-
incarnation of international criminal justice.51 Yet, her main arguments hold 
equal validity with regard to international criminal law. For instance, 
Slaughter’s observation that ‘political scientists must revise their models to 
take account of legal variables’ if ‘international legal rules provide incentives 
or constraints capable of producing outcomes significantly different from those 
                                                      
49 Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, p. 
205.  
50 Idem. p. 205-206. A.M. Slaughter, ’International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 6, no. 1, 1995, pp. 503-538, at p. 503.  
51 Slaughter’s ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ was 
first published in April 1993. On 25 May 1993 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
827, by which it established the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, more commonly referred to as the 




that a pure power theory would predict’.52 Or, on the other hand, that: ‘the 
postulates developed by political scientists concerning patterns and regularities 
in state behavior must afford a foundation and framework for legal efforts to 
regulate that behavior’.53 Although the norms of international criminal law, like 
those of classic international law, came into being through the consensus of 
sovereign states, the ‘incentives or constraints’ international criminal law 
provide seek not only to regulate the behaviour of states, but of all potential 
subjects of international criminal law.54 The lessons of political science 
regarding patterns and the behaviour of political actors can, and should, be 
used to analyse the impact of international criminal justice on various actors, 
state- and non-state actors alike.  
The idea that international criminal prosecutions can have an effect on the 
legitimacy of actors in war, as such, has been noted in passing. For instance, 
Otto Triffterer has pointed to the examples of Bosnian-Serb leaders Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić to illustrate that the ICTY ‘indictments and 
international warrants of arrest [for Karadžić and Mladić] resulted in a loss of 
political and military power’ and that ‘by thus abolishing a condition for 
committing the crimes mentioned in their indictments, these cases have a 
strong preventive effect on the two indicted persons’.55 Triffterer noted that 
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individuals were limited in their ability to act in any official capacity as they 
could not travel abroad without fear of arrest ‘and that entrusting such 
individuals with official functions can endanger the international reputation of 
their state’.56 Priscilla Hayner argued that the Special Court for Sierra Leone's 
indictment of Liberian President Charles Taylor in 2003 ‘de-legitimised 
Taylor, both domestically and internationally’.57 Hayner links the indictment to 
the removal of any last support for him from international partners and 
describes that ‘once it was evident that he could not rely on international 
support, and especially that the US had publicly turned against him, it became 
clear that he would have to leave the presidency’. She adds that it ‘affected the 
morale of his own troops, which was already low because the soldiers had not 
been paid in months’.58 However, she neither suggests how legitimacy can be 
detected, nor how it had impacted on the state institutions Taylor represented. 
Before 1993, war criminals had almost nothing to fear from international law. 
By 2013 there were ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals and the permanent ICC 
prosecuting crimes under international law, and the international Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon prosecuting crimes under domestic law in an 
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international setting. Chapter II of this dissertation will first describe these 
developments in international criminal justice, as well as the history of 
international criminal justice and the international political environment that 
made these changes possible. It will then give a short oversight of the 
establishment of the ICTY, the ICC and the STL. Although primarily assessing 
the effect of international criminal justice, rather than how far it succeeds in 
reaching its aims, the final part of this chapter will analyse the aims of 
international criminal justice. It will illustrate how international courts are 
justified and give an overview of research measuring the effectiveness of 
international legal mechanisms for prosecuting war crimes, as well as the 
problems such research encountered.  
In Chapter III, the notion of a ‘quasi-state entity’ (QSE) will be explored. The 
concept of quasi-state entities will be introduced and the chapter will expound 
on why it is advantageous to name this type of actor by the defining 
characteristics they have in common; their pursuit of ‘a piece of the statehood 
cake’, the ability of QSEs to exercise some of the functions usually associated 
with statehood, and the willingness to deploy or threaten with armed force to 
reach their objectives.59 The chapter will explain how the concept of a QSE, 
despite the overlap with nationalist movements, de facto states and rebels or 
insurgents is a distinct and useful concept. It will provide background on how 
this type of actors, QSEs, became key actors in contemporary conflict and 
describe the paradigm shift after the end of the Cold War. This chapter aims to 
                                                      




assess the behaviour of QSEs in a world that, although changed, remains 
dominated by, and centred on, sovereign states. It will consider different forms 
of QSE and how these evolved in various statehood clashes. Furthermore the 
chapter seeks to explain the notion of legitimacy as a factor for QSE success. 
To understand why it is useful to assess the influence of international criminal 
justice on legitimacy, one has to realise that legitimacy is a highly complex 
concept, used in many different ways. Definitional problems regarding 
legitimacy will be discussed in a review of literature on the concept. This part 
of the chapter aims to demonstrate why the capacity to create and maintain 
legitimacy is imperative for any entity claiming authority, in this case, QSEs. 
The problems of identifying legitimacy will be discussed in this section, as 
well as where, when, how, and why legitimacy is gained, or lost. The concept 
of legitimacy crisis, as described by Jürgen Habermas, will be examined. His 
theory of critical legitimacy moments is used both to identify the existence of 
legitimacy and to explain its complex workings. The final part of this chapter 
will show how the notion of the Trinity3(+), as introduced by James Gow, can 
be used to illustrate the various constituencies that have to be influenced.60 
Moreover, it will deal with the problem of providing narratives that have to 
influence the different relevant constituencies simultaneously.  
The chapters on international criminal justice, QSEs and legitimacy provide a 
foundation for assessing the influence of international criminal justice on the 
legitimating capacities of QSEs. It will provide a framework in which to detect 
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changes in legitimacy and the influence on legitimacy in different 
constituencies. Critical legitimacy theory will be used to assess the impact of 
the ICTY, the ICC, and the STL on the capacity to create and maintain that 
legitimacy in various domestic and international constituencies of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo, the National Movement for the Liberation 
of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali, and Hezbollah in Lebanon respectively.  
Chapter IV will assess the impact of procedures at the ICTY on the legitimacy 
of QSEs in Kosovo and the Kosovo statehood project. In order to do so, the 
first part will describe the history of the ICTY, its jurisdiction and its 
functioning since its establishment. The chapter will continue to sketch the 
history of Kosovo, pivotal to understanding the ethnic tensions between 
Kosovo’s Albanian population and Serbs and the rise of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army. Part 3 will analyse the Kosovo war, both the KLA’s fight against the 
Yugoslav Army and the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1999. It will examine the impact of the indictment of Slobodan 
Milošević by the ICTY for crimes against humanity in May 1999, during the 
height of the conflict, on the legitimacy of the KLA. The Chapter will conclude 
with an analysis of how, despite its somewhat accidental character, this 
indictment became the Tribunal’s most significant activity regarding Kosovo, 
and indirectly transformed the course of the Kosovo project and the prospects 
of the KLA and Kosovo’ ambition of a new state in international society.  
The impact of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the legitimating capacity of 




consider the establishment of the STL, its limited functions and jurisdiction, 
and the operation of the Tribunal during the first years of its existence. The 
second part of the chapter will provide background to demonstrate Hezbollah’s 
success in overcoming legitimacy crises. Since its inception, in the 1980s, as a 
radical Shia militia based on Islamic doctrine, Hezbollah made the transition to 
a social organisation and a political party participating in elections. Before the 
establishment of the STL, Hezbollah repeatedly found itself in a position where 
it had to negotiate a crisis to re-legitimise itself as a whole, and particularly its 
military apparatus. The chapter will discuss the assassination of Rafik Hariri, 
an event that not only gave rise to the establishment of the STL, but that 
impacted heavily on all aspects of Lebanese politics since, and on the 
subsequent balance of power in the region. Finally it will assess the impact of 
the indictment of four (and eventually five) Hezbollah members on the 
legitimacy of the organisation in various constituencies. However, the efforts 
of Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon to de-legitimise the 
court and the investigation, most notably through the so-called ‘false 
witnesses’ affair, will also be discussed. Moreover, the final part of the chapter 
will look at the use of the leaks by the tribunal and by the UN investigation in 
the counter-narratives of Hezbollah.  
Chapter VI will assess the influence of the ICC on the legitimating capacities 
of the MNLA, in Mali. It will start by discussing the Rome Statute and the ICC 
that it created, as well as the jurisdiction of the Court. This section will also 
assess its image as an ‘African Court’ and the acceptance of self-referrals by 




fighting the government of Mali for an independent Tuareg homeland. The 
organisation briefly took control of northern Mali, in 2012, and declared an 
independent Azawad state, only to be overrun by the Islamist militants it had 
allied itself to at the beginning of the conflict soon after. No member of the 
MNLA was indicted with war crimes, by the end of 2013; however, the Malian 
government self-referred the situation in northern Mali to the ICC, in July 
2012, in an attempt to delegitimise the QSEs that took control over large parts 
of its territory. The crimes committed in northern Mali, especially by the 
factions that took control of the major cities from the MNLA, and the 
investigation opened by the ICC, provided a narrative that fitted with pre-
existing ideas in many international constituencies and reinforced existing 
ideas about the northern Mali QSEs.  
Besides the empirical evidence found by studying the different courts and the 
different QSEs, legitimising narratives and counter narratives, this dissertation 
will contribute to knowledge in the field of international criminal justice, and 
on quasi-state entities and legitimacy. This dissertation builds on, and further 
develops, existing research on critical legitimacy. It introduces the concept of 
the quasi-state entity. This is a useful concept as by defining these groups 
according to their goals and aspirations, and the functions they provide, and 
acknowledging them as parties in conflicts over ‘statehood’ and ‘statehood 
functions’ will enhance understanding of these entities. Furthermore the 
dissertation links international criminal justice to QSEs. It does so by looking 
at the de facto effects of international criminal justice, instead of its 




courts and tribunals. Although international criminal justice is a relatively 
recent factor, entities competing with states over statehood functions 
increasingly have to take the legal implications of their actions into 
consideration. Moreover, both their members and individuals connected to 
their state antagonists increasingly have to face the legal consequences of their 
actions. Most important, a close assessment of the legitimising narratives of 
QSEs, counter narratives, and the messages sent by international criminal 
justice with which QSEs have to deal, and their ability to overcome legitimacy 




CHAPTER II.                                                           
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
The present incarnation of international criminal justice could come to life 
when existing elements met new circumstances in the early 1990s. Combined, 
these elements and circumstances created a hospitable environment for 
international mechanisms to prosecute individuals for violations of 
international law to develop. A pre-existing body of international criminal law 
– including the Geneva Conventions –, the UN Charter – including its Chapter 
VII system – and a precedent – in the form of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
–, were all preconditions for the establishments of international criminal courts 
and tribunals, as we now know them.1 The end of the Cold War also revealed 
that inter-state wars no longer were the most imminent threat to peace and 
security, but conflicts within states, or about statehood, with at least one of the 
belligerents being a Quasi-State Entity. Yet, it was the unprecedented level of 
agreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, during 
a time in which human rights were grossly violated in a number of conflicts, 
                                                      
1 Until the 1990s ‘international criminal law’ was often used to describe domestic law 
dealing with cross-border crime, a field of law that is now usually termed ‘transnational 
crime’. The scope of international crimes can be determined in different ways; the ICC 
statute claims jurisdiction over ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’; it can also be defined by its source, to include all crimes created 
by international law, whether laws created by treaty, that part of customary law, general 
principles of law, or jurisprudence of international courts. R. Cryer (et al.), An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge: Cambridge 




that created the environment in which international criminal justice could 
emerge. Not least, this was because the international community proved 
unable, or unwilling, to prevent those violations while satellite television 
networks made the images of the atrocities committed almost instantly 
available to audiences around the world – this is discussed below in the context 
of Post-Cold War international politics.  
Important processes were set in motion in those first years of the 1990s. The 
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Arising from this the foundation was 
laid for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, leading to its 
signing in 1998, and entry into force, in 2002. The justification for these 
international mechanisms to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, primarily depend on forward-looking considerations. 
International tribunals were established with the following objectives; to 
‘contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively 
redressed’; or to ‘contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace’.2 Or, 
in the case of the ICC, one of the stated purposes is ‘to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes’.3 The first part of this chapter deals with the history 
of international criminal justice and the circumstances under which modern 
mechanisms to prosecute crimes under international law could be established. 
                                                      
2 UN Security Council Resolution 827, 25 May 1993. 
3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 




The second part assesses the purposes that have been attributed to these 
mechanisms of international criminal justice. Moreover, it will look at the 
various ways the effects of international criminal prosecutions have been 
assessed  
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
The first and main prerequisite for international criminal justice is the existence 
of a body of international criminal law.4 Nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine 
praevia lege poenali, the principle that no crime can exist, and no punishment 
is lawful without a previous penal law, prevents prosecution based on ex post 
facto norms.5 However, an extensive body of international criminal law existed 
by the 1990s. In fact, it had a history that pre-dated international criminal 
justice by centuries.6 Almost every civilisation has put some constraints both 
on the reasons to go to war, and on the means and methods of warfare that are 
                                                      
4 R. C. Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise 
in Law, Politics and Diplomacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 21. 
5 The legal maxim that a crime can only exist, and can only be punished, if a previously 
existing penal law is violated was first codified in the Bavarian Code of 1813 by Paul von 
Feuerbach and has been incorporated into international criminal law.  
6 Although it could be argued that the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474, for atrocities 
committed during the occupation of Breisach, by an ad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman 
Empire, was the first case of international criminal justice. For more on von Hagenbach 
see: W. A. Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 1 and; E. Greppi, ‘The Evolution of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility under International Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 




deemed acceptable. Both jus ad bellum, the law regarding the legality of 
waging war, and jus in bello, the law concerning the legal limits to conduct in 
war, have a long tradition in customary and codified international law, and 
have been subject to the attention of scholars and legal experts since the fifth 
century BC.7 Aristotle studied what constitutes a just war. His work inspired 
Augustine of Hippo, in the fourth century, on whose work Thomas Aquinas, in 
turn, further built, when he defined conditions under which war could be just, 
in the thirteenth century. In Europe, rules of chivalry developed, in the late 
medieval period, and between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, jurists 
like Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, and Samuel Pufendorf further 
expounded upon jus in bello and jus ad bellum.8 In the early seventeenth 
century, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), the Dutch jurist, Remonstrant theologian, 
scholar, and diplomat, noticed ‘a licentiousness in regard to war, which even 
barbarous nations ought to be ashamed of’.9 Although deeply convinced of the 
existence of a law common to all nations concerning both the declaration and 
the conduct in war, the little reverence Grotius noticed for these laws in the 
                                                      
7 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Perspectives on International Justice’, Virginia Journal of International 
Law, vol. 50, no. 2, 2010, pp. 269-323 at p. 285. see more generally on the history of 
international humanitarian law: M.C. Bassiouni, ‘The Evolution of International 
Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements’, In: M.C. Bassiouni (ed.) A Manual on 
International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements, Ardsley-on-Hudson, 
N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 2000.  
8 A. Neier, ‘International Criminal Justice: Developing into a Deterrent’, Openspace, Open 
Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 5 March 2012, pp 6-10, p. 8. Bassiouni, 
‘Perspective on International Justice’, p. 285. see also: S. Neff, ‘A Short History of 
International Law’, in: M. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, pp. 29-55.  




Christian world incited him to write his treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis, On the 
Law of War and Peace, first published in 1625.10 
While norms of customary international law and later codifications of laws of 
war continued to develop over centuries, they remained equally disregarded as 
in 1625. Although the legal norms on conduct in war existed, there were no 
mechanisms in place to prosecute those violating these norms. Despite the 
continuing attention scholars devoted to laws and norms of war, no 
mechanisms of international criminal justice were established. This situation 
remained even when the main codifications of the norms of modern 
international humanitarian law took place in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, focussed on 
protecting civilians and prisoners in war, and the First and Second Hague 
Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 let to the conventions’ regulating the 
means and methods of warfare.11 Yet, the existence of a body of humanitarian 
                                                      
10 ‘Ego cum ob eas quas iam dixi rationes compertissimum haberem, esse aliquod inter 
populos ius commune quod et ad bella et in bellis valeret, cur de eo instituerem 
scriptionem causas habui multas ac graves. Videbam per Christianum orbem vel barbaris 
gentibus pudendam bellandi licentiam’. (Now for my part, being fully assured, by the 
reasons I have already given, that there is some right common to all nations, which takes 
place both in the preparations and in the course of war, I had many and weighty reasons 
inducing me to write a treatise upon it. I observed throughout the Christian World a 
licentiousness in regard to war, which even barbarous nations ought to be ashamed of. ) H. 
Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1939, (ed. B.J.A. de Kanter-van 
Hettinga Tromp),(First Published 1625) Prolegomena X, p.17; Translation: H. Grotius, 
The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an Introduction by R. Tuck, from the 
edition by J. Barbeyrac, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 1, Preliminary Discourses.  




law did not necessarily mean that attempts to prosecute individuals for 
violations of that law, in the first decades of the 20th century, would be 
successful.12 In the aftermath of the First World War, a proposal to create an 
‘Allied High Tribunal’ to try violations of the ‘laws and customs of war’ and 
‘the laws of humanity’ failed because US and Japanese representatives doubted 
whether penal law was applicable.13 Although the Treaty of Versailles 
provided for Kaiser Wilhelm II to be ‘publicly arraigned’ for ‘a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’ this failed to 
materialise due to the refusal of the Netherlands, where he took exile, to hand 
him over to the Allies.14 As part of the penalties, the Allied powers also 
demanded the extradition to ‘military tribunals persons accused of having 
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war’.15 A list of at least 
1590 German suspects was submitted, including senior officers and political 
leaders, wanted for judgement before an international tribunal.16 However, 
after nationalist street protests in Germany, extradition was suspended on 
request of the German government, and none of the accused was extradited.17 
                                                      
12 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, p. 22 
13 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, Report of the Commission on the Preliminary Peace Conference, 29 March, 
1919, Reprinted in: American Journal of International Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1920, pp. 95-
154, p. 128. Cryer An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 92. 
Bassiouni, ‘Perspective on International Justice’, p. 302-303. 
14 Cryer, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 92. Treaty of 
Versailles, 28 June 1919, Part VII ‘Penalties’, Art. 227.  
15 Treaty of Versailles, Part VII ‘Penalties’, Art. 229. 
16 A. Kramer, ‘The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig’, 
European Review, vol. 14, no. 4, 2006, pp. 441-455, p. 446.  




Instead, the Leipzig War Crimes Trial was held before the German Supreme 
Court in 1921. This only prosecuted 45 men. Only ten of these were convicted 
and the ten only received short prison sentences.18 For the Allies, the trial 
turned out to be wholly unsatisfactory, as the prosecution of a few low-ranking 
individuals for incidental crimes seemed to exonerate all others for collective 
crimes committed.19 After the occupation of Constantinople, the Allied Powers 
forced the post-war Turkish government, in the same fashion, to court-martial 
those responsible for, what was then called, the ‘Armenian Massacre’, which 
they had branded as ‘crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization’ as 
early as 1915.20 In both cases the Allies, at some point, demanded an 
international tribunal, and in both cases this failed to materialise.21 The failure 
of the Leipzig and Istanbul trials did however shape later prosecutions for war 
crimes.22  
After the Second World War, an important precedent for later mechanisms to 
prosecute human rights violations was set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. 
The Holocaust and other atrocities committed by the Nazi regime called for the 
punishment of its military and civilian leaders.23 Total victory of the allied 
powers, the occupation of Germany and Japan, the ‘denazification’ of 
                                                      
18 Ibid.  
19 Idem, p. 449-450. 
20 Idem. p. 441. Telegram sent by the US Department of State to the US Embassy in 
Constantinople, 29 May 1915, containing the Allied joint declaration of 24 May 1915. 
21 Kramer, ‘The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials’, p. 442, p. 444 
22 Idem. p. 451. 




Germany, and the founding of the United Nations, made a judicial tribunal 
‘both necessary and feasible’.24 At the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, twenty-eight Japanese war criminals were brought to trial.25 The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) prosecuted twenty-two 
political, military, and economic leaders of Nazi Germany for crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, or conspiracy to commit those 
crimes.26 Despite accusations of imposing victor’s justice, ‘Nuremberg’ set an 
important precedent for the later incarnation of international criminal justice. 
Most important, the IMT penetrated what Henry King called ‘the veil of 
national sovereignty’.27 According to King, the IMT did so by recognising that 
individuals have international human rights, even if the sovereign denies them 
those rights, and that state authorization provides no cover for the violations of 
those rights; and by judging that individuals have obligations under 
international law that go above, and might be contrary to, obligations to the 
sovereign state, and that they can be punished internationally for violating 
these obligations.28 Moreover, the International Military Tribunals were 
‘international’ in that the judges and prosecutors of the IMTs were nationals of 
                                                      
24 R. Overy, ‘The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making’, in P. Sands (ed.) 
From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.5. Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, p. 23 
25 Bassiouni, ‘Perspectives on International Justice’, p. 312 
26 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 1, Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(London Charter), Art. 6  
27 H.T. King, ‘Nuremberg and Sovereignty’, Case Western Reserve Journal of 





the allied powers, and prosecuted nationals of the axis powers, although the 
tribunals were not established internationally, but by the Allied powers after 
their victory over the Axis powers.29  
The aftermath of World War II and the procedures at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
did lead to further codification of international norms, most notably those 
concerning crimes against humanity and genocide. In 1948, the General 
Assembly, in Resolution 260, adopted the Genocide Convention in which 
genocide was defined and contracting parties agreed genocide would be a 
crime under international law.30 The four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 revised the three earlier treaties from 1864, 1906 and 1929, and adopted a 
fourth convention defining humanitarian protections for civilians in war.31 
Article 13 of the UN Charter states that the General Assembly ‘shall initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of […] encouraging the 
                                                      
29 For more on the establishment of the IMTs and their impact on modern international 
criminal justice mechanisms, see: J. Gow, War and War Crimes: The Military, Legitimacy 
and Success in Armed Conflict, London: Hurst and Co, 2013, pp. 51-54, 59.  
30 UN General Assembly Resolution 260 of 9 December 1948. Although now generally 
accepted as a norm of jus cogens, initially many states did not ratify the treaty. The United 
States, for instance, only ratified the Genocide Convention in 1986, much to the credit of 
Senator William Proxmire, who gave a speech calling for ratification of the Genocide 
Convention every morning the US Senate was in session between 1967 and 1986 (Time, 
15 December 2005, Senator William Proxmire: A Personal Appreciation, by Douglas 
Waller). Ironically, Proxmire mirrored the persistence of Cato the Elder ending every 
speech with: ‘Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam‘, calling for what 
anachronistically would be called genocide of Carthagians that took place in 149 BC.  
31 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 




progressive development of international law and its codification’.32 And it was 
in that light that in 1950 the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the 
Nuremberg Principles, seven principles on war crimes, of which principle VI 
sets out that crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are 
crimes under international law.33 In 1977, two of the three additional protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions were adopted, relating to the protection of victims 
of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and non-international armed 
conflicts (Protocol II).34  
The horrors of World War II also led to the establishment of the UN itself. The 
UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, reflecting a 
determination – among other things – to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights’ and ‘establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained’.35 However, both Dan Plesch and Mark Mazower, among others, 
argue that the actual birth of the UN was the adoption of the ‘Declaration by 
United Nations’ in Washington D.C., on 1 January 1942, and that there is 
                                                      
32 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, Art. 13(1) 
33 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950, principle VI. (The International Law Commission 
is a body of experts named by the United Nations General Assembly to work towards the 
‘promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification’ 
(Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Law Commission)) 
34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 




continuity between the wartime United Nations, and the post-war United 
Nations Organisation as created by the Charter.36 The UN inherited most of the 
League of Nations institutions, but ‘was above all a means of keeping the 
wartime coalition of Great Powers intact’.37 The wartime origin of the new 
organisation was soon obscured, so that it could start with a clean slate as a 
peace organisation, and be put on ‘on a pedestal of moral virtue’.38 This was 
easily done as the losers of WWII rather forgot that part of history, and the 
USSR and US soon started to dislike the idea that they found the UN together 
as allies.39 Yet the origins of the UN as a fighting alliance can still be seen in 
the system of the Charter, which resonates that it was ‘created as an 
organisation with an expectation both that compromise between the powerful 
was necessary and that violence might again have to be met with violence’.40 
The system of the Charter provides for force to be used in certain 
circumstances, but often only if agreement between the great powers can be 
reached.  
The system of measures the UN Security Council can take that the Charter 
provided for was instrumental for international criminal justice, as we now 
                                                      
36 D. Plesch, ’How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace’, Global 
Society, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, pp. 137-158, p. 137. D. Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: 
How the Allies Won World War II and Forged Peace, London: I.B. Taurus, 2011, p. 8-9. 
M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, New York: Penguin Press, 
2012, p. 206. 
37 Mazower, Governing the World, p. 212. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN, p. 8-9. 




know it, to come to existence. The Charter codified the principle of state 
sovereignty – the principle on which the international state system had been 
built since the peace of Westphalia in Article 2(4). But, in Chapter VII, it 
provided for a mechanism in case these norms were violated. The Charter 
codified the then already existing right of individual, or collective self-defence 
as an exception to the principle of non-intervention in Article 51. Yet, the 
Chapter VII mechanism, in Article 39, grants the Security Council the power to 
determine the existence of any ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression’. Moreover it gives the Council the possibility to ask Members to 
take non-military (Article 41) and military (Article 42) measures to restore 
international peace and security.41 Eventually, the Chapter VII system proved 
to become instrumental in the establishment of the first modern international 
criminal tribunals: in the 1990s the ICTY and ICTR would be established as 
measures to maintain and restore international peace and security.42  
After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the subsequent additions to the codified 
body of international criminal law, and the establishment of the UN system, it 
took over 40-years before these mechanisms of international criminal justice 
were established. The ink of the UN Charter was not even dry, when 
animosities between Eastern and Western blocs paralysed the Security Council 
                                                      
41 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII. 
42 For a discussion on the ICTY as a measure to ‘restore and maintain’ rather than 
‘restore’, ‘maintain’, or ‘restore or maintain’ international peace and security, see: M. 
Futamura and J. Gow, ‘The Strategic purpose of the ICTY and international peace and 
security’, in: J. Gow, R. Kerr and Z. Pajić, (2013) Prosecuting War Crimes, London: 




and prevented the system from working as envisaged. This not only prevented 
actions taken under Chapter VII, it also made the prosecution of violations of 
humanitarian law through international judicial institutions virtually 
impossible.43 The period between 1945 and 1990 was marked by countless acts 
of violence that could have been qualified as breaches of the peace, threats to 
the peace or acts of aggression, many of them involving violations of 
international humanitarian law. Yet, during the Cold War, the Security Council 
could only agree to determine a situation a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’ ten times, five of which contained an explicit reference to Chapter 
VII.44  
With the end of the Cold War, 44 years after the signing of the Charter, the 
stalemate in the Security Council came to an end, and the system was put to the 
test almost immediately. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, in 1990, the Council for 
the first time in its existence was able to react in the manner foreseen in the 
Charter.45 It acted with speed and only four days after the invasion imposed a 
                                                      
43 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 9, 1998, pp. 2-17, p. 7. 
44 For a detailed description of Chapter VII actions during the Cold War, see: P. Fifoot, 
‘Functions and powers, and inventions: UN action in respect of human rights and 
humanitarian intervention’ In: N.S. Rodley (ed), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: 
International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London: Brassey’s, 1992, pp. 133-
164, at pp. 148-155. 
45 Although the invasion was clearly an act of aggression, the Security Council in 
Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990 only determined a breach of the peace, probably in the 
hope that Iraq was more likely to negotiate when not condemned for the ‘supreme crime’ 




trade embargo, under Article 41 of the Charter, and affirmed the right to 
collective self-defence in UN Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August 
1990.46 Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 set a deadline for Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait before 15 January 1991 and was the basis for large 
scale military action led by the US, Saudi Arabia, France, and the UK 
(Operation Desert Storm), starting on 17 January 1991.47 40 days later Saddam 
Hussein withdrew from Kuwait. It was also the first time the Council endorsed 
action purely to protect civilians nominally within the sovereign jurisdiction of 
a state when, in Resolution 688, the Council condemned ‘the repression of the 
Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in 
Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international 
peace and security in the region’.48  
The reaction of the Council to the invasion of Kuwait led to widespread 
optimism about its functioning. It renewed hope that the UN Charter would be 
                                                                                                                                                
45 O. Schachter, ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 85, no. 3, 1991, pp. 452-473, p. 453-9. 
46 UN Security Council Resolution 661, 6 August 1990. 
47 Although Resolution 678 refers to Chapter VII as the basis for action, it does not refer to 
an article so it remains unclear whether the action was taken under Article 42 or under the 
principle of self-defence confirmed in Article 51. {{AJW: not quite- needs more 
discussion}} 
48 UN Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991. Although referring to the 
consequences for peace and security outside Iraq this was an important step, France, the 
United Kingdom, and United States with the consent of Iraq used Resolution 688 to 
establish no-fly zones, thereby legitimising already existing ‘safe zones’ to protect 




taken seriously as an instrument of collective responsibility.49 But, the Gulf 
War also made clear that interstate conflicts, such as this, had become 
increasingly exceptional and that the main threat to international stability no 
longer came from states waging war against each other. In January 1992, the 
UN Security Council Heads of State and Government recognised those changes 
when they stated that:  
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability 
in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become 
threats to peace and security. 50 
This formal reinterpretation by the Security Council of what constituted a 
‘threat to international peace and security’ meant that violations of 
international humanitarian law could be formally determined to be such a 
threat. The Council thereby widened the legal possibility for the UN Security 
Council to sanction measures to restore the peace, under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  
Widening the legal possibility of taking measures against violations of 
humanitarian law did not lead to the establishment of mechanisms of 
international criminal justice alone. Although it created the possibility of doing 
so, other factors prompted the establishment of the first international tribunals 
were consequences of the end of the Cold War. The international community 
                                                      
49 Schachter, ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, p. 452.  




was confronted with the horrendous violations of humanitarian law in conflicts 
in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, and also with ‘blue helmets’ who proved 
unable to prevent gross human rights violations and even genocide. Despite the 
hope for a ‘new world order’, the international community demonstrated its 
inability, and/or lack of political will, to prevent the most horrible atrocities 
committed in these conflicts.  
By 1993, the international community had proved unable to stop an ongoing 
war in Yugoslavia, and the horrible atrocities committed in it. The widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law included ‘mass forcible expulsion 
and deportation of civilians’, ‘imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention 
centres’, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances the 
massive, and organised and systematic detention and rape of women.51 The 
Security Council had expressed alarm, and strongly condemned these acts, but 
it had been unable to stop them. In the belief that prosecuting the individuals 
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law ‘would contribute 
to ensuring that such violations were halted and effectively redressed’ The 
Security Council established an International Tribunal, in May 1993.52 The 
Security Council did so Resolution 827, and acting under Chapter VII, as a tool 
                                                      
51 UN Security Council Resolution 771, 13 August 1992. UN Security Council Resolution 
780, 6 October 1992. UN Security Council Resolution 798, 18 December 1992, UN 
Security Council Resolution 808, 22 February 1993  




to restore and maintain peace and security.53 
A year after the establishment of the ICTY, in 1994, this time faced with its 
painful failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council again used 
a Chapter VII resolution to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).54 The genocide in Rwanda started when old conflicts between 
the Hutu and Tutsi’s intensified after the plane of Hutu President Habyarimana 
was shot down by a missile in April 1994. While the conflict in Yugoslavia had 
an international dimension after the constituent republics declared 
independence, the external dimension of Rwanda was limited to refugees 
fleeing the country and militia’s regrouping across the borders. Yet, the 
Rwandan Genocide happened at an incredible speed; 250,000 people were 
killed in the first two weeks of the massacre, and during the 100 days the 
massacre went on, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsi’s and moderate 
Hutu’s were killed.55 All this despite the presence of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda to aid the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords that had been signed less than a year 
earlier to end the Rwandan Civil War. UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo 
Dallaire later described in his book Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure 
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54 S/RES/955, 8 November 1994. 
55 A. Des Forges, Leave No One to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, New York: 
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of Humanity in Rwanda, how an understaffed UNAMIR, with only 270 
soldiers left after the withdrawal of contingents of soldiers from several 
countries, uncertainty about their mandate and the use of force to protect 
civilians, and indecision of the UN, left him powerless to prevent atrocities on 
a massive scale.56  
Both the ICTY and the ICTR came to being by neglect to act and inability to 
prevent gross human rights violations by the international community. But, 
these ad-hoc tribunals also created momentum for further developments in the 
field of international criminal justice. The International Law Commission took 
advantage of this by completing a draft statute for an international criminal 
court.57 However, by the time the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court was signed in 1998, the initial spirit of optimism about the collaboration 
between the five permanent members of the Security Council already had 
started to subside. By the late 1990s ad hoc courts were no longer political 
viable and the international community was suffering from tribunal fatigue.58 
The ICTY and ICTR had not always operated as quickly and effectively during 
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57 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, pp. 25-26. For 
more on the establishment of the ICC, see: Chapter VI, The International Criminal Court: 
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58 R. P. Alford, ‘Proceedings of the Annual Meeting’, American Society of International 
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their first years of existence as many had hoped, and as The Economist had 
predicted, in 1990, ‘the blessed unanimity of the Security Council’ had ended, 
‘along with all that lovely talk about the new world order’.59 The events of 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made the 
environment even less favourable for international criminal justice. While the 
ICTY and ICTR were established under Chapter VII, and re-defined the limits 
of state sovereignty where human rights were violated, hybrid courts like the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia, established in 2001 and 2003 were established after the requests 
of the governments of the states in which they were committed.60  
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), although on the request of the 
government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and pursuant to an agreement 
between the Lebanese government and the UN, was established, by Resolution 
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60 Hybrid (or internationalized) courts combine both international and national features; 
they apply elements of both systems in their procedural and applicable law, and consist of 
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1757 in May 2007.61 The Council had to use its Chapter VII powers again to 
establish a court because the Lebanese government could not reach agreement 
on ratification, but the narrow margin it passed showed hesitance among some 
of its members to do so.  
The Rome Statute provided the ICC with jurisdiction to prosecute the ‘most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’. This 
encompasses war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.62 While ad 
hoc tribunals depended directly on the political will among members of the 
Security Council to establish them, the ICC, being a permanent court, could 
initiate investigations, indict suspects, and prosecute independently. In theory 
this gives the court more ability to act on legal grounds, instead of political 
considerations. This was an enormous step forward for international criminal 
justice, barring the fact that, for the foreseeable future, the Court would lack 
anything closely resembling universal jurisdiction.  
Looking at what was accomplished, by 2013, 122 states had agreed that crimes 
taking place on their territory or committed by their nationals were subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.63 By Resolution 1593, the Security Council referred 
the crimes committed in Darfur to the ICC in 2005.64 And by unanimously 
adopting Resolution 1970 in February 2011, the Security Council referred the 
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crisis in Libya to the ICC.65 Neier notes that while China, Russia and the 
United States are not themselves parties to the Rome Statute their vote in 
favour of the resolution on Libya reflected global acceptance of the role of the 
Court.66  
THE PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
It has been argued that the ad hoc tribunals, which spurred the developments 
made in international criminal justice since the early 1990s, were set up out of 
a sense of guilt and that they should, therefore, be seen as merely symbolic 
gestures.67 It is true that the ICTY and ICTR were established after the 
inability, or lack of will, of the international community to prevent war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
And, even some among those establishing the tribunals, might not have been 
expected them to have much effect.68 Yet, the continuation of these courts and 
the establishment of new courts like the ICC suggest that they are more than 
very expensive symbolic gestures and they have some sort of desired effect.69  
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The high hopes and expectations many people have for the prosecution of war 
criminals and génocidaires, give significant reason to devote attention to the 
potential efficacy of international criminal justice. Arguably, these high hopes 
and expectations are a better reason to look at the effectiveness of international 
criminal justice than the use of resources – in terms of time, money, and 
expertise – it requires. Unsurprisingly, scholars have indeed studied the 
(potential) effectiveness of international criminal justice ever since the first 
modern ad hoc tribunals were established, in the early 1990s. Their 
conclusions however, differ as widely as the methods they use to come to these 
conclusions. This is not surprising, as to come to a conclusion about 
effectiveness, one has to define what the desired results of international 
criminal justice should be, and also to determine whether the capability to 
produce these desired results is sufficient to be considered successful. Most 
arduous, – even when merely assessing the effects of international criminal 
proceedings – one has to find a method to measure their results, and establish a 
causal link between outcomes and the existence of international criminal 
justice.  
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First, different benchmarks for success lead to vastly different conclusions 
about effectiveness. Before looking at the complicated task of measuring the 
effects of international criminal justice, one could wonder at what point 
international prosecution can be considered a success. The ICC admits that the 
Rome Statute embodies high aspirations for the work of the Court.70 Katherine 
Marshall argues that ‘lofty goals have made it difficult for the ICC to meet 
expectations’.71 Steven Freeland rightly remarks, that ‘if success is to be 
regarded as a complete cessation of all wars, and an end to gross violations of 
human rights throughout the world, then it is obvious that the system of 
international criminal justice can never be effective’.72 This would be an unfair 
expectation of international criminal justice. By its very nature, international 
criminal justice operates after the actus reus, the criminal act, so, ending all 
human rights violations is more than can be expected of it. Alternatively, it has 
been suggested that assessing the ‘numbers’ can measure the success of 
international criminal justice. Lillian Barria and Steven Roper, for instance, 
suggest looking at the indictments handed down and the actual numbers of 
individuals apprehended to measure effectiveness.73 By that standard, at least, 
the ICTY and ICTR eventually proved successful.74 Aryeh Neier, among many 
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others, indeed quotes the high numbers of indictees brought to trial to conclude 
that the ad hoc tribunals have been successful.  
However, the numbers of indicted individuals, the percentages of those 
standing trial, or the conviction rate of tribunals, do not paint a complete 
picture of the impact of the proceedings.75 International tribunals are inherently 
selective, they are established to prosecute those ‘most responsible’ for the 
commission of ‘the most heinous’ crimes. This has not always been the case. 
The ICTY, in its early years, prosecuted many individuals who carried out, 
rather than ordered, murderous plans. Trials before any international court, by 
their very nature, will be complex, detailed, lengthy, and require large 
resources in terms of expertise, time, and money.76 International Courts will 
therefore indict only a limited number of the individuals who committed 
crimes under international criminal law; and this will depend on the 
cooperation of states for successful prosecutions.77 In itself, the selectiveness of 
                                                                                                                                                
most notably Joseph Kony and Omar al-Bashir. At that point all 4 suspects indicted by the 
STL remained at large, and the STL made the (in international criminal justice) 
unprecedented step to undertake procedings in absentia. 
75 Although the ICTY apprehended all individualswho remained at large, and the ICTR 
most of them, it took the better part of two decades to bring Ratko Mladić and Radovan 
Karadžić to The Hague. Charles Taylor was eventually apprehended in Nigeria and stood 
trial before the SCSL. But, Omar al- Bashir and Joseph Kony remained at large. It is 
unlikely that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi will ever stand trial in The Hague.  
76 Freeland, ‘The effectiveness of International Criminal Justice’, p.3. 
77 Lacking a police force to arrest suspects, secure evidence and enforce judgments, the 
success of international courts in apprehending and prosecuting those indicted then 
depends on the political will of states. Charles Taylor could only stand trial because 
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international tribunals does say anything about their effectiveness, if the goal is 
to prosecute only those ordering crimes, they can still be effective in reaching 
these goals by prosecuting a limited number of individuals. But, even to 
prosecute only a few perpetrators successfully, the courts depend on states – 
either directly or through the UN – for the funding of these expensive 
proceedings.78 These costs are often quoted in debates over its effectiveness, 
but where some argue that you cannot put a price on justice, others argue that 
nothing costing this much can be worthwhile.79 A debate over the break-even 
point of international criminal justice eventually boils down to a political 
question. Or as Freeland put it: ‘how much international criminal justice are we 
prepared to pay for?’80  
The political question of benchmarks for success aside, different studies also 
attribute different justifications and goals to international criminal justice. 
Success and effectiveness ultimately depend on the goals set. Some argue that 
the justifications and objectives of international criminal justice should be 
derived only from the establishing documents of international courts – that one 
                                                                                                                                                
Ntaganda, served as a general in the DRC Army for years without being arrested and the 
DRC only called for his arrest, after he defected again in 2012. He eventually turned 
himself in at the US Embassy in Kigali with a request to be sent to The Hague. No matter 
the amount of money spent on international criminal justice, without consistent 
cooperation from state authorities, international criminal justice can never be successful. 
78 The high costs of the ICTY and ICTR probably played a role in the funding 
arrangements for the ICC, which has to submit a budget for approval of the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP) every year. ICC Financial Regulations and Rules.  
79 See: Neier, ‘International Criminal Justice: Developing into a Deterrent’. 




should stick to the ‘black letter of the law’.81 Cedric Ryngaert, on the other 
hand, argues that the ‘purpose and mission as interpreted by the tribunal’s 
actors themselves [e.g. the prosecutor as opposed to the political operators 
behind the scenes] should be used as the primary point of reference for an 
effectiveness assessment of the work of the tribunals’.82 There is a wide range 
of other stakeholders, from victims to human rights advocates, from suspects to 
states, and even the international community as a whole. At times, the 
objectives of stakeholders in international criminal justice may play a role in 
proceedings. It has been argued, for instance, that the objectives of victims 
should be taken into consideration by international tribunals.83 Some 
stakeholders indeed exercise considerable influence on proceedings, e.g. States 
Party to the ICC, or members of the Security Council, when referring cases to 
the ICC.84 Yet, the justifications and objectives laid down by political operators 
in establishing documents, and their interpretation by practitioners, are the 
sources primarily shaping international justice and should therefore be the 
primary concern when assessing its impact.85 
                                                      
81 Barria and Roper, ‘How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? p. 349.  
82 Ryngaert, The effectiveness of International Criminal Justice, pp. ix-x. 
83 See: R. Roth and M. Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’, in: Cassese, Gaeta 
and. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Commentary, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1551. M. Rauschenbach and D. Scalia, ‘Victims 
and international criminal justice: a vexed question?’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, vol. 90, no. 870, 2008, pp. 441-459. 
84 Rome Statute Article 13.  




The establishing documents of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC show many 
similarities regarding their justifications and objectives. UN Security Council 
Resolution 827 establishing the ICTY lists as its purpose ‘to bring to justice the 
persons who are responsible [for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law]’, to ‘contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted 
and effectively redressed’, and to ‘contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace’.86 Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR uses the same 
phrasing but attributes to the court the additional aim to ‘contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation’.87 The Rome Statute justifies punishment by 
the International Criminal Court with the affirmation that ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured’ and expresses 
the aim ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus 
to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’.88  
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The justifications and objectives, of international tribunals, as described by the 
courts, generally follow the justifications laid down in their establishing 
documents. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski for 
instance, emphasises that ‘a purpose of sentencing for international crimes’ is 
‘to deter others from committing similar crimes’.89 But the Appeals Chamber 
concurs with its own statement in Prosecutor v. Tadic that ‘this factor must not 
be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences to be 
imposed on persons convicted by the International Tribunal’.90 The Appeals 
Chamber explains that retribution is an equally important factor, but that this 
‘is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing 
the outrage of the international community at these crimes’.91 In this case, and 
in other cases before the ICTY and ICTR, it is expressed that one purpose of 
sentences, and by extension of the tribunal, is to ‘make plain the condemnation 
of the international community’ and show ‘that the international community 
shall not tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights.92 The ICC expressed ‘high aspirations’ to contribute to ‘an end 
to impunity for perpetrators of the most serious international crimes, the 
                                                                                                                                                
exception. Yet, UN Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007 states that ‘this 
terrorist act [the assassination of Rafiq Hariri] and its implications constitute a threat to 
international peace and security’. 
89 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, 24 March 2000, § 185. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. Prosecutor vs. Tadic, Case N0: IT-94-1-A and A bis, Appeals Chamber, 26 
January 2000, § 48. 
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prevention of such crimes and lasting respect for and the enforcement of 
international justice’.93  
The establishing documents and their interpretation by international courts 
reveal a hybrid system of justifications for punishment, analogous to most 
domestic justice systems. However, inevitably, analogies between international 
criminal justice and national systems are also problematic, because 
international criminal justice aims to combine the two very different traditions 
of international law and criminal law. 94 While the former is horizontal, and 
relies on consensus between equal states, the latter is a vertical, coercive 
system ideally expressing the common values and norms of a community.95 
Yet, analogies are inevitable, because international criminal justice relies on 
many of the same means, justifications and assumptions about punishment 
used in national systems.96 As in domestic systems, punishment under 
international criminal justice is justified by both backward-looking and 
                                                      
93 Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, 4 August 2006, ICC-ASP/5/6, p. 2. 
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR there is a lack of ICC rulings further interpreting and 
specifying its objectives.  
94 Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, p. 562. R. Sloane, 
‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’, Columbia Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers, Paper 06100, 2006, p. 2.  
95 Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, p. 562. Sloane, 
‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’, p. 2. L. Arbour, ‘Progress and 
Challenges in International Criminal Justice’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 
21, 1997, pp. 531-540, p. 531.R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and 
How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p.1.  




forward-looking considerations.97 There are two classic theories of punishment 
– retribution and utilitarianism –, and the purposes ascribed to the punishment 
of perpetrators of humanitarian violations generally fit within one of these.98  
The retributive considerations of international criminal justice are based on 
restoring a moral wrong, or restoring a sense of justice. They are based on the 
belief that wrongdoing should be punished in a way appropriate to the criminal 
conduct.99 Those believing that retribution is the only justification for 
punishment argue that the future conduct of the offender, or of society, is 
extraneous to the purpose of punishment.100 Utilitarian justifications for 
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punishment are forward-looking, in that they are based on the possibility of 
desired effects in the future. They are based on a greater utility for the majority 
of people found in punishing an individual. As in domestic systems, the main 
utilitarian justifications of international criminal justice are general and special 
prevention, or deterrence of future criminal conduct.101  
The objectives of international criminal tribunals regarding deterrence, the 
‘restoration and maintenance of peace’, national reconciliation’, and 
‘prosecuting and punishing those most responsible for the crimes committed’ 
have been defined in very broad terms.102 Moreover, there is a long list of 
subsidiary purposes that, at times, have been ascribed to international criminal 
prosecutions.103 Minna Schrag lists those most commonly given as:  
To bring a sense of justice to war-torn places; to re-establish the rule of law; 
to provide a sound foundation for lasting peace; to bring repose to victims and 
provide an outlet to end cycles of violence and revenge; to demonstrate that 
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culpability is individual, and not the responsibility of entire groups; to provide 
a safe forum for victims to tell their stories; to demonstrate fairness and the 
highest standards of due process; to provide exemplary procedures to serve as 
a model for rebuilding a legal system; to create an accurate historical record; 
public education in general; to develop and expand the application and 
interpretation of international law and norms; to provide a forum for 
considering restitution and reparations.104 
However, most of these additional aims are primarily aims of international 
criminal justice procedures rather than aims of punishment.105 For instance, this 
is true of the aim to produce a reliable historical record of the events and the 
background to the crimes committed to prevent future falsification or 
corruption of the facts for political gain.106 It is also true of the often named 
objective of international justice, in which international tribunals are seen as a 
forum to give victims of atrocities a voice, to work towards reinforcement of 
rule of law norms, developing a culture of accountability and creating respect 
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for judicial institutions and their influence on domestic justice.107 At times, 
even the roles of international courts in the interpretation of international 
criminal law and the creation of case law have been described as objectives, 
rather than consequences, of rendering judgements.  
Justifications for punishment, often quoted in domestic systems – special 
prevention by rehabilitation for instance – are generally considered to play a 
less significant role in international criminal justice.108 In contrast to the 
rehabilitation of individuals, the rehabilitation of communities is considered to 
be an aim of international prosecutions and important in post-conflict state 
building and reconciliation. It is argued that, by holding individuals responsible 
for crimes, the perception is avoided that ethnic, religious or political groups 
are collectively responsible.109 As the late Antonio Cassese explained to the 
UN General Assembly: 
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Collective responsibility must be replaced by individual responsibility. Only 
international justice can dissolve the poisonous fumes of resentment and 
suspicion, and put to rest the lust for revenge.110  
Payam Akhavan correctly stated that crimes under international law should not 
be simplistically explained by ‘myths of primordial “tribal” hatred’ or 
‘expressions of spontaneous blood lust or inevitable historical cataclysms’.111 
These crimes are often the result of ‘deliberate incitement of ethnic hatred and 
violence by which ruthless demagogues and warlords elevated themselves to 
positions of absolute power’.112 The removal of individual leaders, and their 
punishment, is therefore likely to have a positive effect on post-conflict 
society. However, despite individual liability, expressed in international 
criminal justice, most acts that constitute crimes under international law are 
committed in, or by, an organised group. At least, the situations deemed grave 
enough to prosecute, the role of the individual can only be understood and 
explained within the framework of a state or QSE.113  
War crimes are violations of the laws of armed conflict applicable to armed 
conflict between groups. And although a single individual can commit them, 
that individual has to be part of a group. For crimes against humanity, it is 
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necessary that conduct was ‘committed as part of a widespread, or systematic, 
attack directed against a civilian population’ and that the perpetrator had 
knowledge of this wider plan.114 Although, in theory, a single person could 
commit genocide, as a practical matter it almost always involves a shared, 
specific ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such’.115 According to Kenneth Anderson, the emphasis on 
individual liability takes the emphasis away from the nature of how these 
crimes are committed, namely as part of a corporate activity.116 Robert Sloane 
notes that international crimes also characteristically involve ‘a collective or 
corporate mental state, a consciousness of action on behalf of or in furtherance 
of a collective project’. 117  
Because committing crimes under international law is usually an organised 
activity, tensions could arise between the desired preventive effect of 
international criminal courts and the perceived retributive effects. According to 
Mirjan Damaska, the individuals whose convictions are best suited to 
producing the preventive effects are seldom those from whose conviction the 
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victims of crimes derive the greatest satisfaction.118 Victims often have 
stronger retributive feelings towards the ‘executioners’ of crimes, – as those are 
more recognizable, and who in Rwanda and Bosnia may well have been their 
neighbour – than towards the leaders who did not physically commit the 
crime.119 But, in the light of preventive effects and other wider aims of 
international criminal justice, prosecuting political and military leaders is the 
primary aim of courts, not least because their convictions can be expected to 
contribute to a wider sense of accountability for gross human rights 
violations.120  
As there is no consensus on which goals of international prosecution should be 
prioritised, tensions may arise between them.121 The establishing documents 
and the case law created by the courts do not create a hierarchy among the 
various objectives of international prosecution. For instance, tension may arise 
between providing ‘utmost fairness to the accused’ and ‘special protections for 
victims’.122 However, the examples most often given are when ‘justice’ and 
‘peace’ are at odds, for instance when a leader that is prosecuted, or would be 
prosecuted when out of power, is unwilling to give up power, and when 
international criminal justice might hamper peace-negotiations. Although this 
situation is not unthinkable, Neier argues that there is no example, yet, that can 
be cited, where holding officials accountable for war crimes, crimes against 
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humanity and genocide has actually been proven to have negatively interfered 
with a peace settlement.123 Creating an accurate historical record may at times 
be at odds with post-conflict peace building, or reconciliation, if it fails to 
avoid collective responsibility. For reconciliation the discourse that atrocities 
were incited by a small group of leaders (who can then be prosecuted) would 
be advantageous. Although this may be true, the inciting narratives of these 
leaders often fit pre-existing nationalist or ethnic tensions.124  
Despite the hybrid system of justifications for international criminal justice 
lacking a clear hierarchy between its retributive and utilitarian justifications 
and objectives, the establishing documents, the case-law produced by tribunals, 
and the statements of international law practitioners point towards three aims 
that resonate across the different existing mechanisms for international 
criminal prosecution.125 They are the retributive justification: (1) ‘to do justice’, 
and the utilitarian goals: (2) ‘to deter further crimes’, and: (3) ‘to contribute to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace’.126 Although, retribution has been the 
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dominant justification for punishment throughout history, and both establishing 
documents and practitioners use it as a justification for punishment under 
international law, to assess the effectiveness of international criminal justice, 
looking at the backward-looking considerations for punishment, is 
problematic.127 According to Immanuel Kant:  
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some 
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in 
all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a 
crime.128  
When taking a purely retributionist standpoint like Kant’s, retribution has no 
other legitimate goal than the punishment itself, making measuring any 
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outcomes for the criminal himself, or for civil society, nonsensical. Even if 
retribution is not understood ‘as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly 
expressing the outrage of the international community’, it is impossible to 
gauge whether enough outrage has been expressed.129 
In a hybrid system, such as international criminal justice, it therefore makes 
more sense to focus on forward-looking goals than to attempt to measure 
whether ‘justice is done’.130 A wide range of studies conducted over the years 
used a wide range of methods to prove the effects of international criminal 
justice towards its utilitarian justification.131 Despite the different outcomes of 
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these studies, there seems to be agreement that to measure the effects of 
international criminal justice is either very difficult, or all-together 
impossible.132 Practitioners also acknowledge this. For instance, former United 
States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, although 
of the opinion that there is ‘a possible deterrence effect’, sees proof for neither 
the existence of deterrence, nor for its absence, because ‘[h]ow do you prove 
the state of mind of a perpetrator of these crimes?’133 It is even harder to prove 
the state of mind of a potential perpetrator who was deterred from committing 
human rights violations by the existence, or threat, of international criminal 
justice.  
While it is true that it is impossible to look inside the heads of (potential) 
perpetrators, Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe argue that ‘it is not clear that such 
proof is at all necessary to measure the likelihood of deterrence’.134 They 
propose an approach utilising economic models of deterrence to assess the 
likeliness of a potential perpetrator to be deterred by the risk of a future 
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prosecution by an international court.135 According to their model, the certainty 
and severity of punishment, and the individual’s preference for risk, have to be 
taken into consideration, as well as the likeliness and severity of other (extra-
legal) sanctions.136 They come to the conclusion that the influence of 
international criminal justice is marginal, because likely perpetrators of 
atrocities (according to their study of African dictators and coup-plotters) are 
more likely to suffer a worse fate than being sent to The Hague.137 Economic 
models of deterrence are problematic because they do not take other factors, 
such as the likeliness and severity of punishment, into consideration. Ku and 
Nzelibe depend on a pre-determined pool of likely perpetrators and a lot of 
data is needed. In their research, the pool of perpetrators that is likely to be 
indicted by, and transferred to, international courts is composed of ‘individuals 
in weak states who have been forced from political power’, in casu. former 
African dictators, failed coup plotters, and ex-leaders of quasi-state entities.138 
The outcome that for this group extra-judicial punishment at home will often 
prove more terrifying than the prospect of ‘The Hague’, was strengthened 
when Congolese war crimes suspect and rebel general Bosco Ntaganda turned 
to the ICC, in March 2013, in order to stay alive, after his understanding with 
the Congolese government fell trough and his M23 militia turned against 
him.139 Yet, the potential cases on which they base their research is limited, 
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looking solely at individual deterrence and disregarding the reality that 
international criminal justice does not lend itself to statistical analysis very 
well.  
In national criminal justice systems, statistics are often used to measure the 
impact of criminal justice. The correlation between justice administered and 
the absence of crimes, or a drop in the crime rate, may be established by 
analysing data. However, Song Sang-Hyun, the president of the ICC, notes 
that, while in national systems data with statistical relevance can be produced, 
a ‘similar exercise is far more difficult with regard to atrocity crimes. Every 
situation is unique and each conflict has its specific historical and political 
setting’.140 Similar problems arise when assessing the effect of international 
criminal justice on post conflict state building. There is evidence to suggest 
that it has a positive effect on post-conflict societies, but relevant data cannot 
be produced. It is impossible to know how Bosnia would have fared today 
without the ICTY, or Rwanda without the ICTR. Song admits that causality is 
the greatest challenge as ‘there are so many factors affecting the occurrence of 
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atrocities that it is almost close to impossible to determine what the effect of 
deterrence is’.141  
Song, like many others, nevertheless believes that a deterrent effect is slowly 
emerging, but relies on anecdotal evidence to come to that conclusion.142 It is 
often pointed out that the likelihood of punishment has grown and with the 
indictments of sitting heads of state by the ICC and ICTY, and the conviction 
of Charles Taylor – the first head of state since Karl Dönitz – somewhat ended 
impunity.143 Akhavan, among others, believes that:  
[T]he symbolic effect of prosecuting even a limited number of the 
perpetrators, especially the leaders who planned and instigated the genocide, 
would have considerable impact on national reconciliation, as well as on 
deterrence of such crimes in the future.144  
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Antonio Cassese suggests that the failed efforts to punish the perpetrators of 
the Armenian genocide ‘gave a nod and a wink to Adolf Hitler and others to 
pursue the Holocaust some twenty years later’.145  
After his former protégé, Charles Taylor, was handed over to the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, in July 2007, The Economist quoted Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi 
as saying: ‘This means that every head of state could meet a similar fate. It sets 
a serious precedent’.146 Freeland notices that the precedents set by international 
criminal justice gave rise to a ‘Pinochet syndrome’ and that ‘the senior political 
and military leaders of today and tomorrow can no longer ignore the rule of 
law and the reach of the various systems of national and international criminal 
justice’.147 Neier also concludes that high ranking officials and state leaders 
have to take international prosecution into account, but he admits that: ‘We do 
not know enough yet to be able to say for certain that this is acting as a 
deterrent. But it seems likely that it is a factor in some cases’.148 The reality is 
that it remains incredibly difficult to establish a causal link between 
international criminal justice and deterrence. Or, as Ryngaert puts it: ‘From an 
empirical perspective, clearly, the causal link between international criminal 
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justice and a durable peace, political reconciliation, and the entrenchment of 
the rule of law has not yet been conclusively proven’.149  
General prevention may work in different ways, by internalisation and 
deterrence. International criminal justice addresses both leaders who operate on 
a programmatic level, ‘the leaders responsible for planning, ordering, and 
instigating the crimes’, and those who carry out criminal plans.150 According to 
Immi Tallgren, the latter group has ‘little or no influence on those features of 
the crimes that actually make them international; ‘with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a group’, ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack’, ‘as 
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes’.151 Adolf Hitler, Charles Taylor, and Slobodan Milošević, on the one 
hand, and Adolf Eichmann, Duško Tadić, and Dražen Edermović on the other, 
all committed horrible crimes, but they did so in very different ways. The 
former as instigators, as the ‘roots of evil’, while the latter are what Harry 
Mulisch during the Eichmann trial called ‘de kleinste mens’ ‘the smallest 
human being’.152 For the second group, especially, the norms and values of the 
group they belong to are likely to carry more weight than those of the 
international community, and/or, the threats from within their own group may 
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be greater than those international criminal justice poses to them.153 
Internalisation of norms of international criminal law through international 
criminal justice is problematic too. Every system of norms works on the basis 
that people believe in them, not because they are enforced. Although more 
international criminal proceedings may lead to more people believing that 
upholding the norms of international humanitarian law is important, the effect 
of group processes is likely to be stronger. Law, including international 
criminal law, has a function as a basis for punishment, but more important, it 
‘matters as a legitimacy device, as a device for providing the social structure by 
which the law is accepted by one, rather than merely as a command backed by 
a threat against one.154 It is sociological, insofar as it is Weberian in its appeal 
to legitimacy’.155 The violation of law often has a delegitimating effect. As 
Davis Wippman observes, international criminal prosecutions may ‘strengthen 
whatever internal bulwarks help individuals obey the rules of war, but the 
general deterrent effect of such prosecutions seems likely to be modest and 
incremental, rather than dramatic and transformative’.156  
The impact international criminal justice has on legitimacy is more likely to 
affect those who take decisions, rather than those who execute orders. Those 
who lead the organisations or entities in whose name international crimes are 
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committed are typically directly affected by international criminal justice. 
Akhavan describes this phenomenon:  
Stigmatizing delinquent leaders through indictment, as well as apprehension 
and prosecution, undermines their influence. Even if wartime leaders still 
enjoy popular support among an indoctrinated public at home, exclusion from 
the international sphere can significantly impede their long-term exercise of 
power.157  
It is this effect of international criminal justice, the impact on legitimacy, 
which is underestimated and deserves more attention. It is the point where the 
impact of the changing discourse – the use of an international criminal justice 
discourse – can be seen to create critical legitimacy moments for those 
implicated, or the entities that they represent.  
                                                      




CHAPTER III.                                                                  
LEGITIMACY AS SUCCESS FOR QUASI-STATE ENTITIES 
 
Contemporary armed conflicts, – the conflicts that gave rise to the 
reincarnation of international criminal justice, and in which the bulk of the 
crimes that are subject to international criminal procedures are committed – are 
no longer conflicts between states, but they are ‘statehood conflicts’. 
Contemporary armed conflicts revolve around issues of statehood – whether an 
existing state is the right political form, whether its character should be 
adjusted, whether a new state should be created, or whether the state system 
itself should be brought down (as is the mission of al-Qa’ida). Statehood 
conflicts are generally characterised by the involvement of at least one 
belligerent, who aims to alter the borders or change the system of a state, and 
another belligerent, usually a state, that fights to prevent that from happening, 
to maintain the status quo. Typically they are about the ‘redistribution of 
territory, populations and resources within, or across, the boundaries of 
existing states’.1 However, international society firmly remains a society of, 
and dominated by, sovereign states. The perks of sovereign statehood, the right 
to territorial integrity and non-interference, remain the leading principles in 
that international community.2 Statehood remains the thing to aspire to for 
ethnic, national, or religious minorities within an existing state, and these 
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tensions often lead to armed conflicts between those groups aspiring to 
statehood, or a share of it, and those preventing them from attaining these 
aspirations. These non-state entities cover a wide range of organisations, or 
entities, with widely diverging goals. They are built around ethnicity, a national 
goal, religion, or another shared identity. They go by different names, but 
whether called freedom fighters, insurgents, terrorists, or secessionists, these 
entities are all, and primarily, defined by the fact that they are competing with 
the sovereign state over statehood functions. They are what can be 
conceptualised as quasi-state entities (QSEs).  
For QSEs, as for any other actor in contemporary armed conflict, legitimacy is 
the key to success. Success in conflicts between different groups within a 
territory depends on legitimacy more than anything else. General Rupert Smith 
maintains that the morality of force is defined by the legality of it. Because of 
this limitation, some of the ways and means to achieve full military victory 
became unacceptable. Moreover, Smith notes that contemporary warfare is 
fought ‘amongst the people’, not for decisive military victory, but for the 
objective of capturing the will of the people and their leaders, and to influence 
their beliefs.3 To be successful in contemporary conflict, a belligerent has to 
effectively deploy force, but it also has to use all available networks to send the 
desired messages to the multiple constituencies relevant to the conflict.4 The 
process of providing legitimisation for armed force – and the entity that is 
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ordering the use of armed force – is central to contemporary armed conflict, 
whether that entity is a state government, or any other type of organisation. In 
intra-state conflicts, not only state governments need to create and maintain 
legitimacy, in order to be successful; those entities challenging government 
authority need to do so, too.  
The present chapter will first introduce the concept of quasi-state entities. It 
will argue that in an international system that revolves around statehood, those 
fighting for a new state, or an alteration of an existing state, are better defined 
by the core of their existence, than by what they lack. The first section will 
discuss the (legal) position of QSEs in the post-Cold War international order, 
and their role in contemporary armed conflict. The second part of the chapter 
will deal with legitimacy. This section will, first, look at legitimacy as an 
overused, often misunderstood, and complicated, but nevertheless essential, 
concept to understand power relations. Next, legitimacy as a prerequisite for 
success in contemporary conflict will be discussed. The workings of legitimacy 
in a contemporary, interconnected world will be assessed and the final part of 
this chapter will propose an approach by which legitimacy crises, or critical 






When, in 1992, the UN Security Council Heads of State and Government 
widened the definition of what could constitute to a threat to ‘international 
peace and security’, this had several legal and political consequences. As 
explained in the previous chapter, expanding the mandate of the Security 
Council created the possibility of ordering Chapter VII measures to restore 
international peace and security caused, not by ‘war and military conflicts 
amongst States’, but, by ‘instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological fields’.5 This, in turn, created the possibility of ordering coercive 
measures, including armed force, to restore the peace in internal conflicts. It 
also paved the way for the Security Council to establish international criminal 
tribunals, under Chapter VII, as indeed it did for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, and later Lebanon. What, at first glance, may have seemed a minor 
and logical reinterpretation of the Charter had major consequences. In the eyes 
of some commentators, the Council even ‘adopted a strikingly intrusive 
interpretation of the UN Charter’ and its Members ‘endorsed a radical 
expansion in the scope of collective intervention just as a series of ethnic and 
civil wars erupted across the globe’.6 Yet, this redefinition was neither a 
sudden move of the Council, nor an isolated decision, and the sudden rise in 
ethnic and civil wars was not the only cause. It was the result of ongoing 
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changes of the meaning of sovereignty. The statement reflected a trend towards 
a changing understanding of what sovereignty entails. By expressing that, in 
principle, they would not be adverse to intervention in internal conflicts, the 
Heads of State and Government of the Security Council acknowledged the 
trend towards a different understanding of state-sovereignty.7 This trend had 
started earlier, but, similar and parallel to the rise international criminal justice 
and the increasing role of various types of non-state actors in contemporary 
conflict, had been accelerated by the end of the Cold War. Although the notion 
of equal state-sovereignty was the leading principle governing the international 
community after the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, and remains the principle 
that provides the structure (customary) international law is built on, its meaning 
has proved malleable over time. Or, more accurately, the interpretation of 
sovereignty and the practical consequences attached to the principle changed.8 
Jens Bartelson insists that ‘the very term sovereignty, the concept of 
sovereignty and the reality of sovereignty are historically open, contingent and 
unstable’.9 These changes can clearly be seen in scholarship over time. Hugo 
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Grotius only included as sovereign an entity that ‘is called Supreme, whose 
Acts are not subject to another’s Power’, and excluded the ’Nations, who are 
brought under the Power of another People, as were the Roman Provinces; for 
those Nations are no longer a State’.10 In 1905, Lassa Oppenheim defined 
sovereignty as the ‘supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any 
other earthly authority...’ over ‘all persons and things within its territory, 
sovereignty is territorial supremacy’.11 So internal sovereignty, or domestic 
sovereignty, requires public authorities to have effective control over the 
territory claimed by the state.12 The external aspects of sovereignty, described 
by Stephen Krasner as international legal sovereignty and Westphalian 
sovereignty, do not necessarily involve effective control, but mutual 
recognition between sovereign states and the exclusions of external actors.13 
The principle of state sovereignty and the sovereign equality that stems from it 
is the principle that defines the international order, both politically and legally. 
Bartelson describes sovereignty as the ‘relational interface’ between law and 
politics; as ‘that which both separates these domains and binds them 
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pp. 599-625,at p. p. 599. 
12 S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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together’.14 As Benedict Kingsbury points out, sovereignty ‘represents one of 
the defining ideas of 20th century international relations’, and it is therefore no 
wonder that sovereignty, by means of the axiomatic first principle of the UN 
Charter – ‘[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members’ – is firmly embedded in the architecture of the UN 
system.15  
It was shortly after the most blatant and appalling abuse of sovereign powers 
the world had ever witnessed, during World War II, that sovereignty was 
codified in the UN Charter. And although Article 2(7) of the Charter further 
emphasises the principle of sovereignty by stating that: ‘Nothing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...’ The 
Charter also limits the implications of sovereignty by including the exception 
that: ‘... this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII’.16 For the next four decades however, the 
implications of sovereignty did not change significantly. States enjoyed 
internal and external sovereignty, and when these principles were broken, it 
was rarely based on a claim that this was justified by Chapter VII of the 
Charter and never by a claim that violations of humanitarian law limited 
sovereignty. Yet, thinking about sovereignty did change; Mark Mazower 
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noticed that, ‘new and much more conditional attitudes toward sovereignty’ 
already became evident through the human rights revolution of the 1970s.17 
This was what David Lake describes as an intellectual shift in thinking about 
sovereignty that took place in the decades before the end of the Cold War.18 
These critiques of the classical view of sovereignty were either influenced by 
the increasing interdependence of states or by the inequality between states in 
terms of economic or military power as a result of the ‘functioning of the 
capitalist world economy’.19 Either way, the legal implications of sovereignty 
largely remained the same, although the Cold War Blocs could be seen as 
creating a hierarchical society in practice. Again, it was the end of the Cold 
War that had a catalyst effect. Part of the ‘veil of sovereignty’ was already 
pierced by ‘Nuremberg, the UN Charter, and the ‘human rights revolution’, but 
it was the radical change in the early 1990s that really changed thinking about 
sovereignty.20 
After the 1992, broadening of what could constitute to a threat to ‘peace and 
security’, the idea that intervention in the domestic affairs of a state could be 
justified, or – in extreme circumstances – could even be a moral obligation of 
the international community, took further hold. The increased number of 
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internal conflicts – and what had become known as ‘failed states’ – called for a 
more active UN. Moreover, although the UN peacekeeping missions in 
Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia showed the limitations of UN-led humanitarian 
intervention, it also meant that the idea of intervening in the internal matters of 
a state in certain extreme circumstances became more accepted. When, in 
1999, NATO started the air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
– citing humanitarian reasons and with the aim to bring to a halt ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo – but without an explicit UN Security Council Resolution, 
it was clear that, at least in the Western World, the view was that the defence of 
humanity overrode the sanctity of state sovereignty.21 Furthermore, it became 
clear that even the authority of the UN could be overridden unless it would 
embrace these new norms.22 
In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote in an op-ed piece in The 
Economist that:  
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the 
forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely 
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice 
versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the 
fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN 
and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and 
spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, 
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we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human 
beings, not to protect those who abuse them.23 
The ideas that sovereignty no longer entailed rights for the state alone but, also 
a responsibility towards its people, and that the rights of a state to non-
interference could be forfeited by not meeting that responsibility, were 
expressed in the 2005 ‘World Summit Outcome’. Although, the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) as agreed upon by the General Assembly was a watered down 
version of earlier proposals, it stated that every State ‘has the responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity’.24 It also declared that if ‘national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity’ the international community, through the United 
Nations, has the responsibility to protect populations.25 First and foremost, this 
would involve diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, but should 
these measures prove inadequate, the Security Council would use collective 
action, under Chapter VII.26 
What had changed was not that the sovereign lost supremacy in a certain 
territory, but that something changed in the thinking about what the 
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absoluteness of sovereignty meant.27 The idea took hold that the state had 
become limited in its conduct towards its people by humanitarian law. An 
invisible line of a ‘threat to peace and security’ as a result of humanitarian 
disaster could now be crossed, leading to humanitarian intervention.28 The 
territoriality of sovereignty remained the same; the geographic location of 
‘persons and things’ still defines under whose rule they fall, disregarding other 
connecting factors, such as kinship, tribes, religion, and nations. Many states 
remained the supreme authority over different nations, ethnicities, tribes etc. 
within their territorial boundaries, groups that sometimes felt no connection to 
that state, or felt that they had a stronger connection to groups in other states. 
International law and the international community still protected the authority 
of the state, but, now, there were limits to how it could exercise that authority. 
The international system remained, and remains, defined by sovereign states 
that recognise each other as such, and it is still the system of sovereign states, 
on which international relations, treaties and international law are built.29 The 
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference remain the fundaments of 
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the international community and are fiercely protected by its members. 
Moreover, sovereignty is status, as Abram and Antonia Chayes explain:  
[Sovereignty is] the vindication of the state’s existence in the international 
system’ and it has been redefined to mean ‘membership [...] in the regimes 
that make The Real New World Order up the substance of international life.30  
Sovereignty is a status, and membership, that many actors or entities in 
contemporary conflicts do not posses. Yet, it is significant because these actors 
often aspire to this status, and start to act like states; they become quasi-state 
entities. 
Declarative statehood as defined by the Montevideo convention, in 1933, is 
usually considered to have become part of customary international law. 
According to this the attributes of statehood under international law are that 
‘The state as a person of international law should possess […] a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states.31 The latter means that therefore ‘the political 
existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.32 
However, according to Weber, ‘a state is a human community that 
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(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’.33 Yet, statehood also goes beyond merely exercising 
power over a certain territory, it also includes providing services to the 
population of that territory, the ability to fulfil governance functions. A state 
has to deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.34 If the state is 
unable to fulfil the functions required of a state, or if another entity is more 
successful in providing these functions, the state will lose legitimacy, and will 
eventually collapse.35 Although successfully claiming a monopoly on violence 
might be the most important state function, other functions, for instance, 
providing security and justice, the ability to collect taxes, and a functioning 
bureaucratic are also functions of a successful state. All these, and more, are 
functions that can be, and often are, taken over by QSEs. 
While the power struggle between the two ‘superpowers’ caused violations of 
human rights, hindered the spread of democracy, and prolonged many conflicts 
by the external sponsorship of civil wars and support for authoritarian regimes, 
it also contained many domestic conflicts, ethnic tensions, and nationalist and 
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fundamentalist conflicts.36 The collapse of the structure that the two 
superpowers provided by policing their respective blocs, led to an increase in 
conflicts fuelled by ethnicity, nationalism, and fundamentalism, conflicts that 
are fought predominantly internally within the borders of a sovereign state.37 
By definition these internal conflicts involve entities that are armed and not 
formally integrated into institutions such as police or the regular military of a 
state – although they may be informally or formally supported, armed or 
financed by a state actor – and are willing and able to employ armed force, or 
threaten with armed force, to pursue their objectives.38 These conflicts revolve 
around the fact that many states remain the supreme authority over multiple 
groups that feel a nationalist, ethnic, tribal, religious or linguistic connection to 
each other, but feel no such connection to the state. It is the sovereign state that 
is both the accepted legal entity in the international community and also the 
only form of entity with real political standing in that community.39 Even when 
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sovereignty is little more than an empty shell, because the state lacks effective 
authority to enjoy the perks of statehood in parts of, or in its entire territory, the 
international system strongly favours the state. Neither the changes in the 
interpretation of sovereignty, nor the transforming role of non-state actors in 
these internal conflicts altered the central role of states in the international 
community. On the contrary, these conflicts are not among states, but about 
statehood. They are about control of existing states and how they should be 
run.40 As James Gow noted, ‘statehood remained central to armed conflict’.41 
These post-Cold War clashes, usually involving one or more non-state parties, 
are about the absence of central enforcing authority, or about ‘the redistribution 
of territory, populations and resources within, or across, the boundaries of 
existing states’.42 These conflicts are defined by the fact that there is an entity 
that aims to alter the character of the state, the contours, or the status of borders 
of the state, and an entity, usually a state, that fights to prevent that from 
happening and maintain the status quo.43  
A plethora of labels can be attached to the non-state entities that are party to 
statehood conflicts: insurgents, rebels, terrorists, resistance fighters, dissident 
armies, guerrillas, warlords or de facto governments. They diverge in size, 
means, and level of sophistication and central coordination; they use different 
tactics for different aims; an organisation can transform from one type into 
                                                      
40 Gow, Defending the West, p. 31. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.  




another; and more than one label can be applicable to one entity. While some 
of these labels imply a value judgement, others focus on a certain 
characteristic. But what these entities, challenging the status quo of a state, 
have in common is that they fight for statehood objectives. Although some 
‘strong states’ have to deal with entities that want to secede, often, these 
entities fighting for statehood exist by the grace of a ‘weak state’. For entities 
that aspire to statehood, weakened state institutions make it easier to operate 
state functions parallel, or instead of the official state. Decolonisation and the 
end of the Cold War left numerous states that were unable to exercise 
authority, provide security, and fulfil other state functions in their territory. 
They were recognised as states by the international community, they have 
external sovereignty, but are not able to fully exercise internal sovereignty. 
Depending on the level of decline of the power of the state and the reach of 
state institutions, these states are generally refered to as ‘weak states’ or failed 
states’.44 
On the other hand there are entities that de facto function as a state and provide 
services usually provided by the state (and the perks, like a monopoly of 
violence, justice and taxes), but are not recognised as such. These rebels, 
resistance fighters, insurgents or warlords are usually defined by the fact that 
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they are not formally attached to the state; that they are armed; and that they 
use violence or threaten with violence in pursuance of their objectives. They 
are sometimes described as non-state armed actors, armed non-state actors, or 
violent non-state actors, but, what these entities have in common is not only 
what they lack, sometimes only in name – sovereign statehood – but also, that 
they all operate in a state-centred system and ‘they all want a piece of the 
statehood cake’.45 They are armed, and they use, or threaten to use, violence, in 
order to alter the system, or the boundaries, of a state. They challenge the state 
and they compete with the state over statehood functions. In a state-centred 
system, statehood is the highest prize and, in the end, all these entities want to 
exercise at least some of the functions usually connected with statehood.  
When states prove incapable of providing all of the services usually provided 
by the state, when a state is weak, during an internal conflict, or when a status 
quo is reached, in which the de facto new state lacks full statehood, other 
entities take over some, or virtually all, of the functions usually associated with 
the sovereign state. Although the moniker ‘de facto state’ covers the type of 
body that is a state in all but in the juridical sense under international law, it 
does not cover all the entities that aspire to statehood, use force or the threat of 
force to reach their aims, provide statehood functions, threaten the status quo 
of the existing recognised state, but have not reached the status of ‘de facto 
state’. Yet, these entities, whether they are called rebels, freedom fighters or 
seccesionists, either already exercise state functions without the external 
                                                      




recognition of statehood, or they aspire to change the borders of a state, or the 
make-up, or system of a state, in such a way that they can exercise that power. 
Hence, it is more accurate to call them quasi-state entities or QSEs. 
Andrew Clapham points out that those organisations seeking to take over state 
power from incumbent regimes, usually also act like states in important 
respects.46 First he notices that:  
[I]nsurgent movements frequently meet many if not all of the criteria which 
are normally used to distinguish states. Militarily effective movements meet 
the most basic criterion for statehood, which is physical control over territory 
and population.47  
Moreover, QSEs are international actors in the sense that they conduct 
international transactions. They do not necessarily operate in legal international 
markets, as can be seen in drug and weapon trafficking, in Mali, for instance, in 
several ‘narco-states’, or the ‘blood diamond’ trade in West Africa.48 But, they 
also take part in ‘international economic activities, which have normally been 
regarded as the realm of states’.49 QSEs establish relationships with aid 
organisations, for instance, to secure medicines, or food relief, for the 
population of the areas they have under their control. They deal with NGOs, or 
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they establish their own aid organisations, as for instance the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF) did with the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA), or 
Hezbollah in the areas of Lebanon that are predominantly populated by Shia.50 
Relations with diplomats and governments from other states are fairly common 
for these entities with statehood aspirations, regardless of whether they have 
established a de facto state, or have de facto control over a territory or not. U 
Following the old proverb, ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, Clapham 
notes that: ‘Insurgent movements have almost always benefited from the 
support provided by the international opponents of the states against which 
they were fighting, whether in the context of Cold War, post colonial or simply 
regional rivalries’.51 But, however overt these ‘diplomatic’ relations and the 
support for QSEs sometimes may be, they are always limited by the protection 
against external intervention that states enjoy.  
The notion of quasi-states, in itself, rather than quasi-state entities, is not new. 
However, as Pål Kolstø commented, the ‘study of quasi-states has been marred 
by an unfortunate terminological confusion’.52 Kolstø describes two of the 
attributed meanings of ‘quasi-state’, first: ‘recognized states that fail to develop 
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the necessary state structures to function as fully fledged, ‘real’ states’.53 And 
second: ‘regions that secede from another state, gain de facto control over the 
territory they lay claim to, but fail to achieve international recognition’.54 
Robert Jackson uses ‘Quasi-States’ to describe the former type of state, in his 
1990 study, as mentioned above. He pointed out that ex-colonial states posses 
the same external rights as all other sovereign states, they posses what he calls 
‘juridical statehood’, yet many of them, even years after they gained 
independence, are far from complete.55 They lack the ‘institutional features of 
sovereign states’, or, what Jackson calls ‘empirical statehood’, meaning that 
they do not enjoy the advantages that usually come with statehood.56 The 
international community enfranchises these states by recognition, of their 
independence, and often they provide other forms of (financial) support, but, as 
internal institutions are limited, their existence remains mainly juridical.57 
However, at least under international law, and according to the international 
community, they are states, and not ‘quasi’, ‘almost’ or ‘as if’ states. As Kolstø 
rightly points out, the often-used term ‘failed states’ describes these ineffectual 
states more accurately, and although some prefer ‘weak states’, or ‘shadow 
states’, to describe states that lack internal sovereignty, they indeed are usually 
referred to as failed states.58  
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The term ‘quasi-state’ has also been used to describe those states that lack 
external sovereignty, while exercising internal sovereignty, although others 
prefer ‘de facto state’, ‘unrecognized state’, ‘Para-state’, or ‘pseudo-state’, to 
describe what comes down to the same phenomenon.59 Kolstø for instance used 
the term ‘unrecognised quasi-state’, but, attached three criteria to qualify quasi-
statehood: the leadership must: 1) be in control of (most of) the territory it lays 
claim to, 2) to have sought, but not achieved, international recognition as an 
independent state: and 3) to have persisted in this state of non-recognition for 
more than two years’.60 The last criterion, especially, seems arbitrary. Why 
would a quasi-state emerge after two years of unrecognised control over a 
territory, and not after four, or one?61 Nevertheless, Denise Natali, uses this 
concept of quasi-statehood for instance, to describe the Kurdistan region in 
Iraq, and, by Michael Rywkin, to describe separatist regions in the former 
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Soviet Republics.62 Based on high levels of autonomy, recognition, external 
patronage and internal sovereignty, they define these regions as quasi-states.63 
By that logic, the entities fighting for that accomplishment only become quasi-
state entities by attaining most of their goals, falling short only by lacking 
international recognition. Natali calls Kurdistan a ‘quasi-State’, based on the 
accomplishments of an entity, or entities, that created a Kurdish government, 
engaged in civil society building and strengthened autonomy, but what is 
considered is the existing state capabilities, not the entities fighting for the 
change in status-quo.64 Charles King uses ‘quasi-state’ for a situation that 
occurs when ‘after one camp has secured a partial or complete victory in the 
military contest, the basic networks, relationships, and informal channels that 
arose during the course of the violence can replicate themselves in new, state-
like institutions in the former conflict zones’.65 He describes that ‘belligerents 
are often able to craft a sophisticated array of formal institutions that function 
as effective quasi states’, King’s interpretation also suggests that these 
statehood qualities only arise after the conflict.66 But entities already built these 
institutions during a conflict. They are quasi-state entities during the conflict, 
and well before they ensure victory, are defeated or the conflict is stalemated.  
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Here, it is suggested to call these actors quasi-state entities not only because 
they accomplished de facto statehood, but also because their aspirations 
revolve around statehood, and they provide services usually associated with the 
state. These entities are quasi-state entities, whether they are well on their way 
towards full statehood and run a de facto state, like the government of Kosovo, 
whether they are stuck in a stalemate, in which they retain some of the 
characteristics usually associated with statehood, like the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), or in the middle of a struggle for statehood, or changing a 
state, like, for instance, the Syrian Free Army. Of course the scope of QSEs 
differs widely. There are examples such as Nagorno-Karabakh, and South 
Ossetia that meet the Montevideo Convention criteria on statehood, aside from 
recognition as sovereign by other sovereigns. But there are also organisations 
like Hezbollah, which has come to have a stake in Lebanon, and operates state 
institutions and provides services usually associated to the state to a part of the 
population. The South Sudanese SPLA/SPLM, transformed from a QSE to the 
core of a new state, while the Taliban in Afghanistan went in the opposite 
direction and from running the state turned into a QSE controlling state 
functions in parts of the country under its control, including taxation, justice 
and education, while fighting state institutions.  
A QSE is by definition a non-state actor, but not all non-state actors are a QSE. 
In the same vein, a nationalist movement might be a QSE, but not all QSEs are 
by definition nationalist movements, and certainly not all nationalist 
movements are a QSE. While a de facto state is a QSE, something falling short 




nationalist goals, for instance, below, the KLA and the MNLA are discussed, 
and both are organisations that fought to secede from a state. However, not all 
QSEs are nationalist movements, Hezbollah for instance, also discussed below, 
is a QSE that exercises many state functions, and has been successful in doing 
so and transformed the state by exercising these functions and providing 
services, but it has no aspirations to secede any part of Lebanon from the whole 
and defines itself as a Lebanese organisation first and foremost, even when its 
behaviour at times suggests it is a Shia organisation in the first place.67 On the 
other hand, many nationalist movements do not behave as a state in any 
manner. Some behave like a political party, more, or less abiding by the rules 
of the state it is part of, for instance, the Scottish National Party. Others may be 
able to employ, or threaten with the use of armed force or terrorist attacks, but 
are unable to exercise functions and provide services that are usually associated 
with statehood, for example, covert nationalist-terrorist movements in the 
Basque country and Northern Ireland.68 
A wider definition of quasi-statehood has been used by a number of authors, 
but usually in passing, or without an explanation of what is meant by the 
concept. In the process of ‘locating Hezbollah's place within Lebanon's state 
and society’, Brian Early correctly describes the organisation as ‘both a societal 
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organization and a quasi-state entity’, however, he does so without giving 
meaning to the concept of quasi-state.69 The same applies, for instance, to Joan 
Fitzpatrick, who floats the idea that al-Qa’ida can be seen as a quasi-state, but 
does not elaborate on that definition any further.70 Clapham, on the other hand, 
does describe why they have state-like qualities.71 His observations are 
primarily based on the factual functions of these actors, in that they exercise 
functions usually used to distinguish statehood.72 Although a successful QSE 
will at some point might run a de facto-, state, it is not defined as a QSE only 
when it attains all the characteristics of a state but it falls short of full 
statehood. It is suggested here that the term embraces aspect of statehood, short 
of official statehood; that the objective of achieving statehood, combined with 
fulfilling certain functions, usually associated with statehood, are the defining 
characteristics of a QSE.  
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CRITICAL LEGITIMACY  
For QSEs the key to success is legitimacy. As every ‘system of authority’ 
attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy, the same holds 
true for state entities, but, for QSEs, the ability to create and maintain 
legitimacy is often even more crucial.73 As Inis Claude put it, ‘the lovers of 
naked power are far less typical than those who aspire to clothe themselves in 
the mantle of legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, but they do not like 
to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so regarded’.74 Yet, legitimacy is not 
only desired by states and QSEs, it is needed. This is especially the case in 
conflicts between different groups within a territory, in the internal conflicts in 
which QSEs fight for a ‘piece of the statehood cake’, legitimacy is a 
prerequisite for success.  
In contemporary conflict, General Rupert Smith maintains that the morality of 
force is defined by the legality of it. Because of this limitation, some of the 
ways and means for achieving full military victory became unacceptable. He 
notes that contemporary warfare is fought ‘amongst the people’, not for 
decisive military victory, but for the more malleable objective of capturing the 
will of the people and their leaders, and to influence their beliefs.75 To be 
successful in contemporary conflict, all available networks have to be used to 
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send messages and narratives transmitted have to be accepted by the multiple 
constituencies relevant to the conflict.76 The process of legitimising the 
objectives of an organisation and the use of force, – and the entity that is 
ordering the use of armed force and its institutions – became central, whether 
that entity is a state government, a QSE, or some other type of organisation, 
e.g. NATO. More important, the multidimensionality of contemporary armed 
conflict means that it is important how that force can be best utilised and 
deployed to be successful in ensuring legitimacy for the use of armed force and 
the entity ordering armed force. 
In statehood conflicts, QSEs may depend on, and try to influence the beliefs of, 
the same people as the state. States need to create and maintain legitimacy for 
their actions and institutions, in order to be effective; and QSEs challenging 
government authority and competing with the state over power and statehood 
functions need to create and maintain legitimacy, in order effectively to 
challenge the state. To be successful in attaining their objectives, both need the 
ability to create and maintain legitimacy, not only for their institutions, but also 
for their actions, even if their causes and goals are deemed legitimate, in 
themselves. But in contrast to states, QSEs have to engage in this process, 
while not being part of the international community of states, often, without an 
official status within that community, or, even, within their own territory.  
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Discerning where, when, and how far claims of legitimacy of a certain entity 
are accepted is complicated. It is complicated by the lack of a single and 
universally accepted definition of legitimacy, and the reality that legitimacy is 
continuously changing, hard to gauge (especially in its positive form), and has 
to be claimed, accepted, (and analysed) in various constituencies 
simultaneously. The fact that legitimacy is a concept used in divergent ways 
and in different situations, often without an accompanying explanation of what 
is meant by it, further complicates the already inherently difficult task of 
deciding what is legitimate and what is not. 77  
The main discrepancy between different meanings of legitimacy is the 
difference between normative and descriptive definitions. A mainly normative 
understanding of legitimacy tries to identify a set of standards that morally 
justify the authority of an entity to rule over, or take decisions for, another 
group, and to identify those conditions, under which the institutions and actions 
should be regarded as legitimate.78 It is about why an entity ought to be 
obeyed.79 Conversely, a descriptive approach to legitimacy looks why an entity 
is obeyed, without passing judgement on the moral bases of either the claims of 
legitimacy made by the ruler, or the reasons of the ruled, to accept those 
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claims.80 Most scholars define legitimacy, either as a normative concept, or 
choose a descriptive approach. However, both Rodney Barker and David 
Beetham argue that the two approaches are not opposed to each other, but 
rather serve different purposes.81 In many cases, it might be useful to look at 
legitimacy from a normative perspective, to set a benchmark of norms that 
determine when an entity, its actions and institutions ought to be obeyed. But, 
for the purpose at hand, trying to understand how legitimacy works, how it is 
gained, and why and when it is lost – in order to determine the influence of 
international criminal justice on QSEs – applying one’s own moral convictions 
is not very useful. In order to be able to say something about the chances of an 
entity to succeed in its statehood, or state-altering aspirations, one has to look 
why, and how far, its authority is obeyed, and also at the capacity to create and 
maintain such a state. Therefore, using a mostly descriptive approach to 
legitimacy is more suitable.  
Max Weber, the starting point for virtually every descriptive theory of 
legitimacy, successfully avoids a normative judgement, when he defines 
legitimacy rather narrowly as ‘the willingness to comply with rules’.82 Weber 
describes three pure types of legitimising authority: First, legal or rational 
grounds, resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of 
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands; secondly, 
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traditional grounds, resting on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority 
under them; and thirdly, charismatic grounds, resting on devotion to the 
specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns, or order revealed, or ordained 
by him.83 Although Weber realises that pure types are rarely found in reality, 
he argues that these types are met, when asking for obedience.84 
In so narrowly defining legitimacy as ‘willingness to comply with rules’ and by 
describing three types, on which claims of legitimacy are based, both Gow and 
Beetham note that the Weberian typology is ruler-centric, in that it looks at the 
claims made, not at the reasons why they are accepted.85 Like Jürgen 
Habermas, they point out the limits of the usefulness of Weber’s purely 
descriptive concept, as it neglects people's second order beliefs about 
legitimacy.86 So, while a purely normative approach is of limited use in 
understanding actual processes of legitimation, neither is a purely descriptive 
approach.87 Legitimacy is more than just the acceptance of claims, because 
‘legitimacy and acquiescence, and legitimacy and consensus, are not the 
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same’.88 When an entity has legitimacy, it has not only the capacity to run 
certain institutions, make decisions, and have orders executed, but also its 
norms, rules, and principles are socially endorsed.89 This means that 
‘legitimacy is a social concept in the deepest sense – it describes a 
phenomenon that is inherently social’. 90  
In line with these shortcomings of a purely descriptive approach, Marc 
Suchman takes the reasons why claims are accepted into account, when he 
defines legitimacy as: 
[T]he generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.91 
This definition makes clear that, even when looking at legitimacy from a 
descriptive perspective, the claims of legitimacy are judged normatively at the 
receiving end, and his definition stresses that legitimacy is inextricably 
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dependent upon social perception and recognition.92 Suchman considers that 
claims of legitimacy have to fit in with the pre-existing ideas in a certain 
society. Beetham further specifies the notion that claims to legitimacy should 
be ‘appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions’. He describes that power relationship is ‘justified’ in 
terms of the beliefs of the people at the receiving end of the relationship.93 
Suchman goes on to explain that legitimacy is ‘socially constructed in that it 
reflects congruence between behaviours of the legitimated entity and the shared 
(or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group’.94 However, even when 
claims of legitimacy for an entity’s actions and institutions fit within the 
existing ideas that prevail within a certain constituency, this ‘perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate’ is 
not a stable condition. Legitimacy is neither a static concept that an entity 
possesses, nor a quality that the institutions, or actions, of an entity (even if 
regarded legitimate in itself) automatically have. Entities that claim legitimacy 
have to engage in a continual process of legitimisation of their actions and 
institutions.  
Besides the reality that legitimacy constantly changes, Richard Merelman 
warns that ‘it is a mistake to believe that the levels of legitimacy [for an entity] 
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are equally distributed throughout a society’.95 Moreover, at least when 
assessing the legitimacy of entities that are involved in conflicts over 
statehood, the definitions discussed are ‘incomplete in that they fail to take 
sufficient account of the various constituencies with an interest’.96 The 
congruence between the behaviour of the legitimacy-seeking entity and the 
shared beliefs of one social group is not enough.97 This makes the constantly 
changing process of legitimation even more intricate, and even harder to detect 
and analyse. Decisions have to be gauged against the perspectives of multiple 
groups, not only within the entity’s own societies, but also in that of allies and 
opponents, and the global audience.98  
The notion of multiple constituencies in contemporary armed conflict can be 
related to the ‘Clausewitzian trinity’ of blind instinct, probabilities and chance, 
and reason – characteristics that Carl von Clausewitz subsequently maps onto 
the people, the general and his army, and the government.99 This ‘secondary 
Clausewitzian trinity’ of the people, military and government is still relevant, 
but Gow argues that in modern armed conflict there is a multidimensional 
trinity at work.100 This more complex trinity – which Gow named the 
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‘Multidimensional Trinity Cubed-Plus’ or ‘Trinity3(+)’ – illustrates the 
problem of multiple constituencies.101 In order to be effective in attaining its 
goals, an entity first needs to influence its home front, comprising the trinity of 
political leaders, armed forces and the people. Secondly, each aspect of the 
opponent’s trinity needs to be influenced, as well as all of them at the same 
time. Thirdly, there are multiple global audiences that have to be influenced, 
‘all being subject to the same information and images, all affecting the 
environment in which a strategic campaign is going to be conducted’.102 
Consequently, instead of fighting a battle of wills, or hearts and minds, 
contemporary armed conflict is defined by ‘conducting simultaneously 
multiple battles for multiple wills’ by sending out messages to gain 
legitimacy.103  
The ability of an entity successfully to engage in the constant process of 
legitimating its actions and institutions in different constituencies 
simultaneously is extremely hard to gauge. This is not only because the 
outcome depends on a plethora of variables, both within and outside the control 
of the legitimacy-seeking entity, but also because ‘that which is not in question 
is legitimate’.104 Legitimacy in its positive form is hard to see. This is because 
‘people who are satisfied do not take to the streets en masse to shout 'we are 
satisfied' and wave signs saying 'it's all good', the signs of legitimacy are hard 
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to discern.105 As it is so problematic to assert, or affirm, legitimacy positively, 
it is easier to be noticed in periods when it becomes apparent that legitimacy 
has broken down. It is, therefore, easier to pinpoint its absence in the presence 
of a legitimacy crisis than to identify its presence.106 A lack of legitimacy – in a 
certain constituency, of a certain entity or action, at a certain point in time – is 
easier to identify than measuring the existence of it. On the basis of such 
observations, Habermas noted that legitimacy is best noticed in its absence, 
when critically challenged. He describes the moment that a crisis of 
legitimation emerges as follows:  
If governmental crisis management fails, it lags behind programmatic 
demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal 
of legitimation. Thus the scope for actions contracts precisely at those 
moments in which it needs to be drastically expanded. 107 
For Habermas, crises are 'turning points' that ‘arise when the structure of a 
social system allows fewer possibilities for problem-solving than are necessary 
to the continued existence of the system'.108 That turning point can be seen, 
even when legitimacy crises are to be overcome, as the change can be seen in 
changing narratives and actions, as an entity must adapt by effectively 
managing the critical situation. It is by looking at those critical moments, 
where legitimacy is withdrawn, when it is needed most, that one can see the 
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workings of, and the influences on, legitimacy. By analysing the capacities to 
overcome crises, one can gauge the existence of legitimacy.  
Complementing the notion of legitimacy crises as a point where legitimacy 
becomes visible, Gow argued that in dissecting the concept of legitimacy crisis, 
the elements that constitute legitimacy could be detected.109 These elements are 
legitimating ideology (bases), performance, and environmental support. First, 
the legal, political, and normative bases of legitimacy comprise rules, norms, 
laws and statements (both explicit and implicit), and beliefs of the actor (and 
others), about what it is and should be doing.110 Secondly, performance is the 
level at which an entity, or activity, is effective, can strengthen legitimacy 
when the bases are weak and performance is strong, or, on the contrary, being 
ineffective, will weaken strong bases of legitimacy.111 Thirdly, support will 
bolster legitimacy, where legitimacy claims are accepted, as a degree of social 
and communal support exists and can be sustained, both in terms of bases and 
performance of the entity, and its actions, as well as in relation to various other 
entities, bodies, groups or organisations in society and in the international 
community.112  
Understanding legitimacy as a compound concept of these elements provides 
the possibility of considering the components individually, although only 
                                                      







together can they be understood to constitute legitimacy.113 It also further 
illustrates critical legitimacy moments; not only is legitimacy needed most 
when it is withdrawn, but when performance is low, legitimacy is weakened, 
and a negative spiral of legitimacy becomes harder to turn around. As Weber 
observed ‘if he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to 
be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds’.114 If they fail, even strong bases 
of legitimacy will be weakened. In this context, international criminal justice 
can bring critical challenges to the legitimacy of actors. These can affect both 
sides in a conflict and, as much as they can lose legitimacy for one side, they 
can boost the other.  
For states, the mere fact that they are involved in a statehood conflict is an 
indication that its legitimacy, or at least that of some of its institutions or 
actions, in certain constituencies, is questioned. Yet, the actions they can take 
to re-strengthen that legitimacy at the same time are limited. This is especially 
the case when a state reaches a point where it uses violence to enforce 
decisions. It is, then, likely to end up in a spiral of legitimacy crises, which 
very well may spread among constituencies. Arendt points out that loss of 
power becomes a temptation to substitute violence for power but that the use of 
violence is a sign of weakness rather than power.115 In the same vein, David 
Easton suggests that ‘where acceptance of outputs as binding must depend 
                                                      
113 Ibid. 
114 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Translated, Edited, and with an 
Introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946, 
p. 249. 




upon force, the social costs are high’.116 If they can continue to operate at all, 
‘illegitimate political regimes operate far less efficiently than legitimate 
regimes’.117 
As its aims are detrimental to that of the state, the QSE can gain legitimacy 
where the state loses it. Legitimacy is not a zero sum game in the sense that 
when one entity loses it its opponents automatically gain it. But, when a regime 
loses legitimacy, it influences the legitimacy of other groups in society, 
especially its enemies and any entity filling the authority vacuum. For the 
QSEs on the other side of the statehood conflict, the ability to create and 
maintain legitimacy is a prerequisite for success. They need to influence their 
legitimacy primarily within their core constituency, but they also need to do so 
in other relevant constituencies and ultimately in the international community. 
If, for instance, a QSE seeks full statehood, it ultimately needs to be recognised 
by other states and will need legitimacy in the international community. Often, 
providing a narrative that will appeal to all different constituencies will prove 
impossible, forcing a QSE to make choices. The organisational sophistication 
of a QSE, the statehood functions it aspires to perform and the services it 
already provides, and its legitimacy in various constituencies, among other 
things, will dictate which constituency is prioritised.  
A misleading research strategy for determining legitimacy would be to ask 
people whether they believe something is legitimate. According to Beetham, 
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this might encounter the problem of expecting ordinary people to understand 
what legitimacy is.118 Although ordinary people might understand very well 
what legitimacy entails – surely they understand when it is absent, and they 
take to the barricades –, even then, it would be practically impossible to take a 
poll to determine what a representative group in every relevant constituency 
thinks at any given time about the legitimacy of the relevant entities, their 
institutions and actions. Even if such a poll were feasible, it would still be 
impossible to know why the claims of legitimacy are accepted or rejected.119 
To gauge legitimacy, and both how and how far international criminal justice 
influences the capacity to create and maintain legitimacy – and thereby the 
conduct of QSEs –, one can scrutinise the decisions they make under the 
pressure of international criminal justice. In the same vein, one can consider 
the components that together constitute legitimacy and how far they are 
influenced, in a certain constituency, at a certain time, by international criminal 
procedures. But, most important, one can assess critical legitimacy moments. 
By analysing whether international criminal justice creates critical legitimacy 
moments in certain constituencies, and by assessing the ability of QSEs to 
overcome any crises that are the result of international criminal justice, one can 
detect the influence these procedures have on QSEs.  
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Success in this continuing process of legitimation and in overcoming 
legitimacy crises heavily depends on the legitimating entity’s ability to provide 
a compelling narrative that fits in with pre-existing ideas and values in a certain 
society.120 As Nye repeatedly pointed out: ‘In the information age, success is 
not merely the result of whose army wins, but also whose story wins’.121 This 
may be a simplification, but it is true that succes largely depends on legitimacy, 
and that the ability to create and maintain legitimacy in turn depends on 
narratives, or whose story is accepted. These legitimising narratives have to be 
aimed at various constituencies, in which legitimacy is sought and has to fit in 
with the existing believes and experiences of those groups in order to be 
successful.122 International Criminal Justice is one of the most significant 
factors to impact on the process of legitimization and on the narratives used to 
that end. Legitimacy is not created in courts in The Hague, or in the UN 
Headquarters in New York for that matter, as such. However, the narratives 
used in these arenas, and the stories accepted in international Courts, and the 
narratives of events created by them, and then broadcast, transmitted and 
received – however they are actually interpreted – carry considerable weight. 
In particular, they become authoritative narratives in many Western 
constituencies in the international community. To be effective, these narratives 
have to be public, and as Beetham already pointed out, to see the evidence of 
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legitimacy, the best strategy would not be to attempt to look into ‘private 
recesses of people’s minds’, but at the public domain.123 The possibilities 
modern mass communication offer changed this process profoundly.  
In general, new ICT developments led to interconnectivity among individuals, 
institutions and communities; this growth in connectivity led to the possibility 
to bypass traditional authorities, both private and public.124 The speed of 
communication and transmittance of data mean that decision-making is 
accelerated. And the extraordinary growth in information that is available to an 
unprecedented number of people created an openness of information that 
crowded out secrecy and ended the traditional information monopoly of states 
and corporations.125 The Internet not only made one-to-one communication 
(e.g. e-mail) faster, easier available and less costly, it also democratised one-to-
many communication (e.g. YouTube). The act of broadcasting or publishing to 
a large audience is now available to every person with access to a computer 
connected to the Internet. Typical of the Internet age is many-to-many 
communication (e.g. blogs, wiki’s and Facebook) with people both creating 
input and receiving information to and from the Internet. Although these 
communication networks by now cover the entire world, one should note that 
there is still a so-called ‘global digital divide’. Large parts of the population of 
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developing countries are disadvantaged due to their limited access to ICT.126 
Furthermore, in countries with totalitarian regimes where the population has 
reasonable access to the Internet, censorship blocks certain sites that are 
perceived threatening. (e.g. China). Although these blockades are easy to 
circumvent by using servers abroad it does impair the free flow of information.  
The Arab Spring showed the importance of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc. in 
organising groups that are not necessarily geographically close, but are 
connected by ideas, to rally around a common idea, and rally against regimes. 
Besides facilitating the expressions of dissatisfaction, Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and other Internet based platforms, spread the (visual) evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of, and the atrocities committed by, these regimes.127 In Egypt, 
for instance, Facebook provided the protesters with a means to create sufficient 
environmental support to strengthen its basis of legitimacy, while Facebook 
and YouTube simultaneously showed the atrocities of the Mubarak regime in a 
way that his legitimacy eroded, which was covered in real time on Twitter.128 
Social media was not only used to organise protest, but also to show the 
atrocities and brutality of the regime. YouTube is even more apt to almost 
instantly spread the images of atrocities and injustices around the world, and is 
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used widely across the Arab spring. Or, as an Egyptian activist put it in a tweet, 
during the anti-Mubarak protests: ‘we use Facebook to schedule the protests, 
Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world’.129 Al Jazeera, even 
before the ‘Arab Spring’, had showed that CNN might have lost most of its 
relevance, but also showed that satellite networks are still very influential. Not 
in the least because they further spread content produced and work as both a 
traditional news network and an amplifier of mass-to-mass communications.  
In the increasingly interconnected world technology brought us, all different 
groups that have to be influenced are increasingly subject to the same 
messages.130 The messages and actions that make those narratives, and their 
counter-narratives, can usually be found in the public domain. When narratives 
are no longer accepted, competing narratives start to prevail, or it can be seen 
that the legitimacy of an entity, its actions or institutions are questioned in 
certain groups. It is in those moments that one can detect the indicators for 
legitimacy crises.  
Narratives are not PR, or they could be, but they are not per se. A narrative is 
an account of a series of events.131 It is how a story is told, which events are 
selected, how they are presented and connected to other events or myths, or 
placed in a historical or cultural context. Narratives not only structure our 
perception of the world around us, but at the same time influence that 
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perception. Although it may be hard to imagine that a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing can be perceived in any other way than as a despicable crime, often 
there is a group that does so. To justify these acts a group places the same 
events in a different narrative, usually one of victimhood or (existential) threat, 
belonging or ownership, and often based on history, myths or other pre-
existing ideas. The availability of moving image narratives has a more acute 
impact on the perceptions of people than other means of conveying a 
narrative.132 The availability of images, the technology to capture them, and 
who is able to share and spread these images, has been steadily growing over 
the last century, and surging in the last 20 years. That is not to say that limiting 
or selecting the images and changing statements to make these images fit better 
with the pre-existing ideas, sentiments and beliefs of a certain group, can no 
longer make a change in the perception of an action, or policy, in that group. 
Even in places where the public has access to all kinds of information about 
war, and images of its consequences that are freely available on the Internet, 
the images that reach them are often filtered. In the US for instance, the 
audience that Fox News attracts will be exposed to different images, and 
information accompanying those images than those watching CNBC. Members 
of the ‘Christians United for Israel’ Facebook-group are exposed to different 
cartoons, photos, and moving images than subscribers to the ‘Free Palestine’ 
group.133 What both narratives have in common is that they fit in with the pre-
existing ideas of most of their members. The members of the ‘Pro-Assad’ and 
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those of the ‘Syrian Revolution’ Facebook-groups both see YouTube clips of 
very similar war crimes and humanitarian disaster, but accompanied by very 
different narratives, and often do want to see or hear the opposing narrative.134 
In short, people tend not to listen to what they do not want to hear, and do not 
watch what they do not want to see.135 However, in an interconnected world, 
the same message will be available and often reach various audiences, making 
it harder, and sometimes impossible, to send different legitimating messages to 
different audiences simultaneously.  
A legitimating narrative needs an audience to be effective. Indicators of critical 
legitimacy moments are therefore available in the public domain. The main 
indicators of legitimacy crisis are the same means that are used to convey the 
public narratives used by those who claim and maintain legitimacy: 
newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts. Internet made mass-to-mass 
communication possible, but is self-selecting. In a way, it is very easy to send 
messages fitting in with the pre-existing beliefs of groups that do not share a 
geographical location, but are formed around a common interest. However, 
these narratives often need an amplifier to spread the message effectively. 
Whether it is a re-tweet by people with many followers on Twitter, or a 
YouTube clip that is picked up by a ‘classic’ news network, they need some 
form of amplification. Moreover, many of those ‘Internet’ narratives lack 
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credibility, especially among those groups opposing the message sent, at least 
until confirmed by a credible journalistic source.  
Implied and explicit messages that influence the success of parties seeking 
legitimacy are sent in every possible way by statements, but also with actions, 
not only by the actors that are seeking legitimacy, but also those of other actors 
and international organisations like the ICC, the UN or even NGOs, will 
influence their legitimacy in different constituencies. Moreover, the 
international community is highly susceptible to normative judgements made 
by international organisations and especially courts. When charged with crimes 





CHAPTER IV.                                                                                     
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE IMPACT ON LEGITIMACY IN KOSOVO* 
  
While much has been written in connection with the ICTY, as a body and 
regarding the development of international law, as well as about the Tribunal in 
relation to Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, consideration of Kosovo has been 
limited. Yet, it was in Kosovo, where the impact of the Tribunal can be 
distinguished most clearly. The existing literature predominantly focuses on the 
legal procedures and juridical merits of cases, not on how these procedures 
influenced the outcome of the conflict over Kosovo. Sonja Boelaert-Suominen 
and Marc Weller have each discussed legal aspects of the Tribunal’s 
engagement with Kosovo.1 Laura Dickinson focused on the relationship 
between the ICTY and the domestic-hybrid court in Kosovo.2 Michael Scharf 
examined the ICTY’s handling of the Milošević case, including those parts 
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relating to Kosovo,3 while David Gowan, a former British diplomat who had 
been responsible for war crimes liaison between London and The Hague, 
explained something of the role the UK played regarding Kosovo.4 Various 
authors have considered the ICTY investigation of NATO action over Kosovo 
during 1999.5 None of these, mostly legal, analyses, concern the impact of 
international criminal justice on Kosovo itself. A handful of studies focused on 
the ICTY’s impact on Kosovo. Mirko Klarin examines the effect of the 
Tribunal on public opinion there.6 Majbritt Lyck, concerned with the 
implications of executing arrest warrants for suspects in post-conflict 
peacekeeping situations, considers the case of former Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) commander, and then Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj and its 
implications for the NATO-led security force in Kosovo.7 Fred Cocozzelli 
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considers how Kosovo’s fate might have been different had events at critical 
junctures after 1999 taken a different course, one of which concerns the 
Tribunal: the indictment of then-Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj.8 This is, 
indeed, a significant moment, where it contributes to the legitimacy-building 
process affecting the KLA and Kosovo’s quest for recognition of independent 
international personality. Cocozzelli, while noting the significant moment as 
part of a path-dependency study, fails to develop the analysis of that critical 
juncture into a wider understanding of critical legitimacy regarding Kosovo. 
More significantly, he misses the key critical moment for Kosovo’s legitimacy, 
the point from which later ones flowed: the indictment of Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milošević, in May 1999. The purpose of this present chapter is to 
show how, despite a somewhat accidental character, the Tribunal’s most 
significant activity regarding Kosovo was this indictment, which transformed 
the course of the Kosovo project and the prospects that the KLA would achieve 
its ambition of a new state in international society.  
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA: THE REINCARNATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE  
The Yugoslav War played an important role in the rise of international criminal 
justice for many reasons. First, the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) gave rise to a conflict that, at its core, had a strategy of war 
crimes.9 Secondly, the Yugoslav War was the ‘first truly television war’.10 
Through satellite-TV networks, images of refugees, the shelling of civilian 
targets, and the concentration camps at Omarska and Trnopolje reached a wider 
audience than the horrors of previous wars. Televised human rights violations 
changed public opinion, especially among Western publics, and ‘concern 
shifted to condemnation’ in relation to human rights violations.11  
Beside international audiences watching the events in Yugoslavia unfold on 
their televisions, so did a swath of international and regional organisations. The 
UN, the European Community (EC) (after 1993 the European Union (EU)), the 
                                                      
9 For more on the strategic use of war crimes in the breakup of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, See: J. Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy 
of War Crimes, London: Hurst and Co., 2003. 
10 M. Michalski and J. Gow, War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, p. 118. Michalski and Gow acknowledge that the Vietnam 
War and the Gulf Conflict both have a claim to be the first ‘telivision war’. But, while at 
the end of the Vietnam War same day broadcasts became possible, reports remained 
limited and isolated, while the Yugoslav War was ‘the first war in which televion was 
everywhere’. Neier, ‘International Criminal Justice: Developing into a Deterrent’, p. 8 





Western European Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (after 1995, the OSCE) all expressed growing 
concern about the war that started to unfold on their doorstep. The newly 
reinvigorated Security Council, strengthened by its success in Iraq, launched a 
string of initiatives and resolutions on Yugoslavia from September 1991 
onwards. In Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991, the Council expressed its 
concern that continuation of the situation would constitute a threat to 
international peace and security and commended the efforts undertaken by the 
EC, its Member States, and the CSCE to restore peace and dialogue in 
Yugoslavia, and to implement cease-fires.12 When those cease-fires were 
broken, the UN established an arms embargo, in Resolution 721 of 11 
December 1991.13 In the course of 1992, the Council established The United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in Resolution 743 of 21 February 
1992;14 it expressed its concern about the daily violations of the cease-fire;15 
demanded that all parties stopped the fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina; and 
noted the urgent need for humanitarian assistance.16 In Resolution 757, the 
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Council installed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro).17 Later in the year, the Council first acted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter and condemned violations of international humanitarian law, 
including those involved in the practice of “ethnic cleansing”’.18 The resolution 
reaffirmed that those persons who committed or ordered the commission of 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, were 
individually responsible, although at the time no international mechanism to 
hold them responsible existed. Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992 established a 
no-fly zone over Bosnia and Hercegovina. Most significant for later steps 
towards the formation of an international tribunal was the establishment of a 
‘commission of experts to investigate and collect evidence on “grave breaches” 
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian 
law’.19  
By the beginning of 1993, the Council had repeatedly expressed alarm at 
continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law. 
It had mentioned horrors ranging from ‘mass forcible expulsion and 
deportation of civilians’, to ‘imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention 
centres’, and deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances.20 
It had strongly condemned ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the massive, organized and 
systematic detention and rape of women. But, despite all the measures it had 
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taken, the Security Council, and the wider international community, had been 
unable to stop or prevent these atrocities.21 The Commission of Experts issued 
its first Interim Report, on 22 February 1993, which stated that the 
establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal was necessary.22 In 
May 1993, Resolution 827 established an International Tribunal, in the belief 
that prosecuting the individuals responsible for violations of international 
humanitarian law ‘would contribute to ensuring that such violations were 
halted and effectively redressed’.23 The Security Council did so under Chapter 
VII, as a tool to restore and maintain peace and security. However, in clear 
view of the entire world, including that of the Security Council, the killing, 
raping, and ethnic cleansing continued, despite continued condemning of those 
violations of international law and previous resolutions by the Council and the 
international community.   
Resolution 827 provided the ICTY with a Statute determining its jurisdiction, a 
basic structure, and very general procedural rules. The jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal defined in the Statute was little more than an expanded version of its 
official name: ‘The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991’. Besides 
defining the court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis as open ended from 1 January 
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1991 onwards, and its jurisdiction ratione loci as extending to the entire 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, it also gave the Tribunal primacy over all 
competing domestic jurisdictions.24 The jurisdiction ratione personae of the 
Tribunal was not limited by the official position of an individual or by 
immunities applying to heads of state.25 Moreover, the Statute identified four 
categories of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICTY; grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.26 However, apart from a Statute and 
jurisdiction, when Resolution 827 passed unanimously in the Security Council, 
the newly found court lacked everything else a court needed, and the ICTY was 
a long way from being a functioning international criminal tribunal. The 
tribunal had no judges, prosecutors, or registrar; there were no courtrooms or 
prison facilities, and there were no means to conduct investigations.27 
Moreover, for guidance, the Tribunal had little precedents it could fall back 
on.28 Although an extensive body of substantive international criminal law 
existed, and the Statute defined some of the norms applicable, in terms of 
procedural law and jurisprudence, the ICTY had to start with an almost blank 
slate.  
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According to Resolution 827, the ICTY had its seat in The Hague, and the 
Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the Netherlands and the 
United Nations of 27 May 1994 solved some of the practical issues such as 
premises of the Tribunal, use of detention facilities in Scheveningen, and the 
legal position of the Tribunal and its staff, such as the personality of the court 
and immunities applying to its employees.29 However, one of the biggest 
challenges the ICTY had to overcome in those early days was a lack of 
funding. While, within the UN, a debate was active about whether an initiative 
by the Security Council could be financed by the regular UN budget, the 
Tribunal only received $5.6 million, a fraction of the estimated costs 
(excluding detention and housing costs) of $31.2 million for the first year of 
operations.30  
That the ICTY was so underfunded was also a sign, or a symptom, of the fact 
that few really believed an international criminal tribunal could work. 
Scepticism that was based on the fact that the Tribunal was established on the 
presumtion that the Security Council could do so under Chapter VII but then in 
many ways was left to its own devices to establish itself, its legality under 
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international law, and its legitimacy. Even among those who had supported the 
establishment of the Tribunal, many doubted whether it was feasible to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions, and expected it to remain little more than a 
political statement. Not least, this was because the ICTY lacked a police force 
to track down, arrest and transport accussed to The Hague. Nevertheless, by 
July 1994, the Office of the Prosecutor was sufficiently staffed to begin field 
investigations and, in November 1994, the first indictment, against Dragan 
Nikolić, was issued and confirmed. By July 1995, two years after its 
establishment and after a year of being operational, the Tribunal had indicted 
46 individuals.31 However, the individuals accused by the ICTY, in its first 
years, were not those ‘most responsible’ for the crimes committed. With the 
exception of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, most of the accused were 
lower ranking individuals, who were accused of executing orders to commit 
atrocities, rather of than having ordered them. Nikolić, for instance, was 
commander of Sušica camp, in eastern Bosnia, and Duško Tadić, the first to 
stand trial at the ICTY, commencing in May 1996, also had a low rank in the 
hierarchy of the Serb paramilitary forces. This was in part because the ICTY 
had difficulties apprehending suspects and could only undertake proceedings in 
the cases of Dražen Erdemović, a member of the Bosnian Serb Army, who had 
been indicted for participating in killing Bosnian Muslims at Pilica Farm, and 
pleaded guilty, and Tadić, who had been arrested in Germany. Not all the 
countries that had come out of the former Yugoslavia showed will to work with 
                                                      




the Tribunal. The prosecution of ‘small fry’ did however make the ‘Tribunal 
look rather impotent when it came to the “big fish”’.32  
The first Prosecutor at the Tribunal Richard Goldstone, and the first President, 
Antonio Cassese, made place, in 1996 and 1997 respectively, for Louise 
Arbour and Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, as the Tribunal entered a new phase. 
The two had been driving forces in establishing the Tribunal and turned a ‘lofty 
– some might have said nebulous – idea to a living reality’.33 However, now 
that the ICTY was a real, functioning Court, it also had to deal with the 
practical realities of a real Court. These ranged from dealing with accused in 
detention to developing procedural law. The ICTY had to develop a victims 
and witnesses programme, a legal aid system, and had to deal with defence 
attorneys.34 Moreover the Tribunal created a Judicial Database of all its 
jurisprudence, trial records and evidence presented to the Court, in order to 
deal with vast amounts of information. Besides practical and legal issues, the 
ICTY started to aim to prosecute those higher up the chain of command, and 
by issuing indictments under seal the new Prosecutor’s strategy made it more 
likely that accused would be apprehended. It was Arbour who did not relent 
when under pressure not to go all the way to the top of the command chain, 
indicting Slobodan Milošević for crimes committed in Kosovo, in 1999. 
Moreover, she was able to persuade those with boots on the ground in the 
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former Yugoslavia, in particular members of NATO, to cooperate with the 
Tribunal in arresting suspects.35  
Although the first arrests by international forces on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia meant a turning point for the Tribunal and gave a symbolic boost to 
the Court, some high profile indictees remained unaccounted for in the years 
that followed.36 Moreover, the cases of those who were present in The Hague 
often moved slowly. In part, this was due to the procedural law that had to be 
developed, as the Tribunal went along. In part, it was due to the Court’s 
sometimes broad scope in the charges against the accused and the desire to 
create a historical record of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.37 
But the Tribunal’s desire to give those it accused a fair trial, and to let them 
exercise the right to represent themselves also contributed to lengthy 
proceedings that were sometimes misused as a political stage. Especially 
Milošević, while defending himself, sometimes used this right for rants against 
the Court and to make political accusations. Nevertheless, it was a huge 
setback for the Tribunal that the proceedings against Milošević, which had 
started after his arrest and transfer to The Hague, in June 2001, and ‘had 
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always been the trial for which the ad hoc Court was created’ came to a 
premature end with the death of the accused in March 2006.38 
Notwithstanding the huge amounts of work done in developing procedures and 
both legal and institutional frameworks for international criminal justice, the 
focus, in those early years, was on The Hague and, as Kerr points out, there 
was a lack of dialogue with the Tribunal’s core constituents in the former 
Yugoslavia and the late start for the ICTY’s outreach programme was a 
mistake.39 Moreover, the ICTY, throughout its existence, had to deal with an 
image of anti-Serb bias, which it never managed to overcome. The acquittal, by 
the Appeals Chamber, of Croatian general Ante Gotovina and security chief 
Mladen Markač for their roles in Operation Storm, after having been found 
guilty and sentenced to 24 and 18 years respectively in first instance, enforced 
this image. Only two weeks after the acquittal of Gotovina and Markač, 
Ramush Haradinaj, the former leader of the KLA and prime minister of the 
Republic of Kosovo, was acquitted for the second time for crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. This only exacerbated 
the negative perception of the Tribunal among the Serb population. 
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The ICTY had an enormous impact on the development of international 
criminal justice. This was not only at the procedural level of international law, 
but also in terms of a vast body of jurisprudence and the institutional 
development. The ICTY played a pivotal role in the evolution of international 
criminal law and procedure. Moreover, against all odds, the ICTY eventually 
managed to apprehend all individuals at large. In May 2011, Mladić was finally 
apprehended, after being on the run for 16 years, and, on 20 July 2011, Goran 
Hadžić was the last of the 161 ICTY indictees at large to be arrested and 
transferred to The Hague.  
THE KLA AND KOSOVO 
While Kosovo had statehood questions dating back to the Second World War 
and before, and so represented the QSE phenomenon already, this took on a 
new dimension with the emergence of the KLA in the course of the 1990s. On 
22 April 1996, four simultaneous attacks on Serbian security forces were 
claimed by a mysterious and until then little known organisation calling itself 
the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or Kosovo Liberation Army – the 
KLA. While in Kosovo a majority had supported the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova throughout the early 1990s, in the 
Diaspora and among exiles in Western Europe the idea that the Serb leadership 
would only bend under force was taking hold. They linked up with radicals in 




Movement for Kosovo (LPK) set up a special branch, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, to prepare for a guerrilla war against the Serbs.40 Although the KLA 
executed some successful attacks on Serbian policemen between 1993 and 
1996, it had a very limited supply of arms and ammunition. This changed in 
early 1997, when the collapse of a pyramid scheme in Albania led to the 
collapse of the economy and civil unrest in the entire country.41 The 
government of President Berisha fell and with him governmental control over 
the weapons in army depots. Some weaponry from the border area with 
Kosovo disappeared and gave a boost to local rebels in Kosovo, not necessarily 
part of the KLA, at that stage, although, broadly, the KLA was to get most of 
its materiel from Serbian sources.42 However, the KLA and its supporting 
communities were boosted and began to attract both funds and recruits, 
enabling it to step up its campaign of attacks against the Serbian police and 
ethnic Albanians whom it regarded as collaborators. 
Kosovo has been contested territory since the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
and probably before that. The territory of what is now Kosovo has changed 
hands often and violently over the last centuries, usually accompanied by a 
shift of the ethnic composition of the population. There is disagreement about 
the numbers of both Albanian and Serbian refugees that fled the territory 
during, or after, the 1999 war, and about the number that returned. That the 
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censuses in 1991 and 2011 were boycotted by either one side or the other 
further adding to the uncertainty about the pre- and post-war percentages of the 
population identifying as Serbian or Albanian.43 However, it is usually 
assumed that around 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo is ethnic 
Albanian, a percentage that is unlikely to be too far off.44 Nevertheless, both 
Serbs and Albanians claim Kosovo as their home.45 
Since the declining Ottoman Empire lost Kosovo in the Balkan wars in 1912, it 
was as part of Serbia that Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
and later the SFRY. Although Kosovo’s autonomy increased during Tito’s rule, 
ethnic Albanian aspirations to be recognised as a full member republic of the 
Yugoslav federation never disappeared, even though it was denied. Throughout 
the 1980s, growing ethnic tension between the Albanian majority and Serb 
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minority led to numerous violent outbreaks.46 This provided Slobodan 
Milošević, then chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia, with a 
chance to boost his political career by openly supporting the Serbs in Kosovo. 
On 24 April 1987, after a riot with the Kosovo police, Milošević told a crowd 
of Serbs and Montenegrins: ‘Nobody must be allowed to beat you’.47 Televised 
that same evening in Serbia, the event became a turning point in Milošević’s 
career. In early 1989, strikes and demonstrations against the reforms of the 
Serbian constitution that removed most of the autonomous powers Kosovo had 
enjoyed since 1974 were violently repressed.48 And when Milošević became 
president of Serbia in May 1989, he pressed on with installing allies in the 
leadership of Kosovo in an ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’. On 28 June, at an 
event remembering the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, in front of a 
crowd of an estimated one million Serbs that had come down to the heart of 
Kosovo, Milošević warned: ‘Six centuries later, now, we are being again 
engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although 
such things cannot be excluded yet’.49 
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In July 1990, the Assembly of Serbia passed a decision to suspend the 
Assembly of Kosovo, shortly after 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates 
from that Assembly had passed an unofficial resolution declaring Kosovo to be 
an equal and independent entity within the SFRY. In a reaction to the loss of 
autonomy and increasing control by Belgrade, the Kosovo Assembly first 
declared Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia, but then on 22 September 1991 
declared Kosovo independent. In May 1992, in an election that was deemed 
illegal, null and void by the Serbian authorities that retained effective control 
over Kosovo, Dr. Rugova of the LDK was elected president of Kosovo. 
Rugova was running parallel institutions, but while the rest of Yugoslavia was 
burning, he remained a proponent of a non-violent strategy towards statehood 
and against oppression by Serbia. Although this strategy was more based on 
Serb military superiority and a fear of being ethnically cleansed than on 
anything else, the misunderstanding in the international community about the 
non-violence of the Kosovo Albanians – that earned Rugova the nickname ‘the 
Ghandi of the Balkans’ – was a fortunate one for the Kosovo Albanians.50 By 
1995, when the desperation of the EC and other international actors to come to 
a solution for Bosnia kept Kosovo off the agenda at Dayton, ‘the Kosovo 
                                                      




Albanians realized that passive resistance had failed as a strategy'.51 As Tim 
Judah puts it, they felt themselves 'penalized for eschewing violence'.52 
As pressure built among the ethnic Albanian population and Serbian repression 
and provocation continued, a low-level armed conflict began. The conflict 
intensified when, after the shooting of a police officer in February 1998, the 
Yugoslav Army (VJ) took revenge by killing 27 residents of Drenica. A week 
later 58 people were killed in the shelling of the compound of the family of 
Adem Jashari, creating a martyr and momentum for the KLA, in terms of 
support among the population.53 As the KLA started to take territory, Kosovo 
Albanians started to believe in the KLA, and donations and recruits started to 
come in. Initially they took areas dominated by Albanians, but as they tried 
their luck at areas with mixed populations and near the Trepça/Trepča mines, 
the Serbs started a serious counter offensive.54 ‘Milošević’ forces, as they had 
done in Bosnia and Croatia, pushed streams of terrified refugees straight into 
the cameras of the international media, losing the war for public opinion even 
before it really started’.55 
On 16 January, the executed bodies of 45 farmers and their children were 
found near the village of Račak. The massacre ‘was widely perceived in 
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Europe and Washington as the final warning bell, and was so portrayed by the 
media’.56 The international community, with the failure to prevent ethnic 
cleansing and atrocities in Bosnia fresh in their memory, wanted to end the 
armed conflict in Kosovo as soon as possible and with all means at their 
disposal.57 The images of displaced people and refugees that the conflict started 
to produce provided the international media with images similar to those of 
Bosnia, only a few years earlier. Moreover, the same narratives were used that 
were used in the Bosnian War. Kosovo was different in many respects, but 
what matters was that the depiction was the same, and the images available to 
Western audiences were images that were associated with the death and 
destruction of Bosnia and the role of the Serbs in those crimes. 
All attempts to negotiate a settlement that would keep Kosovo within Serbia, 
but would guarantee the impossibility of ethnic cleansing, failed. In a last surge 
of coercive diplomacy the Contact Group, composed of the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, organised a final round 
of talks at Chateau de Rambouillet, just outside Paris, in February 1999. On 21 
January, President Clinton and Prime-Minister Blair had already agreed that 
force should be used, if the Contact Group proved unsuccessful; a NATO 
activation order had been approved as early as October 1998 and on 30 January 
the Alliance had sent out a press statement: ‘The NATO Secretary General may 
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authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory’.58 The Russians, wanting 
to keep the initiative with the Contact Group they were part of, had given tacit 
approval to threatening with the use of force, yet continued to insist that the 
actual use of force by NATO against Yugoslavia would be unacceptable.59 The 
negotiation process at Rambouillet was not only putting pressure on the Serbs, 
but the agreement also proposed that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia, and 
the KLA would have to disarm. However, US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright made clear to the Kosovo delegation, consisting of KLA members and 
Rugova, and headed by Hashim Thaçi, that if they would not sign, there would 
be no airstrikes against Serbia.60 Nolens volens, the Kosovo Albanians 
eventually signed on 18 March. Milošević, possibly out of fear of being handed 
over to the ICTY, had stayed in Belgrade, where US envoy Richard Holbrooke 
visited him in a last attempt to make him sign the agreement. He refused and 
36 hours later NATO commenced Operation Allied Force.  
The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia lasted from 24 March 1999 to 10 June 
1999, and was a first in many ways. The campaign was the first sustained use 
of armed force by NATO; the first time NATO used massive armed force with 
the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions, but 
without authorisation of the Council; and the first major bombing campaign 
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intended to bring a halt to crimes against humanity.61 Belligerents usually have 
different expectations of the outcome of an armed conflict, but Milošević and 
NATO had very widely diverging expectations of the outcome of the bombing 
campaign. Milošević initially had reason to believe that the unity within the 
alliance would not last and would be over soon. While NATO also expected a 
short bombing campaign, its leaders relied on experience from Bosnia, when it 
only took 13 days of airstrikes to get Milošević to Dayton – albeit that the two 
situations were quite distinct, from the Serbian leader’s perspective.62 When 
three days, or one week, and not even 13 days of air operations failed to alter 
Milošević’s position, a protracted stalemate emerged, which ended abruptly 
and surprisingly, after 78 days. Throughout that period, Kosovo remained very 
firmly within the embrace of Serbian sovereignty, in the international 
perspective, despite the NATO action. The KLA, while more prominent than 
ever before, remained a largely ineffectual phenomenon, even with NATO air 
power at work. The armed conflict was suddenly ended, Serbia’s sovereign 
grip on Kosovo was loosened, and the KLA was transformed from irritant to 
victorious combatant by international judicial intervention, albeit that this was 
entirely unexpected. The publication of the indictment against Milošević and 
others inverted the bases of legitimacy and revolutionised the environments of 
support. The next section will discuss the indictment, ahead of later analysis of 
its impact. 
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THE MILOŠEVIĆ INDICTMENT  
On 27 May 1999, 64 days into the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, 
the ICTY announced the indictment, and issued arrest warrants, against 
Slobodan Milošević and four other senior members of the leadership of Serbia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.63 The indictment, that had been 
submitted five days earlier by Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour, besides 
indicting Milošević as President of the FRY, was also directed against Milan 
Milutinović, President of Serbia; Nikola Šainović, Deputy Prime Minister of 
the FRY; Colonel General Dragljub Ojdanić, Chief of the General Staff of the 
Yugoslav Armed Forces; and Vlajko Stojiljković, Minister of the Interior of 
Serbia. According to the Prosecutor, Milošević et al. had ‘planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a campaign of terror and 
violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo in the FRY’.64 
The Prosecutor claimed that this campaign was executed by forces of the FRY 
and Serbia acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support 
of Milošević and the other indicted persons, and that they were ‘undertaken 
with the objective of removing a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian 
population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over 
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the province’.65 Besides a general description of the events in Kosovo, the 
indictment also described details of 20 incidents, or operations, that were 
executed in a systematic manner and together resulted in the forced deportation 
of approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians and the killing of 
hundreds of Kosovo Albanian civilians including women and children.66 The 
Serbian leaders were charged with three counts of crimes against humanity; 
deportation (punishable under punishable under Article 5(d) of the Statute of 
the Tribunal), Murder (Article 5 [a]), Persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds (Article 5[h]), and one count of a violation of the law or 
customs of war; murder (punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal and recognised by Article 3[1][a] [murder] of the Geneva 
Conventions).67  
Before the indictment against Milošević et al., the Tribunal had focussed 
mainly on the perpetrators of specific atrocities or criminal acts. The first 
indictments were against people such as Dragan Nikolić, the Serbian 
commander of the Sušica camp, Duško Sikirica the commander of the 
Keraterm camp, and other commanders, guards, and interrogators of camps in 
Bosnia, as well as members of paramilitaries and local politicians. However, 
the responsibility for these crimes was extended to their commanding officers 
and the leadership of the Republika Srpska by the indictment of Ratko Mladić 
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and Radovan Karadžić.68 Until March 1999, the leadership of Serbia, or the 
FRY, had not been indicted. This was not because the Prosecutor did not want 
to, but because she had no possibility of doing so. As Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
Graham Blewitt of the ICTY later explained: ‘We were given a task by the 
Security Council and it was our job to bring the indictment if the evidence was 
sufficient’.69 The indictment over Kosovo was a result of the ability of the 
Prosecutor to gather evidence of violations of humanitarian law in Kosovo. It 
was a result of the ability to establish command responsibility of the Serb and 
FRY leadership over those executing the executions, a connection between 
those masterminding, and the foot soldiers doing, the dirty work of ethnic 
cleansing.  
In the Kosovo case, instead of prosecuting the individuals that pulled the 
trigger, the Prosecutor could refer both to individual responsibility, under 
article 7(1), and to command responsibility, under article 7(3), of the statute of 
the ICTY.70 By describing the official functions of the accused, the indictment 
claimed they had 'had authority or control' over the individuals committing 
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crimes. Command responsibility was more straightforward to address for 
crimes committed in Kosovo than it had been for crimes committed in Bosnia, 
as Kosovo was considered a purely internal matter and there was no entity like 
the Republika Srpska acting as a buffer. Moreover, the indictment pointed out 
that Milošević was the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) as he 
chaired the Supreme Defence Council.71 Although we can assume that 
Milošević also had de facto control over all Serbian forces, including the forces 
of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova, 
MUP) and other Para-military and police forces, in peacetime the formal chain 
of command of these forces was less straightforward than that of the VJ. 
However, a state of war was declared in Yugoslavia, on 24 March 1999, 
increasing Milošević’s control over domestic media and parliament, which also 
went beyond the de facto control he already wielded, to give him de jure 
control over all forces, for the first times since war broke out in the Yugoslav 
lands, at the start of the 1990s.72  
At the same time, the ability of the Tribunal to gather evidence increased. The 
ICTY had already claimed jurisdiction in relation to Kosovo, in early 1998.73 
And the Security Council had affirmed its jurisdiction in November 1998.74 
However, as a result of Yugoslavia’s persistently denying this claim to 
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jurisdiction, the ICTY had no access to Kosovo. The Chief Prosecutor was 
denied access to Kosovo after the Račak massacre of January 1999, and at the 
time of the indictments the Tribunal had no access to the sites of the atrocities 
it described.75 With a lack of forensic evidence, the prosecution had to depend 
on the witness statements it gathered itself from refugees in camps outside of 
Kosovo and on testimonies transmitted through NGOs.76 Not only had the 
Tribunal’s abilities to collect evidence improved, but governments could also 
provide information, and the US and UK, that both had been hesitant to share 
information during the early years of the ICTY, now handed over evidence in 
the form of satellite images and telephone intercepts to the Prosecutor to make 
the case against Milošević.77  
Milošević was indicted because it was the first time the ICTY was able to do 
so. But, the timing of publication of the indictment was also prompted by fear 
of a deal between Holbrooke and Milošević. Although Holbrooke’s promising 
Milošević immunity of prosecution by the ICTY in itself would have held no 
real legal value, it would have undermined the work of the Tribunal. This 
illustrates how the diplomats and NATO did not foresee the impact that the 
indictment would have. On the contrary, when Washington and London found 
out about the imminent indictment, they tried to persuade Chief Prosecutor 
Arbour to delay the indictment, or keep it under seal, as they expected it could 
                                                      






hamper negotiations to end the NATO campaign.78 The indictment of 
Milošević also proved to be a turning point for the future status of Kosovo and 
shaped its transition to statehood, as is demonstrated in the final part of this 
analysis. 
THE PIVOTAL MOMENT: THE INDICTMENT TRANSFORMS ARMED 
CONFLICT AND THE SERBIA-KOSOVO LEGITIMACY EQUATION  
At the beginning of 1998, the KLA was designated as a terrorist organisation 
by the US State Department. In 1999, it was a legitimate negotiating party. In 
1998, Kosovo was nowhere in terms of statehood. In terms of military 
capabilities at that time, the KLA had no chance of enforcing anything against 
the VJ and Serbian security troops, and politically the international community 
was protecting the principles of territorial integrity. After 1999, Kosovo was 
put on a path towards statehood. By the end of 2012, Kosovo was a self-
declared republic, which had de facto control over most of the territory it 
claimed and a government that formally executed most of the functions usually 
attributed to statehood. Following a unilateral declaration of independence, in 
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February 2008, by December 2013, 106 UN Member States had recognised 
Kosovo as a sovereign state having international legal personality independent 
from Serbia.79 Its direct neighbours – Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania – 
as well as 23 of the 28 Members of the EU recognised Kosovo’s independence, 
although the European Union lacks the unanimity to express a common foreign 
policy towards Kosovo’s independence. From transitional administration under 
the UN, Kosovo moved on to become a transitional state, with more and more 
qualities of complete statehood.80 
Although blocked from membership of the UN by states that objected to its 
independence, most notably Russia, Kosovo became a member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in June 2009, and it 
became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), in December 2012.81 While, by late 2012, the government of Kosovo 
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exercised most statehood functions, transitional support and administration of 
Kosovo were still needed and in place. The United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) still existed and were both operating in 
Kosovo, under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.82 The EULEX mandate 
had been extended, until 2014, and had largely taken over the functions of 
UNMIK. By the same point, the NATO-led international peace implementation 
force KFOR had been scaled down, but was also still necessary. The 
International Civilian Office (ICO), a parallel body to UNMIK, founded by the 
International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG), involving states backing 
Kosovo’s independence, to oversee the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) – known as the Ahtisaari Plan, closed in 
September 2012.  
That Kosovo would take the route of transitioning statehood, becoming a 
functioning de facto or quasi-state was not a foregone conclusion. On the 
contrary, in early 1998, Kosovo was absolutely nowhere in terms of statehood. 
Militarily, it faced an uphill battle against a superior opponent, and politically it 
was not in a position to take any major steps towards statehood. The KLA was 
no match for the Serb security forces and the Yugoslav Army, in terms of arms 
and military capabilities. In terms of international support, the outlook was 
bleak, at best. The KLA was listed as a terrorist organisation by the US State 
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Department.83 And with the limited degrees of NATO support at the time, 
aimed at preventing ethnic cleansing, the Kosovo Albanians had very limiting 
prospects of enforcing anything against the Yugoslav Army.84 
In 1998, there were no real prospects of political achievement either. The 
sovereignty principle and the protection of states, their status and borders, 
favoured Belgrade as far as the international community was concerned. The 
international community generally adheres to those sovereignty principles, 
even while some of the parties involved with the former Yugoslavia, at that 
time, in particular, the United States, were to a certain extent sympathetic to the 
Kosovo Albanians. There was a widespread consensus that the territorial 
integrity of states is limited by humanitarian concerns, and that this might 
trump the non-intervention principle, but few were willing to go any further 
than that.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1160, of 31 March 1998, expressed the 
position of the international community, at the time, by affirming ‘the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, although it also expressed support for ‘a 
                                                      
83 J. Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 
1948-2001, London: Hurst 2012, p. 140.  
84 Madeleine Albright, in her memoir, stated: ‘I wanted to stop Milošević from marauding 
through Kosovo, but I didn’t want that determination exploited by the KLA for purposes 
we opposed. We therefore took pains to insist that we would not operate as the KLA’s air 
force or rescue the KLA if it got into trouble as a result of its own actions’. (Albright, 




substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration’.85 
The resolution condemned ‘use of excessive force by Serbian police forces 
against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo’, but in the same 
sentence did the same for ‘all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army’.86 All diplomatic efforts focussed on preventing ethnic cleansing 
stressed the territorial integrity of the territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The proposals, or negotiations, by the international 
community, the Yeltsin-Milošević Agreement, in June 1998, the negotiations 
by Christopher Hill, or the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreements, were all based 
on the basic presumption of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo.87 So did the 
more harshly worded UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 
1998. Even when, in 1999, the international community became firmer with 
Serbia, the Rambouillet Accords only foresaw establishing democratic self-
governance, granting Kosovo substantial autonomy. Milošević refused to sign 
the Rambouillet accords: self-governance in itself would have been a bitter pill 
to swallow for most Serbs, but allowing NATO forces to restore order and 
oversee that self-governance, while granting NATO troops immunity and right 
of passage through the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
was definitely too much to bear.88 Yet, even these proposed provisions did not 
nearly go as far in terms of a road towards transitional administration and 
                                                      
85 UN Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, pp. 57, 67, 81-83.  
88 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet 




transitional statehood as the highway that Kosovo eventually took after the 
war. Although the Rambouillet Accords stipulated that Serbia were to remove 
forces from Kosovo, they included a commitment to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, for instance, 
gave the FRY the power to control international border crossings.89 In essence 
it proposed self-governance and in turn asked a commitment from the KLA to 
stop fighting and the Kosovo Albanians to give up the quest for independence. 
The road of transitional statehood towards de facto independence that Kosovo 
took was the result of a combination, or chain, of events. But, in that chain of 
events, war crimes were the key, and the indictment of Slobodan Milošević 
was the most important link. The NATO bombings indisputably played a 
central role in turning the events that followed, as did the KLA and a myriad of 
other factors. But it was the reaction of the Serbs, which involved more ethnic 
cleansing and war crimes, resulting in a stream of refugees and displaced 
people, and ultimately the indictment of Milošević for war crimes committed in 
Kosovo, that changed the game. If war crimes and the indictment of Milošević 
are seen as the pivot, or fulcrum, on which Kosovo’s future turned, Serbia 
applied continuous resistance to the lever, on one side, and effort was applied, 
on the other, by the KLA and later the Kosovo government, NATO and the 
international community, to turn that future. However, the more resistance 
Serbia applied, the more war crimes it committed, the more legitimacy it lost, 
                                                      




thereby adding length to the lever of the KLA and the Kosovo Albanians and to 
the force that was applied by NATO against Serbia.  
The human rights violations by the Serb security forces and the Yugoslav 
Army, most notably the Račak massacre, in January 1999, meant that the 
international community could not sit back. And NATO justified the airstrikes 
that followed the failed negotiations and cease-fire by just that, preventing 
further humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. However, it was the indictment 
against Milošević that created a critical legitimacy moment. It became the 
pivotal event by which Milošević found himself in a downward spiral of 
legitimacy loss that could no longer be turned around. Milošević lost 
legitimacy in the international community as a whole, but, most important, also 
in Russia, and it was a spiral that eventually led to legitimacy loss in Serbia, as 
well. At the same time, it was a pivotal moment for the KLA, which gained 
legitimacy for its actions and aspirations. The KLA had the principle of the 
international community, and the legitimacy in that community for their aim of 
self-determination. It had legitimacy for resisting the repressive action and 
eventually war crimes, albeit that it also helped to trigger some of them, and 
committed some itself. But, the key principle of legitimacy, in this context, that 
of sovereignty, turned in that moment. And so, the support nexus in Kosovo 
aligned more with the support nexus outside Kosovo, and the new legitimacy 




Resolution 1244 still implied that sovereignty stayed with Serbia and that this 
was not complete statehood, it set the path towards it.90 
All parties in the Kosovo War depended on legitimacy for success in attaining 
their goals. The KLA not only needed legitimacy within its home 
constituencies, but also in the international community. NATO needed to 
maintain legitimacy within 19 home constituencies. Milošević needed 
legitimacy, both internally while his population was bombed, and, to a certain 
extent, externally, in the international community. For all of the actors in the 
Kosovo conflict, critical challenges and spurs to legitimacy evolved around 
war crimes. The legitimacy crises these actors had to overcome and the 
messages that they had to convey to various constituencies simultaneously 
have to be seen in conjunction with each other. Legitimacy is not a zero sum 
game, but if the narrative of one belligerent is more successful in a 
constituency, its opponent will likely lose legitimacy. 
NATO ostensibly went to war for humanitarian reasons. Its leaders made sure 
that the narratives they used focused on the protection of human rights. The 
alliance made its aims clear, in a list of demands, to which Milošević had to 
accede, in order to stop the air strikes. Milošević would have to: end violence 
and repression; withdraw all Serb forces from Kosovo; agree to the deployment 
of international forces in Kosovo; agree to the safe return of refugees and 
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access for humanitarian aid organisations; and agree to work on the basis of the 
Rambouillet agreement.91 Milošević did not take the threats seriously, and 
ongoing debate in NATO capitals seemingly indicated that he could doubt the 
alliance’s credibility.92 NATO had to deal with 19 home constituencies, each of 
which had to continue to believe in the legitimacy of its actions against the 
Serbs. In addition, it had to seek legitimacy in the wider international 
community, especially as it was not acting under a UN Security Council 
Resolution.93 
However, besides a moral argument that atrocities committed by the Serbs 
were a good reason to go to war, it had to find a narrative justifying the means 
it deployed to reach its goals. Freedman noted that the moral paradox of the 
Kosovo War lay there, ‘for it was always easier to proclaim the morality of the 
ends pursued than of the means deployed’.94 As the campaign lasted longer, 
other effects also had to be taken into account. War, inevitably, involves 
bloodshed and innocent casualties. Public opinion, or what some might call the 
‘CNN-effect’, may call for actions against atrocities, but it could also easily be 
turned in the opposite direction, and Western audiences are believed to have a 
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low tolerance for their own casualties.95 The refusal of President Clinton to put 
boots on the ground in Kosovo indicates that he took this 'bodybag-effect’ into 
account. Finally, NATO had to convey a message that its chosen strategy 
worked, which, as long as Milošević was holding out, and NATO failed to stop 
the intensifying campaign of the Serbs against Albanians in Kosovo, was 
complicated. However, Milošević, by stepping up his campaign of ethnic 
cleansing, simultaneously strengthened the basis of NATO action, while 
weakening its claim to success. 
As Tim Judah has so appositely expressed it, the KLA ‘has to rank as one of 
the most successful military organizations in history’.96 This success, though, 
‘had nothing to do with its military prowess’, but depended on being in the 
right place, at the right time, and having NATO able to win its war for it.97 The 
belief among the Albanians in Kosovo that the KLA was doing the right thing, 
in taking up arms after years of a strategy of non-violence, could only take hold 
after the Serbian forces retaliated vengefully after KLA provocation. 
Moreover, what looked like success, taking territory at the beginning of the 
war, strengthened the legitimacy of the armed resistance. International 
condemnation for attacks on Serb forces, and on Albanians seen as 
collaborators, and being labelled as a terrorist organisation by the US, could 
have created a legitimacy crisis. However, the KLA strategy worked, in that 
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the reprisals by Serbian forces were fierce. They won, in what Freedman calls 
the battle of ‘comparative victimology’.98 The Kosovo Albanians, who are the 
KLA’s home constituency, felt the reaction of Serbian security forces but 
euphoria that something was finally happening was often stronger than fear 
within the population.99 In summarising the KLA’s miraculous triumph this 
way, of course, misses the impact of the ICTY indictment against Milošević, 
which, while not sufficient in determining the course of events, was decisive, 
to the extent that it completely stripped almost all his, and Serbia’s, legitimacy 
in the contest. 
The narrative of the KLA fitted with the images of refugees shown on satellite 
news networks and with pre-existing ideas within Western constituencies about 
Milošević’s Serbia and its role in the genocide in Bosnia. Kosovo differed in 
many ways from Bosnia, but these were harder to distinguish for a television 
audience.100 Western audiences saw death and destruction in the Balkans again; 
they did not see that Kosovo was not a sovereign state, as Bosnia had been. 
Also, little noted, was the difference that, unlike in Bosnia, the Serbs could not 
employ a proxy army in Kosovo. What provided the basis for KLA legitimacy 
in its home constituency, fighting for full independence, hampered its ability to 
be successful with international constituencies. The Badinter Commission had 
not considered Kosovo as having a right to independence and the international 
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community followed that line.101 NATO did not want to be seen as fighting to 
change borders and create new states.  
It could be argued that Milošević was unable to sign the Rambouillet 
agreement because being seen as giving away Kosovo would have led to his 
ouster in Serbia. NATO boots on the ground, in the whole of Yugoslavia, was 
neither an appealing prospect for Milošević. Although the population of Serbia 
proper suffered under NATO bombing, a common enemy also boosted the 
legitimacy of those fighting it. Moreover, as Milošević controlled most of the 
media in Serbia, he managed to get across his message of fighting American 
imperialism.102 
Although the Serb population was suffering from air strikes, and mistakes were 
made and innocent people killed, these images hardly reached outside 
constituencies: 
Although Serbs deliberately tried to present themselves as victims, however, 
the harsh methods used to suppress Kosovar Albanian aspirations ensured that 
it was they who appeared as the victims. The Serb effort was also counter-
productive in that it made the KLA harder, instead of easier, to defeat.103 
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Milošević clearly had to deal with a legitimacy crisis in the international 
community. He had done so for years. But, this time, it led to a continuing 
bombing campaign. Now, the Serb leadership had to deal with a situation, in 
which it would have been very hard to find a narrative that would send a 
legitimating message to both international and home constituencies 
simultaneously. Giving in to NATO would have lost him legitimacy at home 
and would have given the KLA (and the Kosovar Albanians) a green light to 
continue their fight for independence. The opposite tack, not giving in to the 
demands made by NATO – but at the same time failing to be seen as the 
victim, created a loss of legitimacy, in the international community. 
The indictment of Milošević et al. turned out to be a pivotal moment in the 
Kosovo War. There is little doubt that the timing of the indictment was a 
significant factor in this. However, this impact was neither foreseen by those 
making the decision to indict, nor by those who were affected by it. During his 
later trial, Milošević pointed out the timing of the indictment as evidence of the 
political influence of the United States on the Tribunal.104 The indictment, 
indeed, came at a crucial moment for NATO. By 27 May, the bombing 
campaign had been going on for much longer than Milošević had foreseen. But 
it had also lasted much longer than anyone at SHAPE, Brussels, and 
Washington – or any other NATO capital for that matter – had foreseen. 
During the airstrikes, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade had accidentally been 
bombed and, in the press, NATO faced fierce criticism in most of its home 
                                                      




constituencies over the use of cluster bombs.105 If NATO had been forced to 
end the bombing campaign before Milošević had given in, either by internal 
criticism in the 19 home constituencies, or by pressure from non-member 
states, it would have done severe damage to the credibility of the alliance, 
damage that might have been irrevocable, and thus had to be avoided at any 
costs with the 50th anniversary of NATO coming up.106 According to Scharf, 
the United States was suddenly pressing for charges to be issued against 
Milošević, as they knew that ‘it would bolster the political will of NATO 
countries to continue the bombing campaign, and would ultimately force 
Milošević to accept NATO's terms for Kosovo’.107 However, James Gow, 
citing senior US and British sources, argues that just the opposite was at work 
and that Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Envoy, was offering Milošević 
immunity from prosecution, if he were to end hostilities,108 reflecting concerns 
that the operations had no end in sight and that Washington, and perhaps other 
capitals, were looking for a way out, short of deploying ground troops, even 
though President Bill Clinton had just agreed to that, in principle. 
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Gow also maintains that it was the impact of the indictment on Milošević that 
prompted him suddenly to sue for peace.109 This is a position backed by US 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer, and others. Scheffer 
argued: ‘when Milošević was actually indicted, in late May 1999, during the 
Kosovo campaign, that indictment by the War crimes Tribunal may have had 
some influence on his concession a couple of weeks later in conjunction with 
the bombing, of course, to basically back down on Kosovo’.110 The moment 
had come for Milošević to save himself.111 An independent Belgrade news 
analyst, on June 4 commented that: 
This time around, Milošević did not have much choice. He could have 
continued the war, which would result in the complete destruction of the 
country and enormous casualties as well as his probable overthrow at the end 
of the campaign. Instead, he decided to accept the peace plan, giving himself a 
little more manoeuvring space in a bid to present his defeat as victory and to 
remain in power, together with his cronies, as long as possible.112 
In a similar vein, the private Belgrade news agency BETA, in its commentary 
of 9 June 1999, reported that the government ‘was faced with a choice to either 
continue to resist and risk a complete destruction of the country's 
infrastructure, or to accept NATO's demands’. BETA went on to say that 
Milošević, being a pragmatist, decided ‘to salvage what could be salvaged, that 
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being his power in Serbia’. It also suggested that the Tribunal's indictment of 
Milošević gave the FRY president an important additional incentive to stop the 
bombing, in that he realised that he could best postpone an appearance before 
the Tribunal in Hague only if he preserved at least a partially stable country in 
which his word remained decisive.113  
Contrary to what most expected, the indictment turned out contingently to help 
NATO’s strategic purpose.114 Or, as Weller put it, the Tribunal ‘played a 
strategic role, as its action effectively denied to Belgrade any hope of achieving 
its principal aims.’115A day after the publication of the indictment, Milošević 
announced that he would accept the G8 principles and that he would withdraw 
unilaterally. In the week that followed, it became clear to Milošević that he 
could not count on support from Moscow and that he was losing control of the 
information that reached the Serbian population, as more critical messages 
about the War in Kosovo were spreading, by word of mouth.116 The indictment 
was a marked a point, in which the downward spiral of the Serbian leadership, 
losing legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the international community, 
reached a point of no return. Legitimacy is not a zero sum game, but 
Milošević’s loss of legitimacy did influence the legitimacy of the NATO 
action: ‘It transformed NATO's use of force from an exercise in coercive 
diplomacy into an action which approximated an actual “war” in a more 
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traditional sense’.117 At the same time, it further legitimised the actions of the 
KLA against the VJ and Serbian security forces. The KLA, still labelled as a 
terrorist organisation, a year earlier, had increasingly become a legitimate 
negotiating partner, while the consequence of the indictment was that 
Milošević was no longer a partner to talk to. He was no longer part of the 
solution; rather he became part of the problem. That happened, not by means of 
NATO propaganda, but by means of an international, UN sanctioned, 
Tribunal.118 
Milošević conceded to the five demands of NATO: 1) to ensure a verifiable 
stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; 
2) to ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and 
paramilitary forces; 3) to agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international 
military presence; 4) to agree to the unconditional and safe return of all 
refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian 
aid organisations; and 5) to provide credible assurances of his willingness to 
work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a 
political framework agreement for Kosovo, in conformity with international 
law and the Charter of the United Nations.119 He agreed to terms that had been 
completely unacceptable for him at Rambouillet. 
                                                      
117 Weller, The Kosovo indictment’, p. 207. 
118 Idem. p. 214. 
119 Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 




The indictment by the ICTY, for crimes against humanity and violations of the 
laws or customs of war, committed in Kosovo, marked the beginning of the 
end of Milošević‘s career. It did not take Milošević out of the game 
immediately. But, it was a pivotal moment, because it created a legitimacy 
crisis he was not to overcome. After Milošević lost elections, in 2000, elections 
he had tried to steal, it was on St. Vitus Day, 28 June 2001 that he was 
transferred by the Serbian Government to Scheveningen jail and the Tribunal. 
The terms on which he conceded went way beyond anything that had been 
offered, or discussed, even, at Rambouillet.120  
In June 1999, Milošević had to agree to withdraw all his forces from Kosovo 
immediately, instead of keeping border guards, police and customs agents in 
Kosovo as proposed in the Rambouillet agreement.121 Moreover, the ending of 
hostilities was cemented by a Security Council Resolution (1244) that, while 
formally bolstering Serbian sovereignty, also, crucially, confirmed the de facto 
separation of Kosovo, with a de jure underpinning.122 While Rambouillet had 
foreseen ‘areas of competence’ that the FRY would continue to enjoy in 
Kosovo, such as a common market within the FRY, monetary policy, defence, 
foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, and federal elections, 
Resolution 1244 did not provide for ‘areas of competence’.123 This set Kosovo 
on a path, through transitional administration and, then, transitional statehood, 
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towards eventual, independent, fully legitimate, international statehood – and, 
so, to success for the KLA’s project. The war crimes issue was decisive in this 
outcome. 
THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY ON LEGITIMACY AND KOSOVO’S 
STATEHOOD PROJECT 
Although international criminal justice is by no means the only factor in 
legitimacy crises, it can be particularly salient, whether by accident, or design. 
Legitimacy is not created in court, and definetly not by court procedures alone. 
But, the narratives international criminal justice uses can, in conjunction with 
other legitimating messages, have an effect on the ability of an entity to create 
and maintain the idea that its actions and institutions are the right one. 
International criminal justice has an impact on legitimacy, not in the least, 
because, in contemporary conflict, the morality of force is defined by its 
legality. War crimes are seen by the international community and condemned 
by the public, and procedures before an international tribunal make war crimes 
and crimes against humanity even more visible. International justice influences 
legitimacy – and legitimacy is a prerequisite for succes. The history of Kosovo 
and the KLA exemplifies this. 
On several occasions, international criminal justice, in the form of the ICTY, 
through the indictment of individual leaders, had an impact on the legitimacy 




criminal justice procedures influenced the beliefs held in various 
constituencies. Therefore, it had an impact on both parties’ chances of 
successfully attaining their statehood goals. War crimes were in the forefront of 
minds in the West, repeatedly and continually; in 1999, during the war, in the 
direct aftermath of the war and during the extended process that one could call 
the ‘final status debate’ (a ‘debate’ that was not only fought in Priština and 
Belgrade, but also in Brussels, Washington and other capitals, and, which, at 
times, was more heated than a mere debate of words, and was not complete at 
time of writing).  
After the ICTY indictment against Milošević, something vital shifted. What 
shifted was legitimacy. The war crimes issue was decisive. It was a turning 
point because it affected the legitimacy of Milošević, and the Serbian cause, 
and, at the same time, it boosted the legitimacy of the KLA. In the KLA’s state 
of militarily having no chance to achieve anything meaningful (in the sense of 
achieving statehood), even with some degree of NATO support, the prospects 
of success were very limited. Physically, at least, at that point the KLA had no 
chance of defeating the Belgrade forces. There was no prospect of achieving its 
political goals because the sovereignty principle, as well as armed force, 
favoured Belgrade and the protection of states, their status and borders – even 
if some of those involved, particularly the Americans, were sympathetic to the 
idea of a new and democratic Kosovo. Milošević, in the contra-flow, rejected 
various terms that would have seen Kosovo clearly as part of Serbia (even if 




willing to give), but under terms that would have prevented the ethnic 
cleansing. 
Although unforeseen, at the time, the indictment had an acute impact on the 
legitimacy of Milošević and his actions in Kosovo. More important, in the 
chain of events that led to the de facto independence of Kosovo, the indictment 
of Milošević was a pivotal moment, in that it rearranged the bases of 
legitimacy and changed the environments of support. By deepening a 
legitimacy crisis to the point where it could no longer be turned around, it 
changed the outcome of the War. But, it also had a long-term effect on the 
future status of Kosovo, shifting beliefs in the West about the legitimacy of the 
Serbian leadership and increasing their belief in the justice of a Kosovar 
statehood project, while until then, there had been, at least, some legitimacy for 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Serbia. For Under the pressure of 
international criminal justice, Milošević was forced to give in to NATO 
demands to salvage what was left of his power in Serbia. For NATO, the 
indictment against Milošević cum suis added weight to the human rights 
narratives it used. In the 19 home constituencies it had to influence it added 
legitimacy to the bombing campaign that had already lasted much longer than 
expected. In terms of critical legitimacy, the KLA had both the principle of 
justice in the face of gross abuses of human rights against its constituency and 
also legitimacy in the community for its aim of self-determination. It had 
legitimacy from resisting repressive action and, eventually, war crimes (albeit 
that it also helped in triggering some of those, and committed some itself). The 




community. The key principle of legitimacy, in this context of sovereignty, 
turned on that moment. The support nexus in Kosovo aligned more with the 
support nexus outside Kosovo, and was endorsed by a UN Security Council 






CHAPTER V.                                                                                     
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON AND THE LEGITIMACY 
OF HEZBOLLAH 
 
On 14 February 2005, the detonation of a truck filled with approximately 2.500 
kilograms of TNT ripped the armour-plated car of former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri to pieces, left a 3 metre deep crater in the Rue Minet al-Hosn, and the 
recently renovated Hotel St. George in ruins.1 The explosion that killed Hariri 
and 22 others could be heard all over Beirut, but it was the aftershock of the 
bomb that had the most profound effect and changed the entire political map of 
Lebanon. The subsequent ‘Cedar Revolution’ ended almost three decades of 
Syrian suzerainty in Lebanon and produced two rival blocs that have since 
dominated Lebanese politics. Over the years that followed, the Sunni-Shia 
divide, that deepened across the Muslim World, ‘replaced the civil war’s 
Muslim-Christian divide to become the dominant schism’ in Lebanon.2 The 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) – a criminal court of an international 
character – was established to bring the perpetrators of the attack on Hariri to 
justice; discussions on the Tribunal dominated Lebanese politics thereafter. 
Combined, these factors often pushed tension in the multi-sectarian system to 
dangerous levels, and paralysed the government. Moreover, the staunch 
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resistance against the STL by Hezbollah – Lebanon’s powerful Shia QSE-cum-
political-party – and the ongoing debate on disarming its militia, further 
exacerbated animosity between pro- and anti- Syrian parties.3 
Literature and research on the STL has largely focussed on the legal foundation 
and jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and on the legal implications of the STL for 
international justice and law. Analysis on the impact of the STL on Lebanon is 
often limited to the crisis of the day. However, as part of a wider analysis of 
post-2005 Lebanese politics, Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr also considered 
the domestic impact of the Tribunal in depth, including the impact on 
Hezbollah. The existing literature generally agrees that the STL is the odd one 
out in the field of international criminal justice because of the way it was 
established, its application of domestic law, and ability to conduct full trials in 
absentia. But, what most distinctively sets apart the STL from other 
mechanisms of international criminal justice is that its stated purpose is very 
narrowly defined as ‘bringing to justice those responsible for the terrorist 
bombings of 14 February 2005’, and that this purpose is reflected in its limited 
jurisdiction. The STL Statute remained silent regarding an aim to end 
impunity, even though it can be assumed the Tribunal has an implied purpose 
beyond mere retribution. Although it has to be noted that none of the 
mechanisms of international criminal justice established so far have been free 
from critique, even from those, who, in principle, support the existence and 
development of international criminal justice, the STL has met particularly 
                                                      




heavy criticism. Criticism is not only aimed at the limited jurisdiction, but also 
at the functioning of the Tribunal. The timing of its establishment, and the 
manner in which it was set up, exposed the STL to allegations that it was a 
political tool against Syria. Yet, this does not mean the Tribunal cannot have an 
impact. Changing narratives, indeed, reveal it has an effect on the legitimacy of 
various actors, in Lebanon, including on what is arguably the most powerful 
QSE in the region: Hezbollah, whose members were indicted for the murder of 
Hariri by the Tribunal. 
The present chapter will show how the investigation into the murder of Hariri 
and the subsequent indictments by the STL impacted on Hezbollah and its 
legitimacy, in various constituencies. But, also, how the set-up of the Tribunal, 
its jurisdiction, actions, and leaks from within the UN investigation, or the 
STL, combined with Hezbollah’s strong bases of legitimacy, in the Shia 
community, and experience dealing with critical legitimacy moments, gave the 
organisation the opportunity to mitigate some of the negative effects that the 
implication of its members for the murder of Hariri could have had on its 
abilities to maintain legitimacy in certain constituencies. By providing counter 
narratives that fitted better with pre-existing ideas in its core constituencies, 
and with increased Sunni-Shia tension in Lebanon, Hezbollah managed to 
make the STL, and the indictment of four of its members, at times as much a 
problem of the government of Saad Hariri, the ‘March 14’ parliamentary bloc, 
and the rest of Lebanon, as it was their own. Moreover, these counter narratives 
gave the organisation and its allies the chance to prevent the Tribunal from 




the murder of Hariri to justice, or to justify its existence by being a step 
towards ending political violence and ‘ending impunity’ for political 
assassinations in Lebanon.  
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON  
Hariri, like all Lebanese prime ministers a Sunni, had dominated post-civil war 
Lebanese politics and the charismatic billionaire had been about to run for a 
third term as prime minister, when he was killed. Hariri was not the first victim 
of a high profile political murder in Lebanon, and he would not be the last. It 
was not the first political assassination in Lebanon that led to outrage in the 
international community, nor was it the first time the UN Secretary-General 
and the Security Council strongly condemned the assassination of a political 
figure in Lebanon. 23 years earlier, both had happened after the assassination 
of President-elect Bashir Gemayel.4 However, the bomb attack on Hariri would 
be the political assassination that changed the political balance, in Lebanon and 
the wider region. Moreover, this time the UN, and especially permanent 
Security Council members France and the US, seemed determined to identify 
and punish the perpetrators. That an international criminal tribunal was 
eventually established to bring those who killed Hariri to justice illustrates, 
even more than other international tribunals, that international criminal justice 
is effectively encircled by politics. The establishment of courts is highly 
                                                      




political. Their funding is political. Their outcomes have political 
consequences. However, the courts themselves are expected to function purely 
juridical, judging on the legal merits of a case.  
The day after the attack on Hariri, the UN Security Council issued a statement 
calling on the Lebanese government to ‘bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of this heinous terrorist act, and noting the Lebanese 
government's commitments in this regard’.5 The Lebanese investigation, 
however, suffered ‘from serious flaws’ and few had confidence in the Lebanese 
security apparatus, police, and judiciary to have the capacity, will, or 
independence from Syrian interference to investigate the case properly and 
bring the perpetrators to justice.6 In the direct aftermath of the attack, Lebanese 
prosecutors briefly suspected 4 men who had allegedly fled to Australia, and, 
thirty minutes after the attack, a video was released to Al Jazeera, in which a 
group calling itself ‘Victory and Jihad in the Greater Syria’ claimed 
responsibility for the attack and named Ahmad Abu Adass, a Palestinian, as the 
suicide bomber.7 However, both notions were dismissed soon afterwards, and 
what remained was suspicion towards Syrian involvement, but a lack of 
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credible evidence, both on who ordered, and who executed the assassination of 
Hariri.8 Nevertheless, the fact-finding mission sent by the UN to investigate the 
bombing stopped short of accusing Syria, but found that ‘it is clear that the 
assassination took place in a political and security context marked by acute 
polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon’.9 The report also 
concluded that the Lebanese investigation had ‘neither the capacity nor the 
commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion’, and following its 
advice, the Council established the UN International Independent Investigation 
Commission (UNIIIC) ‘to gather evidence and to assist the Lebanese 
authorities in their investigation of the attack’.10  
That the Lebanese investigation had not produced a credible investigation into 
the murder was not surprising. The Lebanese security apparatus at the time was 
closely interwoven with the Syrian security services and had no tradition of 
thoroughly investigating political assassinations. Moreover, the premise of 
Lebanon’s National Pact was the proverbial ‘no victor no vanquished’, and 
Lebanon’s internal conflicts were usually defused by inter-sect compromise 
followed by collective amnesia rather than judicial processes.11 Despite 
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Lebanon’s long history of political murders – since the 1950s a president, a 
president-elect, and three prime ministers had been assassinated, as well as 
(former) ministers, journalists, clerics, army officers, and other political figures 
– attacks were usually left unexamined.12 Of the rare cases that were 
investigated or prosecuted, few led to credible convictions.13 As political 
violence continued after the civil war, so did impunity. There were more than 
30 high profile assassinations and assassination attempts after the war ended, 
but, in the few cases that justice was pursued, it was obstructed by politicised 
trials.14 Often changing alliances in Lebanon required political leaders to be 
forgiving of the crimes their new allies had committed against them. To 
facilitate this collective amnesia, Lebanon repeatedly turned to general 
amnesties.15 The most far-reaching, the General Amnesty Law at the end of the 
Civil War, granted amnesty for all political crimes committed by Lebanese 
citizens before 28 March 1991. Thus, nobody was held responsible for the most 
horrible atrocities committed by all parties to the conflict, in which an 
estimated 100.000 to 150.000 Lebanese were killed.16 On the contrary, the law 
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ensured immunity from prosecution for war crimes for militia leaders-turned-
politicians and furthered an existing culture of impunity for political crimes.17  
Contrary to tradition, the murder of Hariri was not to be quickly forgotten, but 
thoroughly investigated – albeit by the UN –, and to prosecute those 
responsible for his murder the STL was established. This was the result of a 
combination of factors: the power of Hariri’s legacy, that the Future Movement 
for the first time united a large part of the Lebanese Sunni population, and the 
stance of the UN Security Council, in particular France and the US. Moreover, 
by 2005 the ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone had proved 
their utility.18 Although Lebanon was, and is, not a signatory to the Rome 
Statute, the Security Council could have referred the case to the ICC, were it 
not for the fact that it was highly doubtful that the murder of Hariri constituted 
one of the international crimes the Court has jurisdiction over, as described in 
Article 6-8 of the Rome Statute.19 It was therefore that, in December 2005, the 
                                                      
17 Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces (Christian) militia was the only 
warlord who received punishment for crimes committed during the civil war (by a judge 
that is, many other warlords have received extrajudicial punishments by car bombs). In 
1994 he was found guilty of ordering four political assassinations, including the murder of 
Prime Minister Karimi, and sentenced to four death sentences, the sentences were 
commuted to life imprisonment. However, shortly after the 2005 elections, in which the 
‘March 14’ coalition, including the Lebanese Forces Party won a parliamentary majority, 
parliament approved an amnesty for Geagea. ‘Amnesty for Lebanese ex-warlord’ BBC 
News, 18 July, 2005. 
18 Knudsen, ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Homage to Hariri?’ p. 221. 
19 Hariri was not murdered with the intent to ‘destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group’; although the possibility that the attack was part of ‘a 
widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population cannot be excluded in its 




day after the assassination of Gibran Tueni, anti-Syrian MP and editor and 
publisher of the daily newspaper, An Nahar, the government of Fouad Siniora 
asked the UN to create a tribunal ‘of an international character’.20 By pressing 
for an international tribunal, Siniora acted against the wishes of the Hezbollah 
and Amal ministers in his cabinet. Unsurprisingly, the ratification of the STL 
led to a government crisis, when, in November 2006, all Shia ministers 
resigned, just days before the government was to discuss a draft document on 
the STL, creating another period of political stalemate.21 As a consequence, the 
speaker of parliament, Amal leader Nabih Berri, refused to convene parliament 
to hold a vote on the ratification of the agreement for the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon that the UN and the Lebanese government, signed on 23 January 
2007. The conflicting views on the Tribunal of the pro-Syrian ‘March 8’ bloc 
and the anti-Syrian ‘March 14’ coalition provoked an 18-month long crisis in 
government.22 Although a petition signed by a majority of MPs was sent to the 
UN Secretary-General to request the formation of a tribunal, the stalemated 
parliament was circumvented, when the tribunal was established by Resolution 
1757 of 30 May 2007.23 That the Security Council was willing to use Chapter 
                                                                                                                                                
proven to constitute to a crime against humanity; finally, the murder was not committed in 
the context of a war excluding the possibility that the assassination would constitute a war 
crime. 
20 Tueni was a parliamentarian and the editor and publisher of An Nahar. Like his uncle, 
Marwan Hamadeh, he was a vocal critic of the Assad regime and its involvement in 
Lebanon. UN Security Council Resolution 1644, 15 December 2005. About the STL, 
<http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/creation-of-the-stl> (accessed 14 May 2013)  
21 ‘Hezbollah ministers quit cabinet’, BBC News, 12 November 2006.  
22 Knudsen and Kerr, ‘Introduction: The Cedar Revolution and Beyond’, p. 10 




VII, its most far reaching powers, to go beyond state sovereignty had to do 
with the standing of the victim, the existence of a precedent for establishing an 
international court, and the fact that the case could not be brought before the 
ICC, but, that the prime suspect (Syria) was targeted by Western countries and 
the UN undoubtedly played a role, as well.24 
On 1 March 2009, the STL opened in Leidschendam, a suburb of The Hague, 
as an independent judicial organisation, not a UN Court, with the primary aim 
of investigating and prosecuting those responsible for a single incident.25 The 
Tribunal’s international judges outnumber the Lebanese judges and, like the 
prosecutor and registrar, are all appointed by the UN Secretary General, with 
the Lebanese judges’ being chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the 
Lebanese government.26 The expenses of the Tribunal (about €60 million per 
year) were to be shared, 51 percent of the costs were to come from voluntary 
contributions by UN Member States and the remaining 49 percent from the 
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Government of Lebanon.27 Although the Lebanese Government was legally 
bound to pay its share, as with everything connected to the STL, Hezbollah 
made sure that the funding of the tribunal became a highly contentious issue.28 
After 2011, under threat of economic sanctions and aided by Lebanese banks, 
Prime Minister Najib Mikati found a way to prevent the government’s 
collapsing over the funding of the Tribunal by paying Lebanon’s share directly 
from the prime minister’s office.29  
The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, provided ‘jurisdiction over 
persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’.30 But, if the Tribunal were to 
find that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon, between 1 October 2004 and 
12 December 2005, were connected to this attack, its jurisdiction would be 
extended to those responsible for those attacks.31 The dates limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal were not randomly chosen, but were those of the 
assassination attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, and the assassination of Gibran 
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28J. Neumann, ‘Hariri Assassination Still Clouds Lebanese Politics’, Voice of America 
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29 Knudsen and Kerr, ‘Introduction: The Cedar Revolution and Beyond’, p. 14-15 
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Tueni.32 Although a number of attacks occurred during that period, the Pre-
Trial Judge ruled that there was only prima facie evidence that the attacks on 
Marwan Hamadeh, George Hawi and Elias el-Murr were connected to the 
attack of 14 February 2005, thereby establishing jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
over these cases.33 However, the attacks did not stop, after 12 December 2005. 
34 In the years that followed, a number of political and army figures were 
                                                      
32 Some of the attacks during that period were; the killing of Samir Kassir, an anti-Syrian 
journalist and columnist for An Nahar, by a car bomb, in June 2005; the death of former 
Lebanese Communist Party leader George Hawi, when his car exploded that same month; 
a similar attack that Ali Ramez Tohme, a journalist, who wrote a book on Hariri, survived, 
in September; and the bomb attack, in which Christian journalist, TV Anchor, and critic of 
Syria, May Chidiac lost an arm and a leg. An assassination attempt, in July 2005, on 
defence minister Elias El-Murr, a pro-Syrian politician, seems to have been retaliation for 
previous attacks on anti-Syrian figures. Moreover there were bombings in a Christian 
neighbourhood, a church, a shopping centre, and a bingo hall, in which no individual 
target could be identified. ‘Hundreds mourn Beirut journalist’, BBC News, 4 June 2005. 
‘Anti-Syrian Politician Killed in Lebanon’, The Washington Post, 22 June 2005. ‘May 
Chidiac, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation Attacked’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 
25 September 2005. ‘Beirut bomb targets top minister’, BBC News, 12 July 2005.  
33 Order Directing the Lebanese Judicial Authority Seized with the Case Concerning the 
Attack Perpetrated against Mr Elias El-Murr on 12 July 2005 to Defer to the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, 19 August 2011, STL-11-02/D/PTJ 
34 In November 2006, Pierre Gemayel, minister in the Siniora government for the 
Phalange party, was killed by gunmen, in the streets of Beirut. In 2007, Walid Eido, 
Antoine Ghanem, and François al-Hajj, the former two anti-Syrian MPs, and the latter an 
Army Brigadier were all killed by car bombs. In January 2008 Wissam Eid – who led the 
ISF investigation of telecommunications data surrounding the murder of Hariri – was 
killed by a car bomb. Over the summer of 2008, two bus explosions in Tripoli killed at 
least 21 other people, including 12 Lebanese Army soldiers. A relatively quiet period 
ended, when, in October 2012, Army Brigadier Wissam al-Hassan, former head of security 
for Hariri, was killed by a car bomb in Achrafieh. ‘Killing seen as bid by Damascus, 




assassinated, including Internal Security Forces (ISF) Captain Wissam Eid, 
who led investigations into five interconnected mobile phone groups that were 
used prior to the attack of 14 February 2005 – and that later proved to be the 
backbone of the evidence against the four individuals indicted by the STL.35 
Although the mandate of the Tribunal also foresaw in jurisdiction over any 
crime connected with the assassination of Hariri that occurred after 2005, 
agreement would have to be reached between the Security Council and the 
Lebanese Government to broaden the jurisdiction to include these crimes.36  
While the ICTY and ICTR were limited to prosecuting crimes under 
international law and other hybrid tribunals have jurisdiction over both crimes 
under municipal law and crimes under international law, the STL was unique 
in that it only dealt with crimes under domestic law.37 Although the possibility 
of prosecuting a crime under international law was not explicitly excluded, 
there were no provisions in the Statute to that effect.38 While Article 2 of the 
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2012. 
35 The Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan 
Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra, Public Redacted Amended Indictment, 6 February 
2013, STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ,  
F08601 AOIIPRV/201305281R 143331-R I 43372/EN/nc 
36 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Article 1. 
37 J. Yun, ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Tribunal of an International Character Devoid 
of International Law’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, vol. 7, no. 2, 2010, pp. 
181-196, p. 182. 
38 M. Milanovic, ‘An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 5, 2007, 
pp. 1139- 1152, p. 1139.. The reason for this may lay in the feasibility of a successful 




Statute stated that the substantive law applicable to the prosecution and 
punishment by the STL were the relevant provisions in the Lebanese Criminal 
Code.39 However, Article 3 added modes of criminal liability usually found in 
international law, most notably the common purpose variant of joint criminal 
enterprise and command responsibility.40 This made the tribunal well suited to 
prosecuting high ranking-officials, who failed to stop subordinates from 
executing the plot, but might conflict with the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege, as both joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility do not exist 
in this extensive form under Lebanese criminal law.41 In a decision on the 
applicable law, the Appeals Chamber interpreted the provisions on applicable 
                                                                                                                                                
prosecution on the basis of war crimes; it was highly unlikely he was murdered with the 
intent to ‘destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’, 
excluding genocide as described in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
(Art. 6); and the scale of the attacks that fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal do not 
suggest these can be qualified as, let alone be proven to be, ‘a widespread or systematic 
attack’, needed to establish a crime against humanity was committed, as defined in Article 
7 of the Rome Statute.  
39 According to Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon the relevant 
provisions are: ‘(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the 
prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and 
personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including 
the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; 
and (b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on “Increasing the 
penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle”’. 
40 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Articles 3(1)(b) and 3(2).. B.Elberling, ‘The 
Next Step in History-Writing through Criminal Law: Exactly How Tailor- Made is the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon?’ Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 2008, pp. 
529-538, p. 534. Milanovic, ‘An Odd Couple’, p.1140.  
41 For a more detailed discussion on the potential problems arising from Article 3 of the 
Statute, see: Milanovic, ‘An Odd Couple’ and Elberling, ‘The Next Step in 




law, and declared that: ‘under the Tribunal's Statute the Judges are called upon 
primarily to apply Lebanese law to the facts coming within the purview of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction’.42 This stipulated that the definition of the crime of 
terrorism, as described under Lebanese law, should be applied, but it also held 
that it would do so ‘in consonance with international conventional and 
customary law that is binding on Lebanon’.43 The Appeals Chamber further 
held that:  
[A]lthough it is held by many scholars and other legal experts that no widely 
accepted definition of terrorism has evolved (...) a customary rule of 
international law regarding the international crime of terrorism, at least in time 
of peace, has indeed emerged.44 
Because of its wide implications for international law, this decision has been 
heavily discussed, and is not without critics. The lack of consensus in the 
international community on the crime of terrorism, and the Appeals Chamber’s 
reliance on domestic laws to establish opinio juris, make it doubtful such an 
opinio exists, or existed in February 2005.45 Moreover, there is no need for an 
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Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (16 February 2011) § II A. 
43 Idem. § II B.  
Idem. §§ 83-85. This customary rule requires the following three key elements according 
to the Appeals Chamber: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, 
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internationalist interpretation of the crime of terrorism by the STL, as terrorism 
is sufficiently described under Lebanese law.46  
Article 22 of its Statute allows the STL to conduct a full trial in absentia. 
While the prosecutors at the ICTY had to wait to start proceedings against 
Ratko Mladić for 16 years while he evaded arrest, and the ICC was waiting for 
someone to arrest Sudanese President al-Bashir, the STL could conduct trial 
proceedings, when all reasonable steps had been taken to secure the appearance 
of the accused, or when the defendant had not been handed over to the Tribunal 
by the state authorities concerned.47 In February 2012, the Trial Chamber 
                                                                                                                                                
2001, pp. 655-675. M.P. Scharf, ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling 
on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of Participation’, ASIL Insights, vol. 15, no. 6, 4 
March 2011. M.J. Ventura, ‘Terrorism According to the STL’s Interlocutory Decision on 
the Applicable Law: A Defining Moment or a Moment of Defining?’ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice ,2011, pp. 1-22, p. 8, p. 21. 
46 Ventura notes that killings involving machine guns and handguns are not considered to 
meet the requisite ‘means’ element under Lebanese Law and could be considered terrorism 
under the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation. However this would only become relevant if 
the Tribunal were to prosecute those responsible for the murder of Pierre Gemayel, who 
died in the only post-2005 political assassination, in which not bombs, but hand guns, 
were used. While prosecuting under a doubtful international customary norm may conflict 
with the nullum crimen sine lege principle, one can safely assume that those responsible 
for killing Hariri were aware at the time of the attack that they were committing a crime 
under Lebanese law. Ventura, ‘Terrorism According to the STL’s Interlocutory Decision 
on the Applicable Law’, p. 5. 
47 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Art. 22.Elberling notes that some of the 
provisions in Art. 22 could be contradictory to Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights concerning the right to a fair trial, especially if a situation should arise, in 
which a defendant was not handed over by the relevant authority against his will. 




decided to proceed to try the four accused in absentia.48 While some 
commentators noted that the conditions in which to hold a trial before the STL 
without the defendant present are stringent enough,49 others argued that it could 
prevent a fair trial and did not live up to the ‘highest standard of justice’ the 
STL was established to uphold.50 The Tribunal subsequently came under 
constant attack from pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon. Criticism was most 
harshly voiced by Hezbollah, but was not limited to members of the Shia 
organisation. The Tribunal was ‘prone to allegations of being a political tool 
and not a legal body’.51 This was not only because of support from the West for 
the Tribunal, but also because it went against Lebanese political tradition 
making liability for a political crime a legal question rather than something for 
negotiation. But, while many of its critics did not get much further than 
attacking the Tribunal on its alleged partiality, or resort to various conspiracy 
theories, the set-up of the STL also made it vulnerable to substantial criticism, 
based on valid considerations.  
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Much of the legal criticism focused on the Tribunals’ limited jurisdiction. 
Eberling points out that the selectivity in setting the mandate of the Tribunal 
was unjustifiable as Lebanon had been confronted by many other violent 
incidents afterwards, some leading to even more casualties than the attacks that 
fell within the jurisdiction of the STL, that were not necessarily directly 
connected to the original crime.52 These, for instance, included the killings of 
civilians at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, near Tripoli, in 2007, during the 
largest internal post-civil war battle between the Lebanese Armed Forces and 
the Sunni Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, and the retaliation attacks on soldiers, 
in the months after. Moreover, the limited purpose of the tribunal, as reflected 
in its jurisdiction was not in line with the wider justification of international 
justice to end impunity.  
Discussions about the impact of the creation of the STL on Lebanese 
sovereignty, specifically the idea that the resolution bypassed Lebanese 
democracy, were also not limited to Lebanon.53 The Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1757 with ten votes in favour, but permanent Security Council 
Members China and Russia, as well as South Africa, Qatar, and Indonesia, 
abstained, fearing that ‘Lebanese sovereignty was being unduly encroached 
on’.54 In the Resolution, the Council, acting under Chapter VII, decided that the 
annex to the resolution would enter into force on 10 June 2007. Bardo 
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Fassbender argues that what ‘the Security Council in fact sought to accomplish 
with Resolution 1757 was to put the Agreement into effect, despite the absence 
of ratification by Lebanon’.55  
The timing of the establishment of the Tribunal, has led to allegations that the 
STL had been ‘tailor-made to further a certain view of recent Lebanese 
history’.56 It came at a moment when both the investigations of the UN and 
Lebanese authorities pointed towards the involvement of high-ranking Syrian 
officials. One could argue that some of the provisions in the statute of the STL 
could be best explained by expectations of the outcomes at the time of its 
establishments, and that its limited jurisdiction was not in line with the aims of 
international criminal justice towards ‘putting an end to impunity’ for serious 
crimes regardless of where, when, and by whom they were committed.57 The 
Tribunal was plagued by leaks during the first years of its existence, to such an 
extent that the Registrar appointed a special investigator to probe ‘unauthorised 
disclosures’.58 This followed the especially painful publication of a list of 
people alleged to be witnesses before the STL.59 Finally, three top officials and 
six senior staff members of the Tribunal quit during the first 18 months after it 
opened, and rumours that they resigned after outside attempts to influence their 
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work weakened the Tribunal.60 Proceedings before the STL continued in late 
2013, although all cases were still in the pre-trial stage and all indictees 
remained at large. On 10 October 2013 the indictment against a fifth suspect 
was made public, this time – and in contrast to the indictments that were issued 
against four individuals in 2011 – the indictment was not leaked while under 
seal.  
HEZBOLLAH AND LEBANON  
As a QSE-cum-political-party, Hezbollah differs from most other QSEs in that, 
besides running a Shia militia, it also entered politics as a political party, using 
the democratic process to change the status quo. Hezbollah has statehood 
aspirations in that it wants to change the system of the state, but it has no 
aspirations to separate a part of Lebanon and to create a different state. Despite 
claims to the contrary, by its opponents, Hezbollah acknowledged that not all 
of their original aims, such as establishing an Islamic state, are attainable, in 
multi-sectarian Lebanon. Nevertheless, the organisation took over many state 
functions, in large parts of the country. Even when representatives of the 
organisation became part of the Lebanese government, it continued to run 
parallel institutions in the parts of Lebanon that were under its control. 
Moreover, Hezbollah withstood numerous demands from both the Lebanese 
government and the UN to disarm its militia. It showed that to further its 
                                                      




aspiration, or when pressured, it was willing to use its advanced military and 
security apparatus within Lebanon against Lebanese. Hezbollah is operating 
both as a QSE, trying to change the make-up of the state and willing to use 
force to do so. It has statehood aspiration, which in part it has realised by 
providing state functions; separate from, and sometimes against the policy and 
interests of, the recognised Lebanese state. Although, other QSEs have been 
integrated into the existing state institutions at some point, usually after peace 
agreements, Hezbollah is a special case in that it continues, and is allowed to 
continue to maintain its QSE nature while having become an essential part of 
the Lebanese government.  
In order to understand how present-day Hezbollah became one of the most 
complex organisations of all Islamist movements, and an a-typical QSE, one 
has to look at its history, and how it came about in the early 1980s. In terms of 
structures and functions, in 1982, the year its leader Hassan Nasrallah refers to 
as the year of its establishment, Hezbollah was, at most, an amalgamation of 
various radical clandestine Shia activists.61 Yet, the young Shia clerics that 
founded it proved apt at providing a narrative that fitted with pre-existing ideas 
of its core constituents, the Lebanese Shia. Ignored by the government and led 
by feudal leaders – who primarily took care of their own interests, the Shia, as 
a group, had been trailing behind the rest of the country for years. The living 
conditions in Lebanon’s rural areas, like the Bekaa Valley and southern 
Lebanon, where the Shia were concentrated, had not improved, during 
                                                      
61 A.R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 




Lebanon’s periods of prosperity and lacked most basic facilities.62 Growing 
political and economic inequality reinforced the lack of a framework for 
individual and collective identity for the Lebanese Shia, while the all-
encompassing life system of Islam, that includes religion, state and law, 
provided a framework of identity that the multi-confessional state could not 
provide.63 The structural imbalance of civil war-torn Lebanon, increased the 
potential for radicalism and militancy, and provided the perfect conditions for a 
religious militia to emerge.64 The Israeli invasion, in 1982, served as a crisis 
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catalyst, in that it provided the impetus for the emergence of a radical militant 
organisation.65 Initially, many Shia tacitly allowed the Israelis to expel the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), a QSE that had effectively created a 
‘state within a state’ in Southern Lebanon.66 Yet, ongoing Israeli domination 
created an environment, in which Hezbollah could flourish. Or, as Ehud Barak 
told Newsweek, in 2006: ‘When we entered Lebanon ... there was no 
Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in 
the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah’.67 
Hezbollah soon gained notoriety with a series of high profile attacks. In 
November 1982, a Mercedes filled with explosives drove into the Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) headquarters in Tyre, killing 141 people. The attack set a 
lethal trend. Between 1982 and 1985, there were at least thirty similar attacks 
against Israeli and Western targets.68 Most notably, the US embassy bombing, 
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in April 1983, and the attacks on the US Marines barracks and the French 
forces, in October 1983, the latter killing almost 300 people, including 241 US 
Marines.69 Because Hezbollah did not formally exist yet, and its military 
branch, al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Resistance) was the possible 
sponsor of a number of other groups, it was hard to determine which of those 
early actions can be attributed to the organisation. Moreover, Hezbollah leaders 
later made ambiguous statements regarding the attacks.70 Yet, the US 
concluded that Hezbollah was behind the bombings, and that Syria and Iran 
must have operated behind the scenes, as Hezbollah was not in the position to 
plan and execute such operations alone.71  
The open letter to the ‘Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World’, by which 
Hezbollah declared its existence, and the formation of ‘The Islamic 
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Resistance’, in February 1985, added to its radical image. The writers of the 
letter identified themselves as ‘the son’s of Hezbollah’s umma (community of 
Muslims), whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran’.72 They committed 
to abiding by the orders of the Wali al-Faqih, the jurisprudent (Ayatollah 
Khomeini).73 They stated that ’each of us is a soldier when the call of Jihad 
demands it, and listed their bare minimum of aspirations as saving Lebanon 
from ‘its dependence upon East and West, ending foreign occupation, and 
adopting a regime freely wanted by the people of Lebanon’.74 Yet, despite the 
deeply religious rhetoric of the manifest it assures that the organisation is 
against imposing religion on others, and calls for the implementation of an 
‘Islamic order on the basis of direct and free choice […] not on the basis of 
force’.75  
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Hezbollah’s grassroots organisation, and ability to operate as a successful QSE 
providing state-function grew, the longer the Israeli occupation lasted. At the 
same time, attacks on the IDF intensified. By 1984, Shia insurgents were 
killing an Israeli soldier every three days.76 In 1985, Israel pulled back to the 
‘security zone’, an area comprising around ten percent of Lebanon’s territory 
that proved to be a magnet for attacks on the IDF.77 But, the poverty and 
misery of the Shia not only fuelled radicalism and militancy, it also gave 
Hezbollah’s leadership no other option than to tackle some of the socio-
economic problems within the Shia community, in order to maintain support 
among the communities they fought amongst – and from which its fighters 
came. By providing aid to the families of killed militants and people who 
suffered from the Israeli attacks, and by creating crisis teams to rebuild houses, 
Hezbollah took the first steps towards what later would become its social 
organisation, its providing of public goods and exercise functions of state. In 
the late 1980s, Jihad al-Binaa – Hezbollah’s construction organisation –, the 
Islamic Health Committee (IHC), and the Relief Committee were officially 
recognised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They marked Hezbollah’s first 
official ventures outside the secrecy of its militia. Over several decades, 
Hezbollah’s social organisation professionalised and grew spectacular. The 
organisation started to provide more and more ‘government services’ 
throughout the Dahiya, the Bekaa Valley and Southern Lebanon, from water 
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supply to education, and from garbage collection to electricity.78 By 2013, 
Hezbollah managed to provide social welfare to the poorest families, run co-
operative supermarkets and firms, and operate a network of schools, hospitals, 
and orphanages.79  
The end of the Lebanese Civil War and the Iran-Iraq War marked a period of 
change for Hezbollah. The Taif Agreement reinforced the power-sharing 
agreement of the National Pact, but also stipulated the disbanding of all 
militias.80 Although Hezbollah signed the agreement with the consent of Iran, it 
justified keeping its forces armed as a resistance force aimed at ending the 
Israeli occupation.81 Hezbollah’s leadership initially expressed doubts over 
whether participation in Lebanon’s first post-Civil War elections, in 1992, and 
in a ‘non-Islamic’ government, would be legitimate.82 Yet, in 1991, Abbas al-
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Musawi replaced hardliner al-Tufayli as secretary-general, and started to shift 
the focus on political participation. This decision was widely popular, among 
the politically disenfranchised Shia, and gave Hezbollah the chance to shape 
political dialogue and resist political initiatives.83 Al-Musawi facilitated the 
release of the last hostages held in Lebanon. Most Lebanese resented the taking 
of hostages and the costs of losing popular support proved to be too high.84 But 
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he also reinvigorated the fighting against Israel – and al-Musawi’s term was cut 
short, when, in February 1992, together with his family, he was killed by an 
IDF helicopter strike.85 Hassan Nasrallah was quickly appointed as secretary-
general to oversee Hezbollah’s participation in the elections. Internally, the 
organisation maintained a governing structure, revolving around the personal 
appeal of its religious leaders, and Islamic doctrine to keep party members in 
line. But, unlike other parties, it also presented a coherent political and social 
program. Its political campaigns emphasized non-religious themes, like 
economic exploitation, corruption, inequality and security. 86 
With the help of its sponsors in Iran and Syria, Hezbollah’s military 
capabilities continued to grow. Though, its exceedingly effective guerrilla 
army showed that it was willing to adhere to some rules, and a ‘modus vivendi’ 
arose that stipulated that the IDF would not attack civilians, and Hezbollah in 
turn would focus on military targets in the security zone.87 This understanding 
was clearly articulated, in 1993, after the Israeli ‘Operation Accountability’ 
bombed fifty villages and killed over 130 civilians, in response to Hezbollah’s 
killing of eight IDF soldiers.88 Despite continuing Hezbollah attacks on IDF 
targets, the ‘rules of the game’ led to relatively quiet years, until, in 1996, 
Israel launched a major campaign, ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’, to undermine 
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popular support for Hezbollah and force the Lebanese government to disarm 
the Islamic Resistance.89 The contrary happened when Israeli shelling of the 
UNIFIL Base, at Qana, killed 109 civilians that had taken refuge there. This 
only strengthened many Lebanese in their opinion that Hezbollah’s military 
actions should continue. Rafik Hariri, at that time nearing his first term as 
Prime Minister, stated that the Lebanese people had ‘a legitimate right and duty 
to resist’, until Israel abided by Security Council Resolution 425.90  
Hezbollah’s superior ability as a guerillia to manoeuvre effectively within the 
rules, eventually led to the withdrawal of Israel, in 2000. Largely deprived of 
the justification of their arms and actions against the IDF, Hezbollah used the 
Lebanese claim to the Shebaa farms as a pretext to continue military 
operations, despite the UN Security Council conclusion that Israel had 
withdrawn its forces, in accordance with Resolution 425.91 However, 
Hezbollah’s militairy success against the IDF, in combination with it 
                                                      
89 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, p. 84. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, p. 
170,. Amnesty International, Israel/Lebanon Deliberate destruction or “collateral 
damage”? Israeli attacks on civilian infrastructure, August 2006, p. 15.  
90 Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, p. 181. Although fighting continued – and 
both parties sometimes disregarded the immunity of non-combatants – US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher managed to persuade both parties to return to the rules not to 
attack civilians, and they usually apologised afterwards for attacks on civilians. (Norton, 
Hezbollah: A Short History, p. 86.) 
91 The Shebaa Farms area is a small disputed territory. Israel claims it is part of the Golan 
Heights it occupied and later annexed from Syria. Lebanon also claims the area. It is 
supported in that claim by Syria, which is more than happy to cede its claim to a small 
piece of land to provide Hezbollah with a reason to keep fighting Israel. ‘Security Council 
Endorses Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon as of 16 




successfully running many state-like institutions in Shia dominated areas also 
made that the (second) Hariri government was unable to disarm Hezbollah. The 
government therefore also maintained the ‘resistance’ point of view, even after 
Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2 September 2004 again called for the 
disarmament of all militias.  
The assassination of Rafik Hariri, in February 2005, and the subsequent 
establishment of the STL, changed the political environment in Lebanon 
drastically. However, as Sunni-Shia tensions increased over Syrian influence 
over Lebanon, the STL, and Hezbollah’s weapons, the organisation managed to 
strengthen its position as the first and foremost protector of Shia interests in 
Lebanon. Moreover, it remained a staunch supporter of Syria and made clear 
that it would protect Assad’s interests in Lebanon. It became the leading party 
in the pro-Syrian ‘March 8’ alliance and relentlessly opposed the STL, at the 
time that Syria was the main suspect in the murder of Hariri. As a political 
party, Hezbollah consistently received a large part of the Shia vote.92 Yet, it 
was only after Syrian military withdrawal, that it was forced to join the 
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government to protect its interests.93 As part of the coalition government, a 
situation arose in which Hezbollah, in parallel, was a QSE retaining the means 
to fight, or threathen, the state in order to change it (or, as proved to the case, to 
defend it beyond the established means of the state, in face of IS attacks in 
2014). However, The ‘national unity’ cabinet, of which Hezbollah became part, 
soon after the 2005 elections reached a stalemate. Hezbollah ministers refused 
to take part in cabinet meetings, after it had voted in favour of an international 
tribunal, only to return to government after Prime Minister Siniora 
acknowledged Hezbollah’s role as a national resistance movement.94 With 
Syria out of Lebanon, and relative calm on the border with Israel, increasing 
numbers of Lebanese started to demand the disarmament of Hezbollah. In an 
attempt to silence the proponents of disarmament by military success, 
Hezbollah tried to capture five IDF soldiers. Although actions against military 
targets fell within the ‘rules of the game’, this time it pushed Israel to start a 
34-day long war in July 2006.95 Israel launched massive airstrikes and artillery 
fire, an air and naval blockade, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, 
while Hezbollah launched more than 4000 rockets into northern Israel and 
engaged the IDF in guerrilla warfare. The war came at great costs for both 
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countries – an estimated $2 Billion USD for Israel and $5 Billion USD for 
Lebanon – large parts of the Lebanese civilian infrastructure were destroyed, 
including Beirut's International Airport, almost every city in Lebanon was 
bombed, and large parts of Beirut were left in rubble.96 The intensity of the 
bombing that took place just before the ceasefire agreement came into effect, 
supports the accusation that Israel deliberately attacked and destroyed civilian 
infrastructure.97 The conflict displaced approximately one million Lebanese 
civilians and, at least 1,191 Lebanese and 44 Israeli civilians were killed, as 
well as 119 IDF soldiers and at least 250 Hezbollah fighters (the IDF claimed 
the number was over 600).98  
For Israel, the war ended disastrously. As Hezbollah held out longer than Israel 
could withstand international pressure for a cease-fire, and by failing to come 
even close to destroying Hezbollah, the strength of the skilled and highly 
motivated militia against a regular army was again demonstrated.99 Nasrallah 
claimed a ‘divine victory’, but, if anything, it was a Pyrrhic victory; Resolution 
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1701, again called for Hezbollah’s disarmament, and for the deployment of 
Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon.100 More 
important, the whole Lebanese population had suffered as a result of 
Hezbollah’s actions. After the war, Hezbollah demanded a veto within the 
national unity government, but when the Hezbollah and AMAL ministers 
resigned from the cabinet after Siniora had pushed for the STL, its Shia 
constituencies were left without government representation. From then 
onwards, Hezbollah deemed Siniora's cabinet ‘illegitimate’, as did President 
Lahoud, and both continued to oppose the government’s decision to work with 
the UN towards establishing the STL. When, in December 2006, Hezbollah 
protests against the government hardened and it blocked the streets of Beirut, 
the whole of Lebanon feared another round of sectarian violence. Although 
Nasrallah ended the protests, in January 2007, it was a reminder that the fate of 
Lebanon was in the hands of Hezbollah’s leaders.101 The political deadlock 
over the Tribunal lasted, until May 2008, when it escalated after the 
government moved to dissolve Hezbollah’s parallel communications network 
and to remove the head of airport security, over his alleged ties to Hezbollah.102 
Militants blocked the airport, as well as the main city streets, paralysing Beirut; 
gun battles erupted between Hezbollah supporters and pro-government 
loyalists; and Nasrallah called the government's decision ‘a declaration of 
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war’.103 Deploying its militia on the streets of Beirut reminded the Lebanese 
that, despite Hezbollah’s assurances that its weapons would always remain 
aimed south, they could also be used internally. After a week, the ‘March 14’ 
majority and ‘March 8’ opposition signed the Doha Agreement that ended the 
period of crisis that resulted in 14 assassinations of political leaders.104  
Hezbollah came out of the crisis apparently more powerful than ever. It kept its 
communications network and the head of airport security was re-instated. 
General Suleiman, hailed for keeping the army on the sidelines during the 
crisis, became president. A national-unity government was formed, under 
Siniora, in which Hezbollah controlled 11 of the 30 posts and was effectively 
given veto power over government decisions and, after the 2006 War, its 
arsenal had been greatly enhanced by Iran.105 But the relationship between 
‘March 14’ and ‘March 8’, and Lebanon’s Sunni and Shia, had also further 
polarised. Moreover, it seemed Hezbollah was having trouble balancing the 
perceptions of its identity as a QSE, operating many state-like institutions – 
and a militia that denied the Lebanese state a legitimate monopoly on violence, 
and used force and the threat of force to change the system of the state. It was 
against this background that Hezbollah was confronted with an article, in Der 
Spiegel, that suggested that the STL was to indict members of Hezbollah. The 
leaks pushed Hezbollah into a dangerous corner, forcing it to change its 
narratives and installing fear among Lebanese, for a repetition of the crisis of 
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2008, or worse. Hezbollah’s legitimacy, outside its core Shia constituencies, 
had been feeble, at the best of times. But, as its members were implicated in the 
murder of Hariri, it had to deal with legitimacy crises in various constituencies.  
THE ASSASSINATION OF RAFIK HARIRI AND THE END OF ‘PAX 
SYRIANA’ 
Winning three consecutive elections, in 1992, 1996 and 2000, and serving 
twice as prime minister, from 1992 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004, Rafik 
Hariri was a dominant factor in post-civil war Lebanon. As a member of the 
‘new contractor bourgeoisie’, Hariri accumulated vast wealth during the Saudi 
construction boom in the 1970s and, as the ‘real voice of King Fahd’, 
participated in diplomacy and negotiations that led to the Taif Agreement that 
ended the Civil War.106 Hariri used his fortune and personality to build an 
extensive patronage system and network of informants, and earned the 
reputation of being the primary dealmaker in Lebanon.107 But, while widely 
praised for his pragmatic approach and willingness to work with other sects, 
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his opponents deemed Hariri too close to the West.108 Moreover, Hariri’s 
ambition to rebuild the war-pocked country and to re-establish Lebanon to its 
former glory as a Middle-Eastern hub, betted heavily on the Oslo Accords to be 
the beginning of a successful Palestinian-Israeli peace-process, which would 
stabilise the region. Lebanon’s dependency on foreign direct investment meant 
that the national debt skyrocketed during his first term. Hariri’s private 
investments led to accusations that he personally benefitted from the 
reconstruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure and that he disregarded the more 
rural, poorer, areas of the country.109 After a power struggle with newly elected 
President Emile Lahoud, Hariri resigned, in December 1998. But, he never lost 
his political clout while out of office, and was appointed prime minister for the 
second time within 2 years. Hariri stepped down again, in October 2004, after 
having been strong-armed by Syria to vote for the unconstitutional extension of 
Lahoud’s presidential term. Less than 4 months later, he was killed in a 
massive bomb attack.  
To understand the impact of the murder of Hariri and the STL on Lebanon and 
Hezbollah, the key, as is often the case in Lebanon, lies not in Beirut, but 55 
Miles to the east, in Damascus. By 2005, neighbouring Syria had maintained a 
military presence in Lebanon for almost 29 years, since its troops entered the 
country, in May 1976, at the request of President Suleiman Frangieh, as the 
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Lebanese Civil War escalated.110 Syrian troops had remained present in most 
parts of Lebanon, despite legally becoming an occupation force, in 1982, and 
despite provisions, in the 1989 Taif Agreement, for their redeployment to the 
Bekaa Valley by September 1992.111 Contrary to the agreement, after the civil 
war, Syrian influence in Lebanese political affairs significantly increased and 
was justified by a treaty of ‘Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination’, in 
1991.112 It was only after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon 
in 2000, that Syrian suzerainty seriously started to be challenged. Initially, it 
was left to Christian politicians to voice calls for implementation of the Taif 
provisions regarding Syrian redeployment. This enabled Hariri, who had 
started his second term as prime minister in October 2000 – only months after 
the Israeli withdrawal, in May, and the death of Syrian President Hafez al-
Assad in June – to steer clear of taking a clear position in this debate. Yet, it 
was public knowledge that his relationship with President Lahoud – described 
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either as a staunch ally of Syria or as a puppet of the subsequent Assad regimes 
– was severely strained, often to a point where it paralysed the government.113  
By summer 2004, Hariri had started preparations to re-establish control over 
his government, as the presidential term of Lahoud, limited by the Lebanese 
Constitution to a single 6-year term, was due to end, in November 2004.114 
Assad had declared, in public, that the election of a new president was an 
internal Lebanese affair, and Maronite politicians started lining-up potential 
presidential prospects.115 By August 2004, however, Damascus had started to 
push for an extension of Lahoud’s mandate, for which, despite Syria’s 
considerable power over Lebanese internal affairs, it needed Hariri’s bloc in 
parliament to vote in favour of a constitutional amendment. Although Hariri 
continued to defend Syria in public, he could not prevent discussion about the 
constitutional amendments becoming part of the wider discussion about Syria’s 
presence in Lebanon, and, after a visit to Damascus on 24 August, Hariri told 
his confidants that he was warned by Assad not to oppose the extension.116 
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According to Hariri, the Syrian president had threatened that he ‘would rather 
break Lebanon over the heads of Hariri and [Druze leader Walid] Jumblatt than 
see his word in Lebanon broken’.117 With a large Syrian troop presence in 
Lebanon, Hariri told his allies that he deemed the risk of plunging the country 
into another round of political and sectarian violence to be too high, and that 
Assad had left him no choice but to support the extension.118  
As the relationship between Hariri’s Western allies and Syria had taken a turn 
for the worse, in the wake of attacks of 11 September 2001, Hariri found 
himself in an increasingly difficult position. On 2 September 2004, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, calling for the disarmament of all 
militias, free and fair elections, and the withdrawal of all remaining foreign 
troops from Lebanon.119 The resolution, which had been pushed by France and 
the US, targeted the most contentious issues of post-war Lebanon. Although it 
did not mention Syria explicitly, it contained an unequivocal message, 
addressed at the Assad government, to end the Syrian hold on Lebanon. Assad 
held Hariri personally responsible for the action of the Council and – although 
a day after the Resolution passed, Hariri reluctantly voted with the 
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parliamentary majority in favour of extending the presidential term – only days 
later, he announced that he would resign as prime minister. On 1 October, 
Druze politician Marwan Hamadeh, a Hariri ally, who had voted against the 
constitutional amendment, was severely injured, when a bomb exploded next to 
his car. While tensions were rising in Lebanon, Lahoud accepted Hariri’s 
resignation, on 20 October, only for Hariri immediately to start negotiations 
with political leaders of other sects to form a broad anti-Syrian coalition for the 
upcoming elections.120  
It was against this background that Hariri was killed, on 14 February 2005. 
Although there was no direct evidence that the Syrian government had 
committed, or ordered, the bombing, it was clear in the minds of many 
Lebanese that the Assad regime had a motive to silence the anti-Syrian 
opposition. Moreover, few believed that such a sophisticated plot could be 
executed without prior knowledge of the head of Syrian intelligence in 
Lebanon, Rustum Ghazaleh. Almost instantly, Syria’s presence in Lebanon 
was plunged into a downward spiral of a legitimacy crisis, which it was not to 
overcome. Hours after the attack, leading members of the opposition stated that 
they held ‘the Lebanese authority and the Syrian authority, being the authority 
of tutelage in Lebanon, responsible for this crime and other similar crimes’.121 
The assassination was condemned and Hariri praised by Lebanese politicians 
from all sects and by political leaders from around the world. Most Western 
governments, although stopping short of accusing Syria of the bombing 
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outright, also called for an immediate Syrian withdrawal.122 Assad himself 
conveyed his ‘sincerest condolences to the family of Mr Hariri and the families 
of the other victims’, and said that Syria stood fraternally alongside Lebanon in 
such difficult times.123 The streets of Beirut, however, soon filled with 
mourners, who did not feel that brotherly love and who called for Assad to 
withdraw his troops. On 19 February, opposition leaders called for ‘an intifada 
for independence', and a daily increase in the number of people protesting 
against the government and Syria on Martyr Square, eventually forced pro-
Syrian Prime Minister Omar Karami to hand in his resignation on 28 
February.124 A week later, under pressure from both the international 
community and mass protests in Lebanon, and after even Russia had urged its 
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ally to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, Assad pledged a two-stage 
withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon.125 However, on 8 March, a 
reported 1 million protesters, mainly Shia supporters of Hezbollah and Amal, 
came down to central Beirut in a counter demonstration organised by pro-
Syrian parties.126 They thanked Syria, protested against Resolution 1559, and 
denounced what Nasrallah called ‘the interfering of the US and Israel in 
Lebanon’s internal affairs’.127 On 14 March, an even larger crowd came to 
Martyr Square – by then, the place of Hariri’s tomb –, demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of the 
security and intelligence services.128 These mass demonstrations, together, 
drew half the Lebanese population to downtown Beirut. They also showed the 
deep divide within the country. From then onwards, ‘March 8’ and ‘March 14’ 
would be used to identify the pro- and anti-Syrian blocks in parliament, 
respectively. On 26 April 2005, Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara 
informed the UN that: ‘The Syrian Arab forces stationed in Lebanon [...] have 
fully withdrawn all their military, security apparatus and assets to their 
positions in Syria...’ as had been demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 
1559.129 In June 2005, ‘March 14’, led by Rafik Hariri’s son, Saad, won the 
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first Lebanese elections without a Syrian security presence and, the next 
month, Fouad Siniora became prime minister leading a ‘national unity’ 
government that, for the first time, included members of Hezbollah.130  
LEAKS, RUMOURS, AND INDICTMENTS  
One of the first acts of the STL after it opened, in March 2009, was to order the 
release of four Lebanese generals, who had been detained by the Lebanese 
authorities in connection with the Hariri investigation. On 29 April 2009, the 
Pre-Trial Judge ruled that, on the basis of the information available to the 
Tribunal, there was no cause to hold Jamil El Sayed, Ali El Hajj, Raymond 
Azar, and Mostafa Hamdan.131 After his release, General El Sayed claimed that 
the evidence provided by what he called false witnesses, paid by Saad Hariri, 
had led to his detention and suspicion of Syria.132 El Sayed filed an 
unsuccessful request to the President of the STL to disqualify the Lebanese 
judges, as well as an application requesting ‘evidentiary material related to the 
crimes of libelous denunciations and arbitrary detention’.133 The Generals had 
been held on the bases of investigations done by the UNIIIC and, in particular, 
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the statements of two self-proclaimed former Syrian intelligence officers. The 
STL later declared that these witnesses were of no interest to the Tribunal. 
They were not considered to be reliable witnesses. Moreover, the Tribunal had 
no jurisdiction to prosecute them for giving false statements.134 Despite the fact 
that the Tribunal was unable to do anything against ‘false testimonies’ and 
those that allegedly gave them, and did not rely on these witnesses, the 
general’s claim that ‘false witnesses’ had testified was used by opponents of 
the STL, in their efforts to delegitimise the Tribunal. This became a frequent 
talking point in the criticisms of ‘March 8’ officials, directed at the tribunal.135 
The pro-Syrian factions in Lebanese politics, led by Hezbollah, managed to 
make it the primary topic of public debate, overshadowing the work of the 
Tribunal and, at times, even the crime it was established to investigate.  
The use of narratives against the tribunal, including ‘false witnesses’ to 
discredit the Tribunal, was intensified, when, in May 2009, German news 
magazine Der Spiegel published a report that the Tribunal was investigating 
members of Hezbollah, in connection with the murder of Hariri. In an article, 
first published on 23 May, on SPIEGEL Online, Erich Follath claimed that he 
‘learned from sources close to the tribunal and verified by examining internal 
documents’, that ‘[i]ntensive investigations in Lebanon are all pointing to a 
new conclusion: that it was not the Syrians, but instead special forces of the 
Lebanese Shia organization Hezbollah (…) that planned and executed the 
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diabolical attack’.136 The article revealed how the mobile phone data 
investigated by Captain Wissam Eid – who, by then, had been assassinated 
himself – had identified circles of mobile phones used by those believed to be 
involved in the attack.137 One of the ‘hot’ phones had been linked to Abd al-
Majid Ghamlush, a member of Hezbollah, after he used it to call his 
girlfriend.138 Allegedly, this had led the investigators to the masterminds of the 
attack, Hajj Salim (Salim Jamil Ayyash) and Mustafa Badr al-Din (Mustafa 
Amine Badreddine), both also known to be members of Hezbollah.139  
Hezbollah reacted by saying that the article ‘was an attempt to tarnish its image 
before parliamentary elections in Lebanon on June 7’.140 In a speech, on 25 
May, Nasrallah said that ‘we see the Der Spiegel report as an Israeli 
accusation’, and claimed that ‘Der Spiegel belongs to the Zionist lobby, which 
funds its operations’.141 Yet, the general election that took place a week after 
the article in Der Spiegel remained peaceful and, in a speech on al-Manar, 
Nasrallah accepted the victory of ‘March 14’, and also congratulated the 
winners of the election.142 But, he also said that Hezbollah would only work 
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within a national unity government if it retained its veto over cabinet 
decisions.143 It took Saad Hariri several months to form a new national unity 
government that included ministers from both ‘March 14’ and ‘March 8’. 
However, in August, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Walid Jumblatt 
broke away from the ‘March 14’ alliance and withdrew its ministers.144 
The fear of plunging the country into a sectarian war meant that even the 
‘March 14’ coalition, including Saad Hariri, decided to avoid rhetoric that 
could be interpreted as bellicose, or supporting accusations that Hezbollah was 
involved in killing Hariri. Moreover, as no other sources had backed up the 
story in Der Spiegel, at the beginning of 2010, it seemed that the Tribunal 
could be deterred from proceeding towards a meaningful prosecution.145 While 
Nasrallah continued his rhetoric against the STL, condemning the investigation 
and claiming it to be an Israeli project to destabilise Lebanon and the unity 
government, the STL investigation – and the suggestion that Hezbollah might 
have been behind the attack on his father – put Saad Hariri in an increasingly 
difficult position.146  
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This already very tense situation became potentially explosive, in summer 
2010. Nasrallah announced that Saad Hariri had told him that members of 
Hezbollah would be indicted by the STL. Hariri had shared the information 
with Hezbollah and had assured Nasrallah that those implicated by the STL 
were ‘undisciplined’ Hezbollah members, and that it was not the party itself 
that would be accused of murdering his father to defuse the situation.147 Hariri 
thereby provided Hezbollah with an opportunity to distance itself from the 
suspects by designating them ‘undisciplined members’, while he maintained 
the peace, stayed in power, and could continue to support the Tribunal. 
However, this strategy seemed to fail when Nasrallah vowed that he would 
resist even the arrest of ‘half a member’ of Hezbollah.148 Tensions rose so high 
that, amid fears a sectarian conflict would erupt, a delegation of Arab leaders, 
consisting of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Saudi King Abdullah, and 
Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad al-Thani, visited Lebanon, in late July, in an 
effort to calm the situation and to ensure the continued power sharing between 
their respective clients: Hezbollah and Hariri’.149  
Paul Salem, the head of the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Centre was 
quoted in relation to the alarming situation and ‘worrisome position’ of 
Hezbollah, in summer 2010:  
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If there is movement towards peace in the region, then Hezbollah has a 
problem. If there's movement toward war, Hezbollah has a problem. And now 
if the tribunal moves forward, they will also have a problem.150 
This precarious situation gave Hezbollah all the more reason to continue its 
attacks on the Tribunal. In a speech, on 8 August, Nasrallah presented evidence 
that Israel was behind the killings.151 In October, Nasrallah went a step further, 
when he urged all Lebanese to boycott the investigation and branding co-
operation with the STL as an ‘attack on the resistance’.152 He said that 
Hezbollah would ‘cut off the hand’ of anyone who tried to arrest any of its 
members charged in the assassination of Hariri by the STL.153 Saad Hariri, in 
the meanwhile, declared that he had made a mistake by accusing Syria and that 
this had been a political accusation, though at the same time he assured that the 
tribunal was not political and would only look at evidence’154  
The political crisis culminated in the collapse of the Hariri government, in 
January 2011. Eleven Hezbollah ministers and their ‘March 8’ allies resigned 
from the national unity cabinet, as indications that Hezbollah members would 
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be indicted became stronger and after Hariri had refused to call a cabinet 
meeting to discuss withdrawing Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL.155 Hariri 
would have been unable to end the cooperation with the STL, both in terms of 
losing support among his Sunni constituents and the international community, 
and in the light of international agreements and the UN Resolution. The latter 
was confirmed by the fact that his successor as prime minister, the Hezbollah-
backed Najib Mikati – who, after the Hariri government fell, was asked by 
President Suleiman to form a new cabinet, in which the March 8 bloc held the 
majority – has never been able to end the cooperation with the STL either.  
A week after the fall of the Hariri government, the first indictments were 
submitted to the pre-trial judge of the STL, the contents of which remained 
confidential, at that stage. When, in March 2011, an amended indictment was 
filed by the prosecutor, this led to speculation that senior Hezbollah members 
would be indicted as well, but it took until 28 June 2011 for the Tribunal to 
issue sealed arrest warrants to the prosecutor general of Lebanon.156 Only a day 
later, the names of the suspects were leaked to the press; Salim Ayyash, 
Mustafa Badreddine, Hussein Anaissi and Assad Sabra, all four known to be 
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Hezbollah members.157 As a result of the leak, Hezbollah had had time to 
prepare when on 28 July the Pre-Trial Judge ordered the lifting of 
confidentiality of personal details of the individuals named in the indictment.158 
Unsurprisingly, in August, the Lebanese authorities had to report back to the 
STL that it had not been able to apprehend the suspects. Although Nasrallah 
was given another chance to distance himself and Hezbollah from the accused, 
he again decided not to do so and instead reject the Tribunal as a foreign 
conspiracy against his organisation, and reiterated that the indicted individuals 
would not be arrested, under any circumstances.159  
THE IMPACT OF THE STL ON HEZBOLLAH: A QUASI-STATE ENTITY 
CUM POLITICAL PARTY 
The ability of Hezbollah to maintain legitimacy in various constituencies over 
time, and how and to what extent the indictment by the STL of four of its 
members, for the assassination of Hariri, impacted on that ability, is not always 
easy to see at first glance.160 Even if there had been comprehensive polling data 
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available that measured the opinions held about Hezbollah and its actions 
among different constituencies and at different moments, one would still not 
know on what beliefs those opinions were based. Yet, by looking at legitimacy 
crises and changing narratives, especially those under pressure by the STL 
investigation, and, by looking at the bases, performance, and support that in 
congruence constitute legitimacy, in different constituencies, one can discern 
how the organisation claims legitimacy and where and when these claims are 
accepted.  
By assessing the legitimacy crises the organisation overcame over the course of 
its existence, it becomes clear that the leadership of Hezbollah demonstrated an 
understanding that legitimacy was a prerequisite for its success. Moreover, it is 
important to realise that throughout its existence, Hezbollah has gained 
experience in dealing with constituencies whose interests do not always 
converge, and whose beliefs differ widely. Legitimacy constantly changes and, 
in the case of Hezbollah, was sometimes ephemeral, when the support, based 
on its military performance, which strengthened the bases of its legitimacy, 
came and went. By its members joining the cabinet the organisation became 
part of the government; Hezbollah became part of the same entity it was 
competing with over statehood. Operating as a QSE and a political party, at the 
same time, in a country that is deeply divided along sectarian lines, Hezbollah 
had to seek legitimacy in multiple ‘home’ constituencies simultaneously. 
Moreover, it had to influence the triangle of political leaders, armed forces, and 
the people of its arch-foe Israel, and the multiple global audiences that affected 




even among its core constituencies, at times, led to a complicated balancing 
act, as the perceived interests of the Lebanese Shia, and its main sponsors Iran 
and Syria, did not always align.  
When looking at Hezbollah, in light of the three types of legitimising authority 
Weber describes, its legitimacy within the Shia community was firmly based 
on traditional grounds.161 The all-encompassing life system of Islam includes 
religion, state and law, and provides a framework of identity. The claims to 
legitimacy of Hezbollah were, and still are, primarily based on Islamic doctrine 
and religious symbolism, and to a lesser extent, on charismatic grounds.162 This 
basis was strengthened by the success of the ‘Islamic Resistance’ in forcing the 
Israeli withdrawal from most of Lebanon’s territory, in 1985, and during 
Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s success in 
fighting the IDF rendered its ideology and actions more persuasive to many 
Shia. Hezbollah proved successful in convincing people not to take refuge in 
the North and in preventing the population from turning against the 
organisation, by swiftly responding to destruction caused by Israeli retaliations, 
and by rebuilding houses and providing aid for the families of militants. Not 
only the success of the ‘Islamic Resistance’, fighting amongst the people, 
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depended on the support, co-operation and hospitality of the civilian 
population, but, the social organisation that was vital to ensuring this success, 
today, touches on almost every aspect of Shia life, in Lebanon. It remains 
essential for Hezbollah’s existence, and generated an unrivalled grassroots 
support that strengthened the basis of legitimacy.163 First, the living conditions 
of the impoverished Shia masses had to improve, before they could become 
politically active. But when they did, Hezbollah’s participation in the elections 
was very popular among the politically disenfranchised Shia, and they formed 
the basis of its political success.  
Participating in the democratic process was also an attempt to create 
legitimacy, in the eyes of the various non-Shia constituencies, in Lebanon. 
Among many Shia, beliefs about what Hezbollah, and what it should be doing, 
are mainly based on religious authority, but it lacks such basis amongst the 
members of other sects in Lebanon. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is 
widely regarded as charismatic, but as a Shia cleric, the norms he sets and the 
statements he makes do not have the same effect on non-Shia, and at times 
even alienate them. Where the bases of legitimacy are weak, the success and 
support elements become more important to claims to legitimacy. As a QSE, 
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Hezbollah was not backed up by regime legitimacy, and only had limited 
symbolic functions for Lebanese nationalism that might contribute to its 
legitimacy.164 So the main function of Hezbollah’s military efforts contributing 
to legitimacy among the members of the various non-Shia sects was that it was 
fighting a common enemy shared by the vast majority of Lebanese. As 
Hezbollah took it upon itself to provide security against Israel, doing so 
effectively was an imperative for legitimacy. It is clear that the environmental 
support and the effectiveness of Hezbollah at some point compensated for 
weaker bases amongst non-Shia, and its military organisation could count on 
considerable support. But, that support relied heavily on its military 
performance and different legitimacy crises proved it to be somewhat unstable. 
Most notably, after Israel withdrew, it constantly had to prove its weapons 
were only aimed at Israel and when, by 2005, the euphoria of the Israeli 
withdrawal had faded, Hezbollah faced another legitimacy crisis. In the 2006 
war, Hezbollah proved to be an effective military organisation. The 
indiscriminate violence Israel used in the war and the excessive damage IDF 
bombing caused, strengthened the conviction of many Lebanese that an armed 
Hezbollah was indispensable to protect the country against Israel. Yet, at the 
same time, actions leading to the war could count on a lot of criticism, 
especially from non-Shia. This was not because of the actions, per se, but, 
because the motivations behind it were believed to serve the interest of 
Hezbollah alone and because of the suffering of the Lebanese, during the war.  
                                                      




Hezbollah’s opponents always feared that the party was only feigning 
attachment to Lebanon as a pluralist society and that its ultimate aim was to 
transform it into an Islamic state. This was despite Hezbollah’s repeated 
statements that the conditions for establishing an Islamic regime would 
probably never exist in Lebanon and demonstrations of pragmatism as a 
political party. As the relationship between ‘March 8’ and ‘March 14’ 
hardened, these fears increased. In the aftermath of the 2006 war, the political 
stalemate over the STL and Hezbollah’s demonstrations of military power to 
enforce political demands reinvigorated a feeling of discomfort about 
Hezbollah’s weapons among non-Shia. Yet, it was with the 2008 blockade of 
Beirut that the ‘veneer of its domestic neutrality vanished, greatly reducing its 
legitimacy as a popular resistance movement and heightening opposition to its 
armed status’.165 The message to Shia was that it was Hezbollah that 
safeguarded Shia political interests, but this was interpreted by many non-Shia 
as meaning that Hezbollah was willing to put Shia (and Syrian) interests before 
the stability of Lebanon. Hezbollah had to negotiate this crisis successfully to 
re-legitimise itself, especially its military apparatus, among non-Shia.  
Unlike most other QSEs, besides operating state functions within the state it 
aimed to transform, Hezbollah also claimed legitimacy for its military 
organisation’s fighting a war against another state, and for a conventional 
political party. Hezbollah never claimed legitimacy for its organisation and 
actions in the eyes of the Israeli trinity of public, government, and armed 
                                                      




forces. But contemporary armed conflict is also a battle for wills, or multiple 
wills, in which diminishing the legitimacy of the opponent and its actions are 
objectives. Israel’s objective, in the 1980s, besides ending the PLO presence in 
Lebanon, was to create an environment, in which a friendly regime in Lebanon 
would guarantee a peaceful northern border. It emerged that military 
superiority and taking hold of territory was not sufficient, in a war that was 
fought amongst the people, for the will of the people, and upon occupation 
Israel lost the initiative to the occupied. Israel learned that its ‘soft’ objectives 
would not be reached quickly and that, fighting an enemy like Hezbollah – 
which did not present a target and avoided confrontation on Israeli terms – 
would take a long time. Hezbollah on the other hand, proved to be superior in 
fighting such a war, and, over the years, learned how to make effective use of 
every available network to fight Israel. The success of the attacks, on the IDF, 
in the security zone led to a rising belief among Israelis that the government 
should discontinue the occupation of southern Lebanon. In the long run, 
Hezbollah, as a guerrilla force, was better able to inflict damage, while 
manoeuvring within ‘the rules of the game’, than the IDF. Additionally, 
Israel’s political situation prevented it from using all its force to achieve its 
aims at all costs, especially in the final stages of the occupation, and when 
forced by the international community to accept a cease-fire, in 2006. 
Moreover, its ineffectiveness against the small targets Hezbollah militants 
presented created a lot of frustration within the IDF.166 In highly militarised 
Israel, the domestic belief that what the IDF was doing was right and justified 
                                                      




was highly important to military leaders.167 By influencing the will of the 
Israelis – in that the costs were perceived to be higher than the benefits – 
Hezbollah gained relative strength over the IDF.168 In 2000, Israel withdrew, 
after 18 years, without reaching its goal, and in the years that followed, most 
notably in the 2006 war, Israel proved unable to break the will or strength of 
Hezbollah.169  
Throughout the Sunni dominated Arab and Muslim world, the fact that 
Hezbollah was the only force successfully fighting the IDF, provided it with 
bases for legitimacy that no other Shia organisation could claim among those 
constituencies. It was generally seen as a legitimate resistance movement 
among Arab populations. This image continued after the Israeli withdrawal, in 
2000, and the July War, in 2006. Hezbollah fought on the side of the PLO in 
the War of the Camps, in the late 1980s, and it served as an inspiration for 
other militant organisations, most notably Hamas. However, its stance against 
any (implied) recognition of Israeli statehood and its condemnation of every 
Arab state and organisation that engaged in talks with Israel, deteriorated its 
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relation with the PLO and led to decreasing legitimacy for Hezbollah’s military 
actions, in the eyes of many Sunni governments. In 2006, for instance, key 
Arab states were quick to voice their disapproval of Hezbollah’s action; Saudi-
Arabia, criticised what it labelled ‘uncalculated adventures’ and Jordan, Egypt, 
and the United Arab Emirates followed suit.170 But, at the same time, its 
success against Israel (temporarily) inflated Hezbollah’s popularity across Arab 
populations.171 As neighbouring countries were also marked by deepened 
animosity between the two main sects in Islam, in the years that followed; and, 
as Hezbollah made very clear that first and foremost, it represented Shia 
interests, more criticism of the Hezbollah could be heard in various (Sunni) 
Arab constituencies. 
Originally founded with Iranian and Syrian aid, Hezbollah relied heavily on 
their (financial) support. Both regimes repeatedly expressed their belief in the 
legitimacy of Hezbollah’s military activities and remained close to the 
organisation. However, Syria always applied ‘divide and rule’ tactics to keep 
control over Lebanese politics of which tactics Hezbollah became a victim, at 
times, when the Assad-regime deemed it to be too powerful. Nevertheless, 
Hezbollah remained close to the Assad regime, as its staunch support, after the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, and, more recently, sending its fighters to support 
government forces in the Syrian Civil War proved; Hezbollah relied heavily on 
Iran for its weapons, but, had to balance its tone to secure domestic legitimacy 
with the ‘Islamic Republic’ rhetoric of its Iranian sponsor. In combination with 
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Supreme Leader Khamenei not being as highly regarded by Hezbollah’s 
leadership as Khomeini was, it became increasingly financially and doctrinally 
independent from Iran.172  
Hezbollah’s radical origin, its manifesto, and its actions against Western targets 
in the 1980s, made it notorious among Western publics and governments alike. 
Whether it really was behind attacks on Western targets, like the US Marine 
barracks, or not, was irrelevant. The organisation was widely believed to be 
responsible. This radical image was enhanced by Israel’s ability to provide a 
narrative that was easier to understand and fitted into already pre-existing ideas 
about Hezbollah and terrorism, in the West. This illustrates one of the problems 
for Hezbollah in dealing with multiple constituencies: its inability to find 
effective means to change its image in the West. Since its transformation in the 
early 1990s, Hezbollah made considerable efforts to play by the rules in its 
conflicts with Israel; it made an effort to spare civilian lives and it generally 
attacked military targets. Unlike other ‘terrorist’ organisations, it never targeted 
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the US, nor did it attack US citizens, after the end of the Civil War.173 
Nevertheless, it was largely unable to convince the West that it was not a 
terrorist organisation. Its past deeds and other actions – rightfully or wrongfully 
–attributed to Hezbollah, played a major part in this. So did its reluctance to 
distance itself from those actions and its radical Islamic rhetoric. In the wake of 
9/11, for instance, Israeli officials were quick to assert the ‘common struggle’ 
faced by Israel and US in the declared ‘war on terrorism’.174 The Israeli 
government proved to be successful in disassociating the violence of Hezbollah 
from Israeli policy towards Lebanon and the occupied territories, and 
associating the violence of Hezbollah with that of al-Qa’ida. It thereby 
successfully continued to legitimise the violence it used and delegitimise 
Hezbollah and its actions, in most ‘Western’ constituencies. Hezbollah, proved 
to be unable successfully to convey a counter message that fitted in with most 
international constituencies. The news media provided images that were the 
‘most salient instruments’ with regard to multiple constituencies and 
determining the balance of legitimacy in contemporary warfare.175 Although 
Hezbollah’s operating of al-Manar suggests that the organisation understood 
the importance of moving images, the international satellite networks were the 
providers of images for broadcasters around the world, not al-Manar. 
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Hezbollah failed to provide the moving images and the narratives to shape 
attitudes. After 9/11, the American news media engaged in reductive 
polarisation into pro- and anti-Western forces, along the lines of George W. 
Bush’s false dichotomy ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’.176 
Hezbollah was often mentioned in the same breath as al-Qa’ida and Hamas. 
This portrayal denied the grassroots support and the considerable level of 
domestic legitimacy Hezbollah enjoyed at the time.177 Additionally, Western 
media used ‘terrorism’ and ‘murder’ for acts by Hezbollah and ‘strikes’ and 
‘incursions’ for those by the IDF. The image of a bearded cleric denouncing 
the West and calling for Jihad fitted existing societal concepts, values, and 
knowledge, and put it into a context that the audience could understand – that 
is, the prevailing mainstream narrative. There were images available of 
Nasrallah as an eloquent leader, almost serenely explaining his party’s 
motivation, but, the radical images were shown. However, Hezbollah 
continued to provide those images by addressing its domestic public with anti-
Israel/America rhetoric, in a world in which every image was almost instantly 
spread around the world, and both its intended and unintended message 
reached different constituencies. 
Hezbollah was added to the US list of terrorist organisations with a ‘global 
reach’, in 2001. Hezbollah’s participation in elections did not change US 
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government ideas about its legitimacy. Neither did Nasrallah’s condemnation 
of the New York World Trade Center attacks, in 2001.178 Washington had 
traditionally boycotted any action that would lead to the reinforcement 
Hezbollah’s position. It supported Israel in the 2006 War. Most European 
countries differentiated between Hezbollah’s militia and its social/political 
organisation, an artificial differentiation, as it was one organisation in both 
practise, leadership and in the eyes of Hezbollah leaders. Yet, some European 
governments established contacts with the movement’s political wing, while 
condemning the same Hezbollah for being a militia. Former EU High 
Representative Javier Solana acknowledged that the movement was ‘part of 
political life in Lebanon and is represented in the Lebanese parliament’.179 Its 
democratic credentials meant that the EU resisted Israeli and US pressure to 
add Hezbollah to the official list of terrorist organisations, until 2013.  
In the changing narratives, and counter narratives aimed at the STL, the impact 
of international criminal justice on the legitimacy of Hezbollah could be 
observed long before the indictment. The establishment of the Tribunal, leaks 
at the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission 
(UNIIIC), investigations into the murder of Hariri, alleged leaks at the 
Tribunal, and speculation concerning who would be indicted for the murder of 
Hariri, all forced the organisation to change its narratives. Yet, the outstretched 
process of ongoing investigation by the STL, its closed indictments, published 
indictments and, eventually, arrest warrants, and more important the leaking 
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information along the way, gave rise to one commentator calling it: ‘“The 
Indictment”: A Thriller lacking in action’.180 The amount of time that the STL 
gave Hezbollah to prepare for what was coming and develop counter narratives 
might have reduced the impact the indictments could have had.  
While Hezbollah could still dismiss the leaks in Der Spiegel, in 2009, 
especially as there were no other sources to back up the story, this was no 
longer possible by the time Saad Hariri informed Hezbollah about the 
imminent indictment of its members, in summer 2010. By then, however, 
Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian factions had opposed the STL since its 
inception, had criticised it since it had opened, and the strategy of focusing on 
allegedly false testimonies seemed to have worked, to a certain degree. 
Hezbollah had chosen an offensive defence, after the Der Spiegel revelation, 
and had stepped up its efforts against the STL. It gratefully used the ‘false 
witnesses’ narrative, claimed that Saad Hariri had paid them and that the STL 
refused to deal with them, disregarding the fact that the Tribunal lacked any 
jurisdiction to prosecute these witnesses for perjury, or contempt of court, as 
these individuals had given their statements to the UNIIIC. Hezbollah claimed 
that the investigation was one-sided and single-minded about implicating Syria. 
Nasrallah clearly hoped to undercut any indictment, not only by breaking the 
news himself, in advance, but, also, by invoking Saad Hariri, who has long 
been the tribunal’s chief supporter. Nevertheless, the narrative Nasrallah chose 
showed that Hezbollah had to make a choice. By not taking the way out 
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provided by Hariri – to declare the suspects ‘rogue members’–, and instead 
declaring that it would never allow the arrest of any of its members, it chose to 
strengthen its legitimacy in its core Shia constituency.  
By 2010, this choice to strengthen legitimacy in its core constituencies had 
possibly already been made, to a point of no return. While, Hezbollah’s first 
participation in elections had given hope to some that it would eventually 
transform into a conventional political party, by integrating its militia into the 
army and its social organisation into government institutions, it had been clear, 
for a long time, that Hezbollah had decided against giving up its quasi-state 
qualities. The reaction of Hezbollah to the indictment should also been seen in 
the light of legitimacy crises Hezbollah had to deal with that were not direct 
results of the Tribunal’s actions, although many of them were closely 
connected with the STL. The assassination of Hariri itself, in 2005, would 
prove to be the catalyst for a popular revolution that ended the ‘Pax-Syriana’. 
In the years that followed, the divide between pro- and anti-Syrian parties was 
deepened, both over discussions about Hezbollah’s arms and the about the STL 
(when it was still believed it would hold Syria responsible for the murder of 
Hariri). Moreover, by the time the notion that Hezbollah members would be 
indicted by the STL took hold, the Sunni-Shia schism had already replaced the 
Christian-Muslim schism in Lebanon. Part of Lebanon’s Christians and, at 
times, the Druze – largely united under the banner of Walid Jumblatt’s PSP –, 
had decided that their interests would be best served by siding with the pro-
Syrian ‘March 8’ alliance. As a result, Hezbollah could claim more political 




support base among the Shia population. Hezbollah’s core constituency no 
longer only consisted of the 'downtrodden of the world', the disenfranchised 
Shia, susceptible to radicalisation, but, also of more moderate Shia. 181 
The 2008 blockade of Beirut had clearly revealed a critical legitimacy moment 
in Sunni (and other non-Shia constituencies) over the arms of Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah’s ability to claim legitimacy for its actions and institutions in the 
Sunni constituency was being lost. But, although the murder of Hariri, his 
legacy, and sectarian tension had united more Lebanese Sunni in Saad Hariri’s 
Future Movement, the ‘March 14’ coalition he led was not very stable. And the 
‘March 8’ opposition had weakened the government further hammering on 
about ‘false witnesses’, as had the self-imposed paralyses of the government, 
over the STL. Moreover, it was clear that Saad Hariri and his government 
would try to avoid escalation into sectarian war, at almost any cost.  
Being implicated in the murder of Hariri, by the STL indictment, both 
accelerated this process of legitimacy loss, and influenced Hezbollah’s reaction 
to it. Hezbollah focused on the constituency that it needed most, and in which 
its bases were the strongest. It also provided narratives that appealed to these 
constituencies, i.e. Israel killed Hariri and Hezbollah will never hand over a 
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member. These narratives Hezbollah used in their attempts both to delegitimize 
the investigation into the murder and STL, were aided by the fact that the 
Tribunal at times seemed to be as leaky as a sieve. Although the Der Spiegel 
leak most likely originated from within the UN investigation, later leaks came 
from within the Tribunal, or the UN.182 This gave the organisation the chance 
to prepare for what was coming. Hezbollah used the time it had before the 
indictments and arrest warrants were publicised to provide ‘evidence’ that 
Israel was behind the bombing of the former prime-minister and that the STL 
was a Zionist conspiracy. The evidence, presented by Nasrallah, among other 
documents, consisted of statements made by agents of Israel, arrested in 
Lebanon, a demonstration of Hezbollah’s ability to capture images from Israeli 
drones and ‘prove’ that the Lebanese telecoms’ infrastructure was infiltrated by 
Israel. Although it may not have been ‘evidence’ in the sense that it would 
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have exonerated Hezbollah, in a court of law, it was not meant to be.183 It was 
effective rhetoric. Nevertheless, it was the first time that Hezbollah came with 
an alternative story about the murder of Hariri, instead of focusing on the 
argument that the STL was a political court.184  
When, in June 2011, the STL, finally, issued arrest warrants, based on the 
indictments for the murder of Hariri,185 and, a month later, the Tribunal 
officially named four individuals, known to be members of Hezbollah, the 
organisation had had time to brace for the impact and came prepared. The 
indictment came only weeks after newly installed Prime Minister Mikati had 
announced his government, in which the ‘March 8’ coalition held a majority of 
cabinet seats. Just like Saad Hariri had tried to avoid a escalation in the months 
before the indictment, the STL indictment now forced Mikati to walk a 
tightrope of ambiguous statements between Hezbollah and its allies, on one 
side, and the international community and ‘March 14’, on the other. Yet, 
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according to many, the indictments did not ‘provoke a political earthquake 
against Hezbollah, as many were hoping’.186  
The absence of this ‘earthquake’ did not mean that the indictment, or the STL 
in general, did not change the landscape. The impact the establishment of the 
STL had on the Lebanese political landscape, as a whole, is hard to 
underestimate. However, the indictment, did not provide a strong compelling 
narrative of how exactly the accused assassinated Hariri, why Hezbollah 
members did so, and who ordered it. Naming the accused and citing Call Data 
Records of groups of mobile phones connected to the accused, the crime scene 
and previous monitoring of Hariri’s movements, and the false claim to Al 
Jazeera, might be sufficient evidence in court, but was very technical. The 
leaks meant that instead of one critical legitimacy moment, or crisis, Hezbollah 
made sure that the revelations that its members would be implicated in the 
murder of Hariri became a rather muddled string of critical legitimacy 
moments, with, at times very effective, counter narratives in between.187 
Moreover, the political tensions in Lebanon, at times prevented its opponents 
from using the indictment, and international criminal justice narratives, to the 
fullest in attempts to delegitimise the organisation and its actions. Shortly 
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before the indictment came out, protests had started against the Assad regime 
in Syria. Soon after the indictment, the Syrian Civil War broke out. Although 
all relevant parties in Lebanon showed a strong will not to let the war in Syria 
spark a sectarian war in Lebanon, the decision of Hezbollah, in May 2013, to 
enter the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Syrian regime added to the 
existing tensions. 
Despite these circumstances mitigating its effect, the establishment of the 
Tribunal, its investigations, proceedings, and especially when it became clear 
that Hezbollah members would be implicated in the murder of Hariri, all 
clearly had an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy. It became clear that 
something had changed. The relentless attacks of Hezbollah on the STL and 
the investigation into the murder of Hariri not only reveal that the STL 
impacted on Hezbollah’s ability to create and maintain legitimacy in various 
constituencies, but Hezbollah’s efforts to prevent the STL from continuing to 
operate, also show that the only way for Hezbollah really to mitigate the threat 
to its legitimacy stemming from the STL would be to stop its operating, or at 
least to stop it from reaching a verdict. It is likely that, the impact on 
Hezbollah’s legitimacy might have the earthquake effect that some anticipated, 
if, at some point in the future, through proceedings’ before the Tribunal, the 
narrative of the crime, and Hezbollah’s involvement were to become stronger 
and clearer, and if a credible conviction were to be rendered. This would be a 





CHAPTER VI.                                                                                     
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ITS ESTABLISHMENT, 
FUNCTIONING, AND THE SELF-REFERRAL OF THE SITUATION 
IN NORTHERN MALI 
 
Before Mali was plunged into turmoil, after the January 2012 reawakening of a 
Tuareg rebellion in the north, and a military coup, overthrowing the 
constitutional order in Bamako, in March 2012, the country was often 
acclaimed as an example of a relatively successful African democracy. Yet, 
despite being its democratic political system, rich culture and relative tolerant 
nature, the country had been dealing with severe hardships such as limited 
natural resources, droughts and corruption for generations. Most destabilising 
however were the recurring armed rebellions by Tuaregs in the north. In early 
2012, The Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad or National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), an organisation consisting 
of veterans of previous Tuareg rebellions, launched attacks on government 
targets to take control of Mali’s three northern regions from the government, in 
Bamako. The MNLA was initially successful against the Malian Army, and 
aided by the state of chaos the central government was left in after the military 
coup, in Bamako, the organisation declared the independence of Azawad in 
April 2012.  
Although the uprising in Northern Mali was not initially sparked by Islamic 
fundamentalism – its origins can be found in age-old irredentist sentiments of 




northern Tuareg – the violence in northern Mali did provide Islamic militants 
with unprecedented opportunities to become major actors. Both foreign and 
home-grown radical Islamist factions were quick to fill the void, in terms of 
ungoverned space, created by the Tuareg rebellion and the collapse of 
government control, and Islamists had taken over control of most of northern 
Mali, by June 2012. These developments transformed the, historically 
balanced, relation between state and religion in Mali, based on a secularism 
and moderation. This does not only pose a threat to Mali and neighbouring 
states, in particular Niger, but also to stability in the wider region, and to 
international peace and security.  
The threat that the conflict in northern Mali posed to international peace and 
security, combined with the evidence of war crimes, committed by various 
parties in the conflict that soon started to appear, meant that the situation 
seemed to be a clear-cut case for the ICC. Especially as Mali had been one of 
the first states to sign and ratify the Rome Statute and, in July 2012, the 
government of Mali, requested Fatou Bensouda, the Chief Prosecutor of the 
ICC, to investigate the most serious crimes committed in the northern part of 
its territory after January 2012. However, by mid-2012, the ICC was reaching 
the limits of its capacity and was already under heavy fire, from the African 
Union and many others, for its focus on situations in Africa. In short, the last 
thing that the Court needed was another official investigation in Africa. 
Moreover, self-referrals by States Parties – while often facilitating easier 
procedures and the collection of evidence – were increasingly watched with 




worse, a court at the convenience of states to neutralise their non- or quasi-state 
opponents by means of international justice.188 Nevertheless, the Prosecutor of 
the ICC, in January 2013, announced that the Court would open an 
investigation into the situation in northern Mali.  
The present chapter will argue that the self-referral of Mali indeed 
demonstrates that the government trusted that it would benefit from the 
involvement of the ICC; and that it sought international criminal procedures to 
boost its legitimacy, while simultaneously delegitimising the various QSEs that 
also vied for control over territory and statehood functions in Mali. The first 
part of the chapter will explain the statehood issues that arose, in northern 
Mali, the underlying grievances, the QSEs involved, and the crimes committed 
in the conflict. The second part will focus on the politics of self-referral of 
situations to the ICC, and how, by prosecuting the most serious international 
crimes, ‘the ICC provides a vocabulary with which opponents can label the 
enemy as a violator of universal norms, and, thereby, as the enemy of humanity 
itself’.189 It will describe the potential pitfalls of self-referral cases for the ICC 
and, indeed, for states that refer situations in their own territory. The third part 
of the chapter will discuss the acceptance of the self-referral by the Prosecutor 
of the ICC and the significance of the self-referral of Mali, in particular. 
                                                      
188 S. Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘ The Law and Politics of Self Referrals’, In: A. Smeulers 
(ed.) (2010) Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: an Interdisciplinary 
Approach, Antwerpen: Intersentia, pp. 255-271, p. 259. 
189 S. Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan’, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 




Finally, the (potential) impact of the ICC investigation on the legitimacy of the 
MNLA and its statehood project will be assessed, and the change in narratives 
under pressure of international criminal justice and the ICC referral, will be 
discussed.  
 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DECISIVE BLOW FOR 
IMPUNITY? 190  
To understand the impact of the ICC, it is useful to not only look at the Court’s 
set-up and jurisdiction, but also at its justifications, history and functioning. 
Plans for a permanent mechanism of international criminal justice had first 
emerged at the end of World War I, but had not resulted in the establishment of 
such a tribunal within the League of Nations framework. In 1948, the UN 
General Assembly recognised the need to establish an international criminal 
court and invited the International Law Commission (ILC) ‘to study the 
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the 
trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes of similar gravity’.191 
The ILC drafted statutes in 1951 and 1953, but during the Cold War years, the 
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process of drafting was postponed, at times reconsidered, only to be postponed 
again. In 1989, the General Assembly asked the ILC to start work on a 
permanent court once more. This was set in motion by a request by Trinidad 
and Tobago that was motivated to prevent drug-trafficking and transnational 
organised crime. However, when confronted with the horrors of the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the subsequent establishment of the ICTY, the draft statute that 
the committee finished in 1994 was designed to hold individuals accountable 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To consider major 
substantive issues arising from that draft statute, the General Assembly 
established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995. After considering the Committee's 
report, the General Assembly established the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which completed drafting the 
text of a statute, in April 1998.192 It was at the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998, that the Rome 
Statute was finally finalised.193 On 17 July 1998, 120 States adopted the Rome 
Statute, thereby forming the legal basis for the establishment of the first 
permanent international criminal court.194  
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After the sixtieth state ratified the Rome Statute, in April 2002, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan announced: ‘Impunity has been dealt a decisive blow’.195 
Three months later, the Rome Statute came into force, creating the 
International Criminal Court, with the aim ‘to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes’, and ‘to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of 
international justice’.196 The mandate the ICC was given might not always be 
sufficient to live up to those high ambitions. It certainly can be doubted 
whether it can deal impunity a decisive blow. Yet, despite its shortcomings, it 
is the ICC that represents the future of international criminal justice, not the 
least because it was established to be just that.  
A permanent international criminal court already in existence could be argued 
to pose a more immediate threat to perpetrators of the most horrible atrocities 
than the uncertain prospect that an ad hoc tribunal might be created ex post 
facto. Quick prosecutions are more likely before a permanent court than in a 
situation in which the UN Security Council, if its five permanent members can 
reach an agreement, have the possibility to establish an ad hoc tribunal under 
Chapter VII. Although the establishment of a hybrid court is often politically a 
more likely scenario than an ad hoc tribunal, the threat of prosecution by a 
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permanent court is more immediate.197 Hybrid tribunals need a stable 
environment to function and will neither be established fast enough to have an 
impact on live conflicts, nor have the same knowledge and means at hand as a 
permanent court. If international criminal justice is to have a noticeable 
structural deterrent effect, it will be through a permanent court that has the 
means, know-how, and jurisdiction to start an investigation at short notice, that 
is widely perceived to be legitimate and independent, and whose decisions 
carry sufficient weight.  
The road to ‘Rome’ however, demonstrates how difficult it was, and often still 
is, to reach agreement among members of the international community on a 
permanent international criminal court. Unlike, for instance, the ICTY, ICTR, 
and STL, which were established by the UN Security Council, under Chapter 
VII, as a tool to restore and maintain international peace and security, the ICC 
                                                      
197 Hybrid (or internationalized) courts combine both international and national features; 
they apply elements of both systems in their procedural and applicable law, and consist of 
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tribunals that are currently in operation, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (since 2002) 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003) are fully hybrid; the 
War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and Herczegovina (2000), the International Judges and 
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calls ‘internationalized domestic courts’, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2006) marked 
the first UN-based international criminal court established to prosecute a crime committed 
against a specific person, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (2000) 
suspended operation in May 2005. (M.P. Scharf, ‘The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable 
Experiment in International Justice?,Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 5, 




is a treaty-based court.198 Its establishment by the Rome Statute means that, 
despite the close connection and cooperation with the UN, the ICC is an 
independent international organisation with international legal personality.199 
Although its seat is in The Hague, proceedings can take place anywhere, and, 
for its funding, the ICC depends on the states party to the Rome Statute, the 
UN, and voluntary contributions from governments, international 
organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities.200  
The potential impact of the ICC depends on the jurisdiction of the Court. As 
well as on the admissibility of cases and the enforcement mechanisms the 
Court has at its disposal. The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited by the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae, the subject-matter jurisdiction, as defined in the 
Rome Statute. Moreover, the jurisdiction ratione temporis, personae and loci 
limit the jurisdiction of the Court by date, the characteristics of the perpetrator 
and the location of the criminal act. In the case of the ICC, the jurisdiction 
ratione loci depends on the States Parties to the Rome Statute, or on the 
willingness of the Security Council to reach agreement on referrals.  
The jurisdiction ratione materiae that the Rome Statute provides the ICC with 
is limited to the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
                                                      
198 For a discussion on the ICTY as a measure to ‘restore and maintain’ rather than 
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Futamura and J. Gow, ‘The Strategic purpose of the ICTY and international peace and 
security’, in: J. Gow, R. Kerr and Z. Pajić, (2013) Prosecuting War Crimes, London: 
Routledge, pp. 15-28, p. 17. 
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as a whole’.201 In Article 5 of the Statute, these are listed as encompassing war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. While 
the first three crimes are defined in Articles 6, 7, and 8, the ICC will remain 
unable to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, until the crime is 
defined, and the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to this crime are set out.202 Although amendments to the Statute to 
this effect were accepted at the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010, 
jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression will only come to force 
after 1 January 2017, to give members the chance to ratify the amendments.203 
The jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC is fairly straightforward. Based on 
Article 11 of the Statute, the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed after 
the entry into force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 2002. However, if a state 
became party to the Statute at a later date, jurisdiction is limited to crimes 
committed after its entry into force in that State, unless a declaration has been 
lodged with the Registrar, accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
with respect to the crime in question.204 The Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
when a crime described in Article 5 of the Statute appears to have been 
committed in a situation that; 1) was referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party; 
or 2) after a referral by the Security Council; or 3) when the Prosecutor 
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initiated an investigation proprio motu.205 In situations where the jurisdiction 
of the Court is based on a request from the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, as described in Article 13 (b), the jurisdiction ratione personae, 
and/or ratione loci are not limited.206 But, in cases where the jurisdiction of the 
ICC stems from state referrals, under Article 14, or from the proprio motu 
powers of the Prosecutor under Article 15, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited 
to persons who are nationals of a State Party or when crimes are committed on 
the territory of a State Party.  
As a result, the jurisdiction of the ICC, in part depends on the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute. The Statute came into force in July 2002 after 60 States had 
ratified the treaty, as of December 2013, it is in force in 122 states and has 139 
state signatories.207 Although the treaty is in force in most of Africa, almost the 
whole of Europe, and all of South America, it is not ratified by three of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council; the US, Russia, and China.208 
Israel, Sudan, and the US signed the treaty, but informed the UN Secretary 
                                                      
205 Idem. Article 13. 
206 Idem. Article 12 (2). The exception to this is that jurisdiction of the Court is excluded 
for persons who were under 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime. 
According to Article 27 of the Statute, official capacities of persons nor any immunities 
under national or international law shall bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over 
a person. Although it could be argued that personal immunities under customary 
international law, as enjoyed by heads of state and foreign ministers, prevents the ICC 
from indicting, arresting and prosecuting them, the ICJ ruled that this does not bar them 
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2000’ (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, § 61.  
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General that they did not intent to ratify it.209 That some of the most powerful 
states have not ratified the treaty is relevant not only because it has a direct 
impact on the jurisdiction that the ICC can exercise, but also in terms of the 
message it sends - that that ending impunity for the most horrible crimes is not 
their primary concern apparently.  
Beside the treaty basis for the Court, limiting its jurisdiction, the admissibility 
of cases before the ICC is limited by the fact that it is intended to be a court of 
last resort. One of the most significant characteristics of the ICC is that the 
Rome Statute foresaw a system complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.210 The Statute limits the cases that are admissible to the Court to 
                                                      
209 The US initially voted against the Statute at the Rome conference in 1998, then on 31 
December 2000, the last day the Statute was open for signature at the UN in New York, 
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short letter from US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton to UN Secretary General Kofi 
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signature on December 31, 2000’. The fear of ICC interference with US sovereignty and 
prosecution of its nationals apparently went so deep that in August 2002 the US adopted 
the ‘American Service-Members' Protection Act’ (ASPA). Also called the ‘Hague 
Invasion Act’, it authorises the President to ‘use all means necessary and appropriate to 
bring about the release [of any US or allied personnel] being detained or imprisoned by, on 
behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court’. (American Service-
Members' Protection Act (ASPA), Title 2 of Pub.L. 107–206, H.R. 4775, 116 Stat. 820 
SEC. 2008. J.F. Alexander, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of 
Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact’, Villanova Law Review, vol. 54, no. 1, 2009, pp. 
1-56, p.6. D.J. Scheffer, ‘Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court’, 
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those in which a state that has jurisdiction over it ‘is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.211 Article 17 of the 
Statute further stipulates that cases are inadmissible when; a state that has 
jurisdiction has investigated the case and has decided not to prosecute, unless 
this decision stems from unwillingness or inability to prosecute;212 when the 
person concerned has stood trial for the same conduct;213 or when the case ‘is 
not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’.214 However, 
unwillingness on behalf of the state to prosecute is presumed when proceedings 
were undertaken, or the decision was taken not to prosecute after an 
                                                      
211 Idem. Article 17 (1) (a). 
212 Idem. Article 17 (1) (b). 
213 Idem. Article 17 (1) (c) j° Article 20 (3).  
In The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, the Appeals Chamber ruled that ‘the defining elements of a concrete case 
before the Court are the individual and the alleged conduct. It follows that for such a case 
to be inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute, the national investigation must 
cover the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings 
before the Court’. The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta 
and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 'Decision on the Application by 
the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11 O A.  
214 Rome Statute, Article 17 (1) (d). As ‘gravity’ is not defined in the Statute, what the 
term means remains debated. However, it is meant to give the OTP some discretion to 
limit its own jurisdiction to relief the case load of the Court, in the first years of operation, 
it seems that practical considerations also played a role. For more on the ‘gravity 
threshold’ see: S. SaCouto and K. Cleary, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the International 
Criminal Court’, American University International Law Review, vol. 23, no.5, 2007, pp. 
807-854. and K.J. Heller, ‘Situational Gravity Under The Rome Statute’, In: C. Stahn and 
L. Van Den Herik (Eds.), Future Directions in International Criminal Justice, 2007, 




investigation into a case, with the purpose to shield a person from the ICC 
using its jurisdiction.215 When there has been an unjustified delay of the 
proceedings, or when the proceedings ‘were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially’, a case is also admissible to the ICC.216 Inability 
to prosecute a case is determined when a ‘substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system’ renders the state unable to obtain the accused, 
testimonies or evidence, or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.217 
Before an investigation is opened, proprio motu, or based on a state referral, 
the Prosecutor will notify the state that then has a month to open an 
investigation under its national jurisdiction, after which the Prosecutor can 
either defer the case to the state, or request the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize 
the investigation.218 When the Court is satisfied that a case falls under its 
jurisdiction and is admissible, both the accused and states that have jurisdiction 
over a case may challenge the admissibility, or jurisdiction, and shall be 
referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber.219 The ne bis in idem principle of Article 20 
prevents other courts from prosecuting individuals for conduct he or she has 
been convicted for, or acquitted of, by the Court.220 Vice versa the ICC will not 
prosecute a person for the same conduct that has led to a conviction or acquittal 
                                                      
215 Rome Statute, Article 17 (2) (a). 
216 Idem. Article 17 (2) (b) and (c). 
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by a national court, unless that conviction or acquittal was meant to shield the 
person from the jurisdiction of the ICC, or proceedings were not conducted 
independently, or impartially, in accordance with the norms of due process, or 
not with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice.221  
Without a police force of its own, the only way the ICC can enforce its 
decisions is through the cooperation of states. Under the Rome Statute, all 
States Parties are obligated to take necessary measures to enforce the ICC's 
indictments and otherwise support its work.222 The Court may request the arrest 
and surrender of a person to the ICC, or it may request States Parties to provide 
other assistance, in relation to investigations, or prosecutions.223 In theory, the 
enforcement mechanism enables the Court to use the resources of States Parties 
to make sure its decisions are executed. But, where a State Party fails to 
comply with a request to cooperate by the Court, the only steps the ICC can 
take is that it may refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where 
the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security 
Council.224  
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Since the Court came into being on 1 July 2002, it opened investigations into 
eight situations. The situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali were referred to 
the Court by the concerned States Parties themselves; the situations in Darfur, 
Sudan and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya were referred by the UN Security 
Council, and investigations in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire commenced after the 
Pre-Trial Chamber authorised the Prosecutor to open an investigation proprio 
motu.225 Moreover, ‘the situation with respect to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid 
on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip’ was brought before the 
Court, after a referral from the Union of the Comoros, as a procedural matter 
only and does not signify the start of an investigation.226 
In short, the statistics for the cases opened, by the end of 2013, were as 
follows: 30 individuals had been publicly indicted by the ICC; arrest warrants 
had been issued for 21 of them; and 9 were been summoned to appear before 
the court. The cases against seven individuals were at the pre-trial stage at this 
point.227 However only two of those were in ICC custody,228 and one was 
reported to have died.229 In one case, the charges were withdrawn and all 
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The Hellenic Republic, and the Kingdom of Cambodia to Pre-Trial Chamber I, The 
Presidency, 5 July 2013, ICC-01/13 
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proceedings terminated,230 and in four cases the charges were dismissed.231 
Proceedings against two individuals have been terminated because they died.232 
Nine individuals indicted by the ICC were still at large in December 2013, 
although various sources reported the killing of one of the fugitives.233 Three 
suspects had been arrested, but had not been transferred to the ICC.234 As of 
December 2013, two trials were ongoing, and two led to a verdict.235 One case 
resulted in an acquittal that was still under appeal in December 2013,236 and 
one case led to a conviction that was under appeal at that point.237  
Among the individuals publicly indicted by the ICC, two were a serving head 
of state. Omar al-Bashir was president of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, 
although the latter was indicted before he became president. One accused 
formerly was head of state, former President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire, 
and the ICC indicted one former de facto head of state, Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, former ‘Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution’ of Libya, 
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although his capturers killed him rather than transferring him to The Hague.238 
In the situations in the DRC, CAR, and Uganda, cases were brought against 
individuals who had no official connection to state authorities, predominantly 
leaders, or former leaders, of QSEs. Conversely, in the cases of Côte d'Ivoire 
and Libya, the accused committed the crimes they were accused of during the 
spiral of legitimacy loss that resulted in their ousting. In Sudan both the leaders 
who acted in the name of the state, and their QSE counterparts, were accused. 
In the situation in Kenya, the lines between state and non-state actors were 
more blurred. Although all suspects had official connections to the state, they 
committed the acts they were accused of in their capacity of leaders of political 
parties divided along tribal lines.239  
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto won elections in Kenya while procedures 
before the ICC against them were ongoing, and became President and Deputy 
President of Kenya respectively. By the end of 2013, Omar al-Bashir continued 
to be president of Sudan, and Joseph Kony had been evading arrest for the 
better part of a decade. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi remained imprisoned in the 
Libyan town of Zintan without any prospect of being transferred to The Hague. 
Cases before the ICC, by that point, had resulted in four dismissals, a 
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Court for their role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence, five either were in 
government or held another office within the state, but they allegedly ordered the violence 
in their capacity of leaders of political parties, as head of the civil service, head of a radio 
station, and as police commissioner. While, at the time, Ruto was in the government camp 
and Kenyatta in the opposition, they became running mates, in the 2013 elections and 




withdrawal, and an acquittal, and in the only case that ended in a conviction, 
that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the suspect was deemed guilty of only one 
count of War Crimes.240 Lubanga was convicted to what many commentators 
called a lenient sentence of 14 years, with 6 years deducted for the time since 
Lubanga surrendered to the ICC, and far short of the 30 years sought by the 
prosecution.241  
Based on these statistics, it may be hard to see the successes that indicated 
significant ICC impact. Even more so, this is the case when taking into account 
that many serious crimes continued to be committed in most of the conflicts 
under investigation by the ICC, and that many more unimaginable atrocities 
were committed in situations across the world that were not under official 
investigation by the Prosecutor. As Judge Sang-Hyun Song noted, and as 
explained above, looking at statistics is by no means an adequate way of 
determining the impact of the ICC. Yet, the list of cases reveals some of the 
ICC’s shortcomings.242 First: the absence of ICC investigations in some of the 
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most atrocious conflicts make it painfully obvious how the limited jurisdiction 
of the ICC affects the impact the Court can have. Second: the number of 
outstanding arrest warrants, the time that passed since they were issued, and the 
fact that three of the accused were kept in custody, but not transferred to The 
Hague, illustrate that the ICC could not always depend on states to enforce its 
decisions. Third: the numbers show that all official investigations opened were 
into situations in Africa, and that all individuals publicly indicted by the ICC 
were African.  
To start with the last of these, although the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC 
(OTP) opened preliminary investigations into situations outside Africa, by late 
2013, these had not led to an official investigation.243 The focus of the ICC on 
Africa had led to much criticism, and is hampering its performance. Although 
criticism on the geographical focus of the Court is understandable, this was 
warranted by the absence of investigations outside Africa rather than by the 
opening of investigations into situations in Africa. Numerous African countries 
experienced civil war over the last decades, in which horrendous crimes were 
committed. It was because their legal systems were often not capable of putting 
the leaders most responsible for those crimes on trial and because the Treaty 
was ratified, in large parts of Africa, that the ICC could step in to do so. 
Moreover, the governments of Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Mali self-referred 
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situations to the ICC, either because they believed that the ICC would be better 
equipped to prosecute crimes committed in their territory, or because they 
thought they would benefit from a self-referral. Côte d'Ivoire accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and asked the Prosecutor to open an investigation, 
resulting in a self-referral in all but name. The other investigation that the 
Prosecutor started proprio motu, in Kenya, was not an example of the ICC 
forcing its jurisdiction on an African country either, as its leaders now claim it 
is. Especially with hindsight, former Chief-Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
could, and maybe should, have used his discretionary power not to open an 
investigation into the crimes committed during the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence in Kenya. But, when the Prosecutor submitted a request to the Pre-
Trial Chamber, in late 2009, there was widespread support for an ICC 
investigation among the Kenyan population.244 More important, the OTP took 
action, on the recommendation of the ‘Commission of Inquiry into the Post-
Election Violence’ a Kenyan investigation commission, led by Kenyan judge 
Philip Waki, that concluded that the government failed to make good on its 
                                                      
244 1,300 people were killed and more than 300,000 forced from their homes in an 
outbreak of violence incited by prominent politicians in the aftermath of the December 
2007 elections. The subsequent coalition accord between the different factions established 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, chaired by Kenyan judge 
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own promise to set up a special tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the 
worst crimes.245 Only the situations in Darfur and in Libya ended up with the 
ICC as a result of outside interference, in both cases, by the Security Council 
that referred the situations.  
More relevant than whether the criticism on the African focus of the Court is 
always warranted, is that it affects the legitimacy of the Court in constituencies 
across the continent and beyond. The narrative that the ICC is a ‘prosecutorial 
tool of Northern Hemispheric states to help subordinate Africa under the rule 
of international law’ fits in with pre-existing ideas in many African 
constituencies.246 Branding the ICC a neo-colonialist tool of the West, a 
rhetoric favoured by Omar al-Bashir since he was indicted for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in March 2009, and genocide in July 2010, does not 
seem to fall on deaf ears, in Sudan, and in many other African countries.247 
Moreover, the indictment of al-Bashir created a rift between the Court and the 
African Union.248 The stance of the African Union does not help in giving the 
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Court a strong base: in 2009, the African Union Assembly requested the 
Security Council to use its powers, under Article 16 of the Statute, to defer the 
proceedings against al-Bashir, and decided that the African Union Member 
States ‘shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of 
President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan’.249 The backtracking of the Kenyan 
government and the election of two ICC suspects to the highest offices, in 
Kenya, further encouraged the Sudanese government and other African 
opponents of the ICC in their campaign against the Court. After Kenyan 
politicians had been indicted, in December 2010, Kenyan parliamentarians 
even voted for withdrawal from the Rome Statute, although this vote should 
mainly be seen as a symbolic protest against the Court.250 By the time Gambian 
lawyer, and former deputy of Moreno-Ocampo, Fatou Bensouda took over as 
Chief Prosecutor, in June 2012, African governments were very hesitant to 
work with the Court.251 In October 2013, the African Union, at a meeting in 
Addis Ababa, even discussed the possibility of the withdrawal of all 34 African 
States Parties from the Court en masse.252 The attempts to sabotage the ICC, by 
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then, led by Kenyan president Kenyatta and supported by al Bashir, played on 
a sentiment that was widely felt on the continent.253 Kenyatta castigated the 
ICC as a tool of the West and called it ‘a toy of declining imperial powers’ that 
violates the sovereignty of African states and conducts a radical witch-hunt on 
the continent.254 However, another sound could also be heard on the continent 
and, ahead of the meeting in Ethiopia, a coalition of human rights groups called 
on Africa’s leaders to stay in the ICC. In an op-ed article, in the New York 
Times, Desmond Tutu recalled that most cases were referred to the court by 
African governments themselves. He reminded those who ‘play both the race 
and colonial cards’ that the ICC is ‘very clearly an African court’ as five of the 
Court’s 18 judges are African, including its vice president, Sanji Mmasenono 
Monageng of Botswana, and the Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda is from 
Gambia.255 According to Tutu: ‘Those leaders seeking to skirt the court are 
effectively looking for a license to kill, maim and oppress their own people 
without consequence’.256 The October 2013 proposal to withdraw from the ICC 
failed to get support because the continent’s heavyweights, Nigeria and South 
Africa, objected. But, the AU did request the Court to defer the prosecution of 
sitting heads of state and decided to support immunity for Kenyatta and al-
Bashir.257 This kind of opposition to the Court contributed to sustaining a 
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situation, in which al-Bashir could travel around the continent, Kony could 
hide, and cases against Kenyatta and Ruto could be weakened by witnesses 
pressured to withdraw their testimonies. 
By looking at the statistics, it becomes clear that the Court is struggling to get 
its decisions enforced and its suspects in custody.258 One can imagine that the 
willingness of a given state to assist the Court will often depend upon that 
state's political motivations, rather than legal obligations.259 The lack of 
enforcement mechanisms is indeed a handicap the Rome Statute left the Court 
with.260 But, the lack of political stick that is employed to compel states to 
cooperate may even prove to be more of a handicap. In a special UN Security 
Council meeting on peace and justice with a special focus on the role of the 
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International Criminal Court, in October 2012, several states brought forward 
the misalignment between the expectations of the court and the means it has, 
both in terms of funding and assistance it gets, and in enforcement.261 The 
Security Council also takes little action towards enforcement of ICC arrest 
warrants, even in the two cases it referred to the Prosecutor. Under the guise of 
protecting their sovereignty, but usually due to a conflict with other political 
interests, governments have proven to be ‘fickle or outright obstructive’ in 
fulfilling their obligations to arrest individuals and hand them over to the 
ICC.262 However, with the right incentives, the political balance can be tipped 
towards cooperation with courts, as was illustrated by the arrest and transfer of 
Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, after political pressure on 
Nigeria.  
That the most atrocious crimes can still be committed without the Prosecutor of 
the ICC being able to open an investigation is a direct result of the treaty basis 
of the Court. In an ideal situation, the Rome Treaty would be ratified by all 
states and would see its decisions enforced everywhere. However, despite the 
fact that the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the territory, or nationals, of 
States Parties or to when the UN Security Council can reach agreement on a 
referral, that jurisdiction is still more far reaching than any mechanism of 
international criminal justice that preceded it. The unanimous adoption of UN 
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Security Council Resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011, referring the situation 
in Libya to the ICC demonstrates that, despite the US ‘Hague Invasion Act’, 
the fact that Russia did not accede to the Treaty, and that China did not sign it, 
in the first place, there is a certain acceptance of the Court’s role and 
importance, even among these permanent members of the Security Council.263 
Moreover, the Libya referral shows that it is still possible for the Council to 
come to an agreement to request the Prosecutor to open an ICC 
investigation.264  
The inconsistency of the Council, in using its prerogative to refer, is 
problematic. So far it only referred two situations to the Prosecutor of the 
ICC.265 In the wake of the Libya referral, and wile the Syrian Civil War was 
ongoing, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, the so-
called small five, or S5, proposed rules of procedure for the Council to follow 
to enhance ‘the systematic use of all mechanisms available under international 
law to ensure accountability for the most serious crimes.266 They did so in a 
wider bid to urge the Council Members to ‘refrain from using their veto power 
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to block collective Council action to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes’.267 However, they had to retract their draft General 
Assembly Resolution, despite the continuing situations in which, according to 
international human rights organisations and UN agencies, ‘unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ were committed, but, 
over which the Court could not exercise jurisdiction based on Article 12 of the 
Statute.268 The most obvious, albeit, by no means, the only example of such a 
situation was the civil war in Syria, in which serious and numerous violations 
of humanitarian law were reported by both human rights organisations and the 
UN Human Rights Council.269 However, NATO’s wide interpretation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973, installing a no-fly zone over Libya, in 
March 2011, and the subsequent military intervention in Libya, made Chinese, 
and, especially, Russian, cooperation in the Security Council less likely.270 It 
seemed that this, combined with other Russian interests in Syria, contributed to 
the disagreement between Russia and other permanent Council members 
France, the UK, and the US, to come to a Chapter VII resolution regarding the 
war in Syria.  
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The inability of the Security Council to reach agreement to refer situations to 
the ICC, and its inconsistency in doing so, might lead to the perception that the 
ICC can be as a political tool. It might even reverse some of the positive effects 
that were attributed to the treaty-based foundation of the Court. Despite the 
obvious downside of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction, the fact that the ICC is 
treaty based also has advantages in terms of independence from political 
involvement. The selection of situations investigated, and cases brought 
forward, lies not just with a political body, the Security Council, or with States, 
but also with the Prosecutor. The Court has a certain degree of independence 
from the Council, and thereby of the five permanent members, in that it can act 
without its approval where and when it has jurisdiction. However, while 
Article 15 allows the Prosecutor to use his own initiative, without any form of 
control by a political body, Article 16 allows the Security Council to intervene 
and stop a prosecution, albeit temporarily.271 So, while the ICC is not entirely 
free of external political control, in the selection of situations, ‘it nevertheless 
represents a considerable development in this respect even when measured 
against the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’.272 
Antonio Cassese argued that the advantages of this independence, in terms of 
the legitimacy of the Court, should not be underestimated; the legitimacy of the 
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existence of the Court, itself, rather than the cases it prosecuted, is indeed 
rarely challenged, not even by those not party to it.273  
The shortcomings the Court has to deal with that become apparent when 
looking at the number of successful cases before it, although very real, by no 
means paint a complete picture of the ICC. The numbers do not do justice to 
the impact the Court can have, and already has, on the legitimacy and conduct 
of both state actors and QSEs. The limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, as marked 
by the Rome Statute, are not necessarily the best indicator of how the ICC 
functions either. That the ICC prosecutes individuals and not states, QSEs, or 
other organisations, does not mean that the Court has no impact on these 
entities. As explained above, the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction 
must be committed as part of a ‘plan or policy’, or a ‘widespread or systematic 
attack’, and are, therefore, only feasible when committed in an organisational 
framework, usually that of a state or QSE. The OTP has made clear that the 
provision in Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute, that only cases of ‘sufficient 
gravity’ will be admissible, means that the Prosecutor will focus on those 
individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.274 Moreover, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, 
from the outset determined to focus the ICC’s efforts on the ‘big fish’.275 When 
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leaders are accused, or prosecuted, the formal individualisation of criminal 
responsibility hardly ever means that the legitimacy of the entities in whose 
names they ordered, or who committed these crimes is not affected.  
When the Rome Statute was drafted, it remained to be seen how the ICC would 
be able to operate within the limits of its mandate, and how its interaction with 
other institutions and entities such as formal sovereign states, QSEs, and the 
UN Security Council would develop. Also, at the inception of the Statute, it 
was not clear how important elements, like the referral mechanism of Article 
14, and the system of complementarity of the Court would function, or, in any 
case, both turned out to function differently than expected. The system of 
complementarity, as set out in the Statute, was incorporated as a means to 
make an agreement possible between those who wanted to establish a court 
with something as closely resembling universal jurisdiction as possible, under 
the circumstances, and those who wanted to defend state sovereignty.276 
Complementarity was a necessary compromise, as the alternative, giving the 
ICC primacy over national courts, was never a viable option, if the ICC were to 
be widely accepted among states. Yet, it was widely expected that 
complementarity would lead to lengthy battles with states, first over 
jurisdiction, and, then, if the ICC established its jurisdiction, over making 
documents and evidence available. In 1998, Louise Arbour, then Chief 
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Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, even called complementarity ‘an absolute 
recipe for disaster’.277  
Despite its obvious downsides, – that discussions over jurisdiction could stall 
investigations and procedures if a state jurisdiction decides to investigate, or 
prosecute, to block admissibility of a case before the ICC, the system of 
complementarity turned out to have advantages, as well. The Statute not only 
made the ICC a ‘court of last resort’, it also re-affirmed the duties and rights of 
national governments to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.278 Although being a court of last resort might limit the Court’s power 
in some situations, complementarity also presents a way in which the ICC can 
increase its potential positive impact on both domestic and international 
criminal justice.279 It has even been claimed that the greater impact of the ICC, 
with respect to prevention, will be in its interaction with domestic systems.280 
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According to Freeland, ‘it is this development of national laws that may 
represent the most important criteria [sic] by which the effectiveness of the 
system of international criminal justice should be measured’.281 Upon 
becoming Chief Prosecutor, Louis Moreno-Ocampo stated that:  
As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the 
Court should not be a measure its efficiency. On the contrary the absence of 
trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions, would be a major success.282 
For a case to be admissible to the ICC, a state must be either unwilling, or 
unable, genuinely to investigate or prosecute. If the former is the case, the 
Prosecutor can use diplomatic channels to encourage a state to start an 
investigation, expressing concern about certain situations and use the proprio 
motu powers as a stick to threaten with.283 In cases where the state in not 
unwilling, but unable, to prosecute, the Prosecutor can advise and assist to 
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make sure the national prosecution lives up to meet international standards of 
due process. Moreover, the Court has such limited means, that it lacks the 
ability to investigate all potential situations, empowering domestic jurisdictions 
to prosecute crimes it would otherwise have jurisdiction over is a more cost 
effective way of spreading international justice. Complementarity turned out to 
be more multifaceted than just respecting sovereignty, it also meant to 
encourage and at times assist national governments in prosecuting international 
crimes themselves, while at the same time limiting the caseload of the Court 
that has to operate with limited resources.284  
The system of complementarity, however, potentially clashes with another 
unexpected way the ICC turned out to function; the fact that Article 14 of the 
Rome Statute, which deals with the referral of a situation by a State Party, 
turned out to become the most important basis of jurisdiction of the Court. In 
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1998 Louise Arbour could not ‘think of a single state that will voluntarily defer 
to the jurisdiction of the ICC if one of their nationals is implicated.285 Yet, so 
far, half of the situations investigated by the Court are ‘self-referrals’, 
demonstrating a mutuality of interests between the Court and States Parties.286 
This mutuality of interests is a result of the unprecedented capacity of QSEs to 
commit large-scale atrocities, and the failure of inter-state human rights 
mechanisms.287 Payam Akhavan notes that, in contemporary conflict, ‘states 
are sometimes the victims rather than the villains’.288 Although QSEs, indeed, 
have an increased ability to carry out violent acts, it is equally true that states 
very much want to be seen as being the victim, rather than the villain. This is 
especially the case because, in what Lawrence Freedman called, the ‘curious 
game of compared victimology’, the ICC can play a significant role.289 
Instead of counting on states to protect human rights, it was expected that it 
would be the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor and Security Council 
Chapter VII referrals that would primarily lead to investigations’ being opened 
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and cases’ being brought before the ICC.290 Not the least this was because the 
assumption was that the ICC would be primarily acting against states.291 
Article 14 would additionally give States Parties the opportunity to request the 
opening of an investigation regarding other States Parties. The likelihood that 
states would refer their own situations to the Prosecutor was considered 
negligible during the negotiations of the Rome Statute.292 However, Uganda 
referred the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC 
in December 2003.293 In reaction to a notification by the Prosecutor that he 
might use his proprio motu powers to open an investigation into crimes 
committed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
government of the DRC also invoked Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome 
Statute, asking the Prosecutor to open an investigation into crimes committed 
in its own territory, in 2004.294 The government of the Central African 
Republic followed with a self-referral, in 2005. Mali did likewise in 2012.295 
Instead of an interstate mechanism, Article 14 became a self-referral 
                                                      
290 Akhavan ‘Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court’, p. 105. P. Akhavan, 
‘Enforcement of the Genocide Convention’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 8, no. 1, 
1995, pp.229-258, p. 237. 
291 Akhavan ‘Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court’, p. 105. 
292 Idem. p. 104. 
293 Press Release, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44. 
294 Press Release, ICC - Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, ICC-OTP-20040419-50. 
295 Press Release, ICC - Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African Republic, 
ICC-OTP-20050107-86. Malick Coulibaly, Ministry of Justice of Mali a Madame la 
Procureure pres la Cour Penale Internationale, ‘Renvoi de la situation au Mali’, Bamako 




mechanism.296 Côte d’Ivoire accepted the court’s jurisdiction, in 2003, while 
not being a State Party to the Rome Statute and, in 2010, President Alassane 
Ouattara confirmed the acceptance of ICC jurisdiction and asked the 
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation, resulting in a new type of ‘self-referral 
in all but name’ for states that have not ratified the Rome Statute.297  
There can be several reasons behind a self-referral. One is that, in a deeply 
divided nation, ‘prosecutions in The Hague are more likely to be perceived as 
fair trials, whereas national proceedings may be portrayed with suspicion and 
as biased, or politically motivated’.298 Another possible advantage of self-
referral is that trials before national courts of political leaders can deteriorate 
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the security situation.299 In the 21st century, the vast majority of mass atrocities 
are committed in internal conflicts that involve states and QSEs fighting over 
statehood. QSEs, or other non-state actors, can commit the most horrible 
crimes.300 But self-referral by states does not only serve the purposes of justice 
that the state cannot provide; the government that refers a situation (on behalf 
of the state) will calculate whether or not, it will benefit from the referral.301 
The outcome of this calculation may be that by referring a situation on its 
territory, the government can ‘criminalize domestic opponents and itself gain 
international legitimacy’.302  
In cases where the ICC prosecutes those fighting to change the status quo, the 
state has the potential to ‘re-brand political actors as criminals’.303 When the 
accused are members of a QSE, in conflict with the state, ‘their stigmatization 
and isolation inadvertently serves the interests of a State that has referred the 
situation to preserve its sovereignty’.304 The negative impact on the legitimacy 
of these QSEs can be substantial. At the same time, a narrative of support for 
international justice is received well in the international community, especially 
the West, and strengthens the government’s legitimacy, in these external 
constituencies. As Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner described, the Court has 
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the ability to brand some ‘as enemies of mankind, hostes humani generis’, 
while it elevates those who assist, or cooperate, with the Court to ‘the stage of 
virtue [...] enforcing universally valid norms and fighting humanity’s enemies 
for humanity’s sake’.305 Moreover, ‘prosecution may convince other 
international actors to support the government in its fight against these 
“enemies of mankind”’.306  
In theory, governments could miscalculate the impact of a self-referral. 
Governments can only refer situations, not specific cases, and cannot limit the 
Court’s jurisdiction to members of one particular group.307 In self-referral 
situations, the Prosecutor could open a case against both members of the 
government, or other state-entities, and the leaders of QSEs. Yet, in the 
situations that have come within the Court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to self-
referrals, the DRC, Uganda, CAR, and Mali, so far no one has been charged for 
acts committed in an official state capacity. For the ICC, these first self-
referrals came at the right moment. The opening of an investigation into the 
situation in Uganda ‘was an attempt to engage an otherwise aloof international 
community by transforming the prosecution of LRA leaders into a litmus test 
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for the much celebrated promise of global justice’.308 Although self-referrals 
potentially clash with the intended purpose of the complementarity principle, 
the Court, so far, has not ruled that such a conflict exists. On the contrary, 
besides unwillingness motivated by the desire to obstruct the course of justice, 
the Trial Chamber came up with a second form of ‘unwillingness’, in the 
Katanga case. ‘This second form of “unwillingness”, which is not expressly 
provided for in article 17 of the Statute, aims to see the person brought to 
justice, but not before national courts’.309 Exactly how much freedom states 
have to choose whether to exercise jurisdiction, or relinquish it to the ICC, is 
not entirely clear. A volatile security situation, or, in a divided nation, the 
‘perceived impartiality and fairness of the ICC’, may warrant a self-referral, 
and even the high costs of a complex trial are sometimes considered to be a 
reasonable ground for relinquishing of jurisdiction.310 The latter reason for 
referral would transform the ICC from a ‘court of last resort’ to a ‘court of 
convenience’.311 One of the motivations behind the complementarity principle 
is to keep the caseload of the ICC down, so, a self-referral for economic 
reasons might clash with the object and purpose of the Statute. However, the 
Prosecutor’s policy of encouraging state-referrals has the advantage that it 
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prevents the predicted legal battles over jurisdiction, and it stems from the 
belief of the OTP that it could overcome the Court’s lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and total dependence on state cooperation.312 Self-referrals not 
only give state entities a chance to demonise their enemies, they also proved to 
be convenient for the Court during its first years in operation. 
THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AZAWAD AND 
THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN MALI  
Mali is the second-largest country by land area in West Africa and, together 
with Niger and Mauretania, forms the border – or buffer – between West 
Africa and the Maghreb.313 Besides sharing its eastern border with Niger – that 
has also been confronted with Tuareg rebellions, violence, and hostage taking 
in its northern regions – Mali borders Algeria to the north, Burkina Faso and 
the Côte d'Ivoire to the south, Guinea to the southwest, and Senegal and 
Mauritania to the west. Although landlocked and separated from the Maghreb 
by the sands of the Sahara that cover the entire northern part of the country, the 
trade routes used for centuries by the Arab and North African merchants go 
through modern day Mali. This made the area not only the historic gateway of 
Islam into West Africa, but, in the 21st century, these trade routes continued to 
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be used by international criminal groups for smuggling and made the area 
vulnerable to the influx of radical elements, drugs, and weapons.  
Mali has one of the youngest populations in the world – 47.3% of the estimated 
14.5 million Malians are under the age of 15 –, and is made up of multiple 
ethnicities that can be roughly divided into sub-Saharan groups and nomadic 
ethnic groups from the northern regions.314 Growing populations and 
competition for limited resources increasingly led to conflicts between 
sedentary groups from the South and nomadic, or semi-nomadic, groups, 
originating from the North. Though ethnically diverse, Mali is religiously 
relatively homogeneous, with an estimated 90% of Malians following Islam. 
Malian Muslims predominantly follow the Sunni branch of Islam, with most 
adhering to Maliki teachings, although traditional religious practices remain 
common in many rural communities.315 After Mali gained independence, from 
France, in 1960, Modibo Keïta’s rule, based on African Socialism, continued to 
promote the French principle of laïcité, and his secular policies sought to 
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neutralise Islamic clerics.316 Moussa Traoré – who overthrew Keïta, in a 
military coup, in 1968 – kept the secular character of the Malian constitution in 
place, during his 22-year long rule, although in practice, Islamic Sufi order 
leaders and various Muslim groups were constantly engaged by the military 
regime and, later a civilianised regime under (the devout) General Traoré.317 
As Victor Le Vine described it, the same delicate balancing act between 
official secularism and deference to Islamic voices in public affairs continued 
under Presidents Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002) and Amadou Toumani 
Touré (2002-2012).318 The democratisation process Mali went through, from 
1992 onwards, meant that more Islamic organisations were formed and radical 
voices and practices (mostly Wahhabi) started to become more visible, 
however, the Malian constitution continued to forbid religion-based political 
parties.319 While Muslim leaders continued to gain political influence during 
those years, the increasing financial support and influence of Western donors, 
who supported the democratic regime, were among the reasons that this was 
not translated into Islamisation of the Malian legal, or institutional, 
framework.320  
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Mali has often been cited as an illustration of the possibilities of a democratic 
political system, in Africa. It became known for its rich and diverse culture, 
and was a favourite with Western tourists. But, while Mali was acclaimed for 
its ‘remarkable ability to remain open and tolerant’, it did so, despite severe 
long-standing strains and hardships.321 The goodwill of the donor community 
might have contributed to promising economic growth, but the country kept its 
place among the bottom ranks of the Human Development Index, a situation 
responsible for many of Mali’s tribulations.322 Mali has very limited natural 
resources, has been plagued by recurring droughts and by a notoriously 
fractious political class, and has a poor record of fighting corruption.323 
However, the most destabilising factor Mali faced were the recurring armed 
rebellions in the north.  
The Tuareg of northern Mali fought the central government for generations; 
they opposed the French colonial power, and unsuccessfully fought it for their 
own state, and, after Malian independence, continued to fight the Bamako 
government that focussed on the Sub-Saharan part of the country, south of the 
Niger, where the majority of Malians live.324 The Tuareg felt neglected and 
disenfranchised by the Malian state and, as in Niger, a regional famine, again, 
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sparked a crisis and a Tuareg rebellion, in northern Mali, in the early 1990s. In 
1995, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached, based on the isolated 
northern region’s receiving more resources and aid from the government.325 
According to Le Vine, it was to the credit of Mali’s ‘traditions of 
accommodation, that the Tuareg crisis of 1990-1991, which threatened to 
undermine, if not destroy, the new democracy, was dealt with by a set of 
solutions that not only brought the Tuareg into national decisionmaking circles 
but also gave them a measure of hitherto unreachable autonomy’.326 However, 
resources remained limited and attempts to absorb rebels into the Malian army 
failed, as did the re-integration of combatants in civilian life.327 In late 2007, 
the rekindled insurgency, in Niger, by the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la 
justice (MNJ) that demanded a share in the uranium wealth of northern Niger, 
spread across the border, into Mali. Despite several ceasefires and an ‘uneasy 
peace’, brokered by Libya and Algeria, attacks on the army and hostage taking 
continued.328 The political and socio-economic grievances of the Tuareg did 
not disappear, either, and, in 2011, the demise of the Gaddafi regime had a 
catalyst effect on the crisis in northern Mali. It forced Tuaregs who had been 
incorporated into Gaddafi’s foreign legions to return to Mali, bringing with 
them heavy and sophisticated arms, looted from Gaddafi’s arsenals. These 
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weapons changed the balance of power between the Tuareg and the Malian 
military.  
The Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad or National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), an organisation that brought 
together several leaders and factions of the 1990s’ rebellion, reactivated old 
claims for autonomy as a response to grievances of neglect and 
disenfranchisement by the Malian state, and launched attacks on garrisons of 
the Malian army and other government targets, in northern Mali, in January 
2012, only months after the return of the well-armed Tuareg fighters.329 The 
MNLA was led by Secretary General Bilal Ag Acherif and Mohamed Ag 
Najim, the head of the movement’s military wing, both of whom were veterans 
of previous Tuareg rebellions, and Ag Najim, whose father was killed by the 
Malian Army, during a Tuareg uprising, in 1963, served as a Colonel, in the 
Libyan Army, under Gaddafi.330 The MNLA was created, in October 2011, as a 
self-declared successor to previous rebel groups. It was the result of a merger 
between the National Movement for Azawad (MNA) and the Northern Mali 
Tuareg Movement (MTNM).331 It declared its official purpose to be to recover 
‘the specific rights confiscated from the people of Azawad’ and aimed to fight 
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for the independence of Azawad, as a Tuareg homeland, in northern Mali.332 
Considered to be a secular Tuareg nationalist movement, the MNLA claimed to 
have no religious ideology.333 Although the territorial claims of earlier Tuareg 
rebellions, in Mali, generally extended as far south as the Niger river, Azawad, 
as proclaimed by the MNLA, comprised the Malian regions of Timbuktu, 
Kidal, Gao, as well as a part of Mopti region, which was the entire area, where 
the government lost control to QSEs, encompassing about 60 percent of Mali's 
total land area, and included a large part of Mali, south of the Niger as well.334 
The MNLA were better organised and much better armed than during previous 
rebellions, and, by mid-March, the rebels claimed control of several localities 
in the northeast of Mali.335 A critical aspect of this development was the lax 
attitude of Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, who, contrary to his 
Nigerien counterpart, not only failed to demand the disarmament of returning 
armed Tuareg fighters, but multiplied gestures of appeasement that 
emboldened them and convinced them that the Malian state had no will to 
resist their bid for independence. Several Islamist factions soon joined the 
MNLA in fighting government forces. Among them was the Islamist group 
Ansar Dine (‘defenders of the faith’), founded by another leader of the 1990s’ 
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rebellion, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who led the Azawad Popular Movement (MPA), a 
moderate Tuareg faction that opted for peace, in 1992, and was disbanded in 
1996.336 Ag Ghaly was appointed Malian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, in 2000, 
from where he was expelled, in 2010, because of his alleged ties to al-
Qa’ida.337 Ag Ghaly’s Salafist beliefs may be traced to contacts he had with 
Pakistani preachers belonging to the Tablighi Jama’at, right after the 1990s 
rebellion, he might have converted to Salafism, in the mosques of Mauritania, 
in the 2000s, or during his more recent job, as a diplomat in Saudi-Arabia.338 
Either way, it was doubted how earnest his beliefs were. Ag Ghaly only 
founded Ansar Dine after he lost the leadership of the (more) secular MNLA to 
Bilal Ag Acherif, he reportedly loved whisky, and, according to the diplomatic 
cables, published by WikiLeaks, he once asked the US embassy, in Bamako, 
for help to fight against al-Qa’ida.339 Although the organisation was regarded 
as a Tuareg jihadist salafist movement, aiming to impose Sharia law across 
Mali, it therefore remained unclear how far radical Islamism was really at the 
heart of the goals of Ansar Dine, instead of access to ungoverned territory for 
smuggling and hostage-taking and hiding purposes. The group split, in January 
2013, when the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) – led by Alghabass Ag 
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Intalla, an influential figure, in Kidal – broke away from Ansar Dine and was 
both ready for negotiations and to reject extremism and terrorism.340 
Regarding other organisations that joined the rebellion, there was less doubt 
about their motivations. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the North 
African wing of al-Qa’ida, had its roots in the Algerian civil war of the early 
1990s. It truly emerged, in early 2007, after the Algerian Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) allied itself to Osama Bin Laden’s international 
franchise.341 The organisation counted fighters of various nationalities among 
its ranks, in particular, Algerians, Mauritanians, Senegalese, Nigeriens, 
Nigerians, and Malians, but, was led, mainly, by Algerians.342 AQIM was 
financed primarily by ransoms and, in the last ten years, kidnapped and held 
more than 50 Western hostages, some of whom were still held at the time of 
writing, for ransom, earning well over $100m, according to estimations by Al 
Jazeera.343 The declared goal of AQIM, was to spread Sharia law, as well as to 
liberate Malians from the French colonial legacy.344  
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) was a splinter 
organisation of AQIM, established in 2011. Like AQIM, MOJWA was mainly 
made up of fighters who were forced out of Algeria, although the movement 
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also had Malian Tuareg within its ranks. MOJWA had the wider objective of 
spreading jihad to West Africa, rather than confining itself to the Sahel and 
Maghreb region, like AQIM.345 In the words of its leader, the Mauritanian 
AQIM veteran, Hamada Ould Khaïrou, MOJWA was an assembly of Sub-
Saharan Jihadists; ‘Mauritanians, Azawadis, Chadians and Nigerians and other 
nationalities’, that had a presence in Nigeria, Niger and Mali.346 Like Ansar 
Dine and AQIM, MOJWA supplemented its funding from smuggling with 
hostage taking.  
In March 2012, the conflict, in the north, reached the Malian capital. Out of 
discontent with the government’s weak response to the rebellion, a group of 
mid-ranking officers mutinied, in Bamako, and, on 21 March 2012, staged a 
coup d’état against the regime of President Amadou Toumani Touré.347 The 
officers took over the presidential palace, state television, and military 
barracks, and, the following day, announced they had formed the National 
Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR) and had 
overthrown president Touré.348 The uncertainty and looting that followed 
destabilised the country further and was followed by widespread internal and 
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international condemnation, and the suspension of Mali, from the African 
Union.349 Moreover, the chaos provided an opportunity for the various rebel 
factions, acting in unison, to progress further southward and overrun Mali’s 
three largest northern cities; Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu.350 A week after the 
coup, in Bamako, the north-eastern city of Kidal fell into the hands of the 
MNLA, supported by Ansar Dine and AQIM. A day later, on 31 March, the 
MNLA took control over Gao, a decisive victory, as it was the location of the 
regional army headquarters.351 On 1 April, the MNLA seized Timbuktu, the 
last large city in the north still under government control.352 Timbuktu was not 
only a symbol for Mali’s cultural, musical and intellectual heritage, but, also a 
UNESCO World Heritage site and a favourite among tourists.  
On 6 April 2012, less than a week after the capture of Kidal, Gao, and 
Timbuktu, the Secretary-General of the MNLA, Bilal Ag Acherif, signed the 
declaration of independence of Azawad in Gao.353 The declaration, in the name 
of the people of Azawad ‘through the voice of the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad’ and recalling the UN Charter, Mali’s colonial history, 
and previous rebellions, claimed independence, based on ‘the accumulation of 
more than 50 years of bad governance’, endangering the people of Azawad.354 
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But, it also based its claim on the breakdown of the government that, according 
to the MNLA, threatened regional stability and international peace.355 The 
statement concluded by declaring that the new state would recognise 
international state borders and stressing the commitment of the MNLA to work 
towards establishing the ‘conditions for a durable peace’, and the institutional 
foundations for a state, based on a democratic constitution.356 The Executive 
Committee of the MNLA invited the entire international community to 
recognize the independent State of Azawad, without delay.357 This, of course, 
did not happen. The Commission of the African Union immediately rejected 
the announcement, calling it ‘null and of no value whatsoever’; ECOWAS 
declared that it would ‘take all necessary measures, including the use of force, 
to ensure the territorial integrity of the country’; and the European Union, the 
US, France and neighbouring countries, followed with statements expressing 
support for the territorial integrity of Mali.358 
Although the declaration of independence was arguably the closest the Tuareg 
of Northern Mali had ever been to an independent state, or self-determination, 
for that matter, the reality was that, by 6 April, the statehood project of the 
MNLA was already dead in the water. Not primarily because of the lack of 
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support for an independent Azawad from regional powers and the international 
community, but because, by then, the MNLA had lost, or was in the process of 
losing, control over most of the territory it claimed in its unilateral declaration 
to Islamist factions. In the first half of 2012, while making a quick advance 
southwards and with the Mali army unable to stop them, Tuareg nationalists 
and Islamist groups had operated in unison. But, as the QSEs of northern Mali 
progressed against the government forces, the statehood objectives of the 
MNLA and the goals of Islamist movements proved to differ too widely. Ansar 
Dine sought an Islamic state, under Sharia law, on the whole territory of Mali. 
AQIM fought for a caliphate, covering the whole Maghreb; and MOJWA 
aimed for Islamic rule, in entire West Africa. Beside their official objectives, it 
was unlikely that the latter organisations really aimed for a stable Islamic state 
or state-like environment, as they benefitted from an environment in which 
they could exercise some quasi-state functions, while continuing their 
smuggling and hostage taking activities. Meanwhile, the MNLA fought for a 
viable, independent, Azawad state, in northern Mali and opposed Sharia.359 The 
adage ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, by April 2012, no longer applied 
to the relationship between the MNLA and the Islamic movements, and, as a 
result of the insistence of the Islamists on implementing Sharia law, the 
movements started to fight each other.360 On 2 April 2012, Ansar Dine drove 
the MNLA out of Timbuktu; MOJWA fighters took control over Goa, after a 
battle with the MNLA, in late June 2012. By mid-July, MOJWA and Ansar 
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Dine had wrested all major cities in northern Mali from the MNLA.361 Both 
Ansar Dine and MOJWA started to impose a strict interpretation of Sharia law 
on the local population.362 Claiming they were idolatrous and un-Islamic, 
Ansar Dine vowed to destroy every mausoleum in Timbuktu, and, in June, 
started to destroy the 14th century mausoleums on the site of the Djinguereber 
Mosque, a UNESCO world heritage site.363 In Timbuktu, a man accused of 
drinking alcohol, was reported to have been whipped; in Aguelhoc, a town 
controlled by Ansar Dine, Islamists stoned to death a couple, accused of 
adultery, in late July; only days later, members of MOJWA cut off a man’s 
hand, as a punishment for theft in Ansogo.364 
THE SELF-REFERRAL OF THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN MALI TO THE 
ICC 
What started as a rebellion in northern Mali, turned into a perfect storm of 
crises, with each having a profound effect on the other. The crisis in northern 
Mali, not only led to a coup in Bamako, but also to attacks on Tuareg, Berbers 
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and Arabs in the South, who were easily recognisable by their lighter skin.365 
The crisis further deteriorated the humanitarian situation across Mali, as water 
scarcity, poor rural infrastructure, and volatile prices gave rise to food 
insecurity.366 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, by August 
2012, 4.6 million people were in need of assistance, and the combination of 
violence and food insecurity led to 500,000 displaced Malians, including over 
250,000 registered refugees, in neighbouring Niger, Burkina Faso, and 
Mauritania.367  
On 13 July 2012, the government of Mali, self-referred ‘the situation in Mali 
since January 2012’ to the prosecutor of the ICC, requesting an investigation to 
determine whether one, or more, persons should be charged for crimes 
committed in the conflict.368 The request followed a recommendation to refer 
the situation to the ICC by ECOWAS' Contact Group on Mali (composed of 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria and Togo), on 9 
July 2012.369 This shows that the Mali referral had the support of the West 
African region. In the referral letter, the government of Mali alleged that, 
especially in the northern region of the country, gross human rights violations 
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and war crimes had been committed, including summary executions of 
soldiers, rape of women and young girls, killing of civilians, the recruitment of 
child soldiers, torture, pillaging, enforced disappearances, and the destruction 
of property (including government buildings, humanitarian installations, 
religious establishments and gravesites).370 Moreover, Mali claimed that it 
would be unable to prosecute, or try, the perpetrators of these crimes.  
Mali was the fifth African country formally to request the ICC to investigate 
crimes in its territory and the fourth to self-refer a situation to the Court, 
although it was the first State Party to do so, in over seven years. ICC Chief 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda ordered a preliminary examination into the report 
of killings, abductions, rapes and conscription of children, and stressed that the 
deliberate destruction of the shrines of Muslim saints, in the city of Timbuktu, 
may constitute a war crime, under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.371  
Immediately after the referral, many questioned whether the ICC could use 
another African investigation.372 Although the African Union never specifically 
criticised the ICC for investigating self-referred situations, and it was argued 
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that, as self-referrals are inherently cooperative, and require the state and the 
ICC to cooperate, Mali’s self-referral could, ultimately, even have a positive 
effect on the perception of the ICC as being biased against Africa.373 But, by 
2012, the Court was reaching the limit of the number of cases it could handle – 
both limited by its funding and staff –. More important, another investigation, 
in Africa, would provide new ammunition to those opposing the ICC, by 
claiming it was a Western tool to oppress Africans. Moreover, there were the 
arguments mentioned above against the policy of accepting self-referrals of 
situations to the ICC, mainly born out of the fear that the ICC would become a 
‘court of convenience’ for states to brand their opponents war criminals.  
ACCEPTING JURISDICTION: THE ICC AS A COURT OF CONVENIENCE 
FOR STATE PARTIES 
The self-referral of Mali shows that the ICC was still expected to have an 
impact on the legitimacy of QSEs. Nouwen and Werner pointed out that, 
ironically, the more successful the ICC ‘portrays itself as neutral, universal, 
and above politics, the more attractive it will become as an instrument for the 
labelling and neutralization of enemies of a particular political group’.374 
Apparently the ICC retained some of that ability, and thereby its appeal to the 
Malian government. It did so amidst a storm of criticism. In terms of 
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international support, especially African, for the ICC, a lot has changed 
following the self-referrals of Uganda and the DRC. The enthusiasm of the 
Ugandan government waned, when the ICC also proved unable to arrest the 
LRA leadership and dismissed plans for a local court to prosecute them. The 
DRC did not always cooperate with the Court, as it had promised when it asked 
for an investigation. Moreover, the motivation for the self-referrals by the 
governments of Uganda, the DRC and the CAR, as well as the request of Côte 
d'Ivoire for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, should be treated with some 
scepticism.375 The governments that referred situations, rather than yearning 
for real justice for all sides to the conflict, or wanting to end impunity for 
international crimes, aimed to incapacitate their adversaries, by means of the 
ICC. The referral of Mali can also be seen in that light. Referring the situation 
was a calculated decision to use the ICC as a weapon for reaching political 
goals, to defeat the QSEs that had taken over state-functions and to restore the 
government’s control over the northern part of the country.376 This is especially 
relevant because the transitional government that had taken over power in 
Bamako, had to deal with a legitimacy crisis itself, both internally and in the 
international community.  
By the time the Malian government in Bamako self-referred the situation, in 
northern Mali, there were considerable arguments against opening such an 
investigation by the Prosecutor. First, the Court had, and would continue to 
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have, too many African cases under investigation. As a result, it had to deal 
with criticism of its focus on Africa, and sometimes met outright hostility, on 
that subject. Secondly, self-referral might give the impression that the Court is 
biased in favour of the government. The image of Chief Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo shaking hands with Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda, 
during a joint declaration announcing the opening of the investigation into the 
situation in northern Uganda was only the most visible element of how the 
former Prosecutor sent the wrong message. Later declarations, by the OTP, that 
all parties to the conflict would be investigated could not prevent the idea 
taking hold amongst many Ugandans ‘that the ICC is an instrument of the 
government’, and that the Court initially had to deal with hostility among the 
northern population and local civil society organizations.377 Thirdly, as 
conflicts were ongoing, QSEs might become state entities, or make peace with 
state entities, or their leaders might become part of the government, and the 
states that were happy to see their former enemies branded as war criminals 
might end cooperation, as these relationships shifted.378 These situations put 
the Court at risk of becoming part of political disputes. Finally, there was 
discussion on the legal limits of self-referral, in cases where the state was 
technically not unable, nor unwilling, to prosecute domestically.  
It might be questioned whether the Malian judiciary was really unable, or 
unwilling, to prosecute those who allegedly committed grave crimes, It was, 
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however, unable to arrest them. After the officers, who initially had taken 
power, resisted foreign military intervention, it seems that the transitional 
government hoped that an ICC investigation would ‘instigate international 
pressure and perhaps even a military intervention to restore the government’s 
authority’.379 The weak position of the Malian government seems to have 
played a role in that, as Ottilia Maunganidze and Antoinette Louw commented,  
The self-referral could thus be characterised as an attempt by the interim 
government – which is weak and in search of support and legitimacy both 
locally and abroad – to put down the rebellion in the north, and eliminate 
opposition from those who might seek to destabilise a new government.380  
Yet, there is every reason to believe that ‘most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’ were committed in Mali.381 The 
motivation of the Malian government for self-referral and the ambition of the 
Court to strengthen its legitimacy, by opening cases outside of Africa, did not 
reduce the gravity of these crimes. Moreover, in Mali, the ICC was given an 
opportunity to demonstrate that it could act expeditiously and demonstrate that 
it had the potential to deter crimes, by acting, in real time, and not only through 
post-conflict investigation and prosecution.382 Furthermore, accepting 
jurisdiction over the situation in Mali fitted with the bases of admissibility, as 
set out by the Court, in the Katanga Case. 
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On 16 January 2013, Chief Prosecutor Bensouda formally opened an 
investigation into alleged crimes, committed in Mali since January 2012. The 
Prosecutor stated that ‘at each stage during the conflict, different armed groups 
have caused havoc and human suffering through a range of alleged acts of 
extreme violence’ and ‘determined that some of these deeds of brutality and 
destruction may constitute war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute’.383 The 
Prosecutor further vowed that the OTP would ‘ensure a thorough and impartial 
investigation and will bring justice to Malian victims by investigating who are 
the most responsible for these alleged crimes’.384 That same day, the ICC’s first 
report on the situation in Mali was published. In the report, the Prosecutor set 
out why the ICC had jurisdiction, why the case was admissible and why 
pursuing prosecution was in the interests of justice. The first hurdle was 
reasonably straightforward: regarding jurisdiction ratione temporis, Mali had 
ratified the Rome Statute and referred ‘the situation since January 2012’ to the 
Court; as the referral set no territorial limitations, and Mali cannot set personal 
limitations, the Court had jurisdiction ratione loci and personae, and could 
investigate crimes committed by anyone, anywhere in Mali; the reasonable 
basis to believe that war crimes had been committed in the conflict gave the 
Court Jurisdiction ratione materiae.385 The lack of national proceedings and 
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sufficient gravity of the allegations were the main reasons that the OTP gave 
for the admissibility of the situation.386  
The ICC report listed a number of war crimes, allegedly committed by 
individuals, in the name of various entities, fighting in the conflict. The most 
serious were the attack on a military camp in Aguelhoc, by the MNLA and/or 
‘other unspecified “armed groups”’, on 24 January 2012, in which, according 
to several sources, up to 153 Malian soldiers were detained and later tortured 
and executed.387 The report further mentioned the stoning to death of an 
unmarried couple and the public execution of a member of the MNLA, 
although more information about these cases was required.388 Besides these 
allegations of unlawful killings, there were indications that a wide array of 
other war crimes had been committed in the conflict. Under the same Article 
(8)(2)(c)(i), mutilation and torture fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, and, 
based on reports by Human Rights Watch, the OTP had reason to believe that 
at least eight amputations imposed by armed groups and 100 lashes that an 
unmarried couple received constituted this crime.389 Moreover, sentencing, or 
execution, without due process is a war crime pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(iv) 
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and the OTP received information that many such sentences were imposed, 
with many of the punishments carried out in public.390  
As the OTP had already publicly stated, in July 2012, the deliberate damaging 
of shrines and mausoleums might constitute another ‘serious violation of the 
laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character’, under Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Rome Statute.391 The report 
described attacks by members of Ansar Dine, AQIM, and possibly also 
MOJWA between 4 May and 10 July 2012, against, at least, 9 mausoleums, 2 
mosques and 2 historical monuments, in Timbuktu, listed as World Heritage 
Sites by UNESCO.392 The Malian government, as well as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for 
Human Rights, informed the OTP that, during the takeover of the northern 
cities of Kidal, Goa and Timbuktu, pillaging took place.393 Furthermore, the 
FIDH recorded more than fifty cases of rape, or attempted rape, after the 
takeover of northern Mali, and Amnesty International collected statements that 
indicated that children had been recruited and used as combatants, in northern 
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Mali, but did not name specific entities that allegedly did so.394 Human Rights 
Watch and UNICEF backed up evidence of the recruitment of child soldiers.395 
The report of the OTP was not limited to allegations that QSEs, operating in 
Northern Mali, committed a wide range of war crimes. In the Report of 16 
January, the OTP also described that there were indications of war crimes 
committed by Malian government soldiers and specified three such incidents 
that were under investigation. This was a strong indication that the OTP had 
learned from its own mistakes in previous self-referral investigations and that it 
had set out to make good on the promise that it would investigate alleged 
crimes committed by all parties to the conflict and suppressed allegations of 
bias in favour of the government that referred the situation. First, the OTP had 
reason to believe that war crimes were committed by Malian army forces, in 
the shooting of 16 unarmed Muslim preachers, at an army checkpoint, on the 
night of 8-9 September.396 In two other cases, the OTP found that, at that stage, 
the information was ‘insufficient to establish whether these incidents amount to 
the war crime of murder’. Yet, it continued to investigate the detention and 
execution of, at least, 4 Tuareg members of the Malian security services, by 
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Malian government soldiers, in Sévaré, a town in the Mopti region, on 2 April 
2012, as reported by Human Rights Watch.397 Another incident, reported by the 
FIDH and Amnesty International, the killing of 3 unarmed individuals accused 
of being MNLA spies in the same town on 18 April, also remained under 
investigation.398 
The preliminary investigation by the OTP led to the conclusion that, at that 
point, January 2013, there were no clear reasons to believe that, in Mali, crimes 
against humanity had been committed, although it continued to investigate 
allegations of disappearances after the coup and whether these allegations 
constituted a crime against humanity.399 Although the preliminary investigation 
started, in July 2012, and the official investigation of the OTP in January 2013, 
by the end of summer 2013, no indictments had been made public, and no 
cases had been opened, in the situation in Mali, nor did the OTP publish new 
reports on the situation.  
IMPACT OF THE ICC INVESTIGATION ON THE CONFLICT IN MALI 
The Malian government only referred the situation in July 2012, the Prosecutor 
opened the official investigation in January 2013, and the OTP, by late 2013, 
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had not announced that it opened any cases against individuals for crimes 
committed in the situation in Mali. However, despite the early stages of the 
investigation, the self-referral to the ICC of the situation in northern Mali by 
the Malian government, in July 2012, shows a perceived mutuality of interests 
between the Malian government and the Court. This was the case despite the 
increasingly strong counter narratives against the ICC uttered by the African 
Union and many of its members. Possibly the strongest indication, so far, that 
international criminal justice, in the form of the ICC, can have an impact on the 
capacity of QSEs, in Mali, to create and maintain legitimacy is the belief of the 
Malian government that it can do so. Whether Malian state institutions could 
be bolstered significantly, or enough, to restore their authority and legitimacy 
in northern Mali, and what the long-term effect of the ICC investigation on the 
various QSEs opposing the state’s authority in northern Mali would be, 
remained unclear at the end of 2013. Yet, there were some early signs that the 
decision of the government to involve the ICC in this conflict would pay off for 
the government, despite the efforts of the Prosecutor to avoid the mistakes 
made in earlier self-referral situations that allowed the Court to be used a court 
of convenience. The preliminary investigation, as well as the later official 
investigation into war crimes by the Prosecutor of the ICC, meant that war 
crimes narratives and international criminal justice narratives became part of 
the discourse of both the Malian government and the MNLA. 
The self-referral, in July 2012, and the opening of the official investigation, in 
January 2013, both came at pivotal moments in the conflict. The first occurred 




realising its statehood goals started to disappear, mainly at the hands of its 
former allies. The opening of the official investigation by the OTP came as 
international support for the Malian government started to be translated into 
actions rather than words, and the French army commenced operation Serval, 
in support of Malian government forces. For Western governments, besides the 
UN Security Council resolutions, an ICC investigation into war crimes 
probably made it easier to ‘sell’ sending troops to Mali to their home 
constituencies, and, initially, more governments signed up to provide troops 
than were needed. 
By late 2013, the allegations of war crimes committed by the organisation 
already impacted on the capacity of the MNLA to create legitimacy for its 
organisation, actions, and its Azawad statehood project. This was despite the 
fact that in the preliminary report of the OTP, allegations were very cautiously 
worded, and were subject to further investigations, and that the report included 
crimes allegedly committed by the Malian armed forces. Soon after the self-
referral, the Malian government succeeded in getting international assistance 
against the QSEs it was fighting. It would go too far to attribute international 
support to the ICC investigation into war crimes committed by the MNLA, but, 
a narrative of preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity added 
legitimacy to this support. Because of the threat the Malian crisis posed to the 
wider region, Mali became a priority for surrounding countries and for 
ECOWAS. But, the fear that Ansar Dine, MOJWA, and AQIM would maintain 
a stronghold in northern Mali, creating a safe haven for fundamentalists to plot 




Mali a problem for the West too.400 While the Malian military initially rejected 
ECOWAS proposals to deploy AU troops, the government, officially, asked for 
an international intervention by AU troops, as proposed by ECOWAS, in 
September 2012.401 On 12 October 2012, the UN Security Council 
unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 2071. The resolution, 
proposed by France, determined that the situation in Mali constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, under Chapter VII of the Charter.402 It called 
on ECOWAS and the African Union for ‘detailed and actionable 
recommendations’ for military intervention.403 The text of the resolution also 
clearly supported the government and blamed its quasi-state adversaries for 
committing crimes:  
Condemning strongly the abuses of human rights committed in the north of 
Mali by armed rebels, terrorist and other extremist groups, including violence 
against its civilians, notably women and children, killings, hostage-taking, 
pillaging, theft, destruction of cultural and religious sites and recruitment of 
child soldiers, stressing that some of such acts may amount to crimes under 
the Rome Statute and that their perpetrators must be held accountable and 
noting that the Transitional authorities of Mali referred the situation in the 
north of Mali since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court on 18 
July 2012.404 
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However, the resolution also called upon ‘Malian rebel groups to cut off all ties 
to terrorist organizations’.405 This showed that a distinction was made between 
Tuareg QSEs fighting for an Azawad homeland and Islamist groups.  
The conflict in northern Mali severely disturbed the delicate balance of religion 
and state in the whole of Mali and the predominantly moderate Muslims of 
northern Mali suffered, not only from the violence of the conflict, but, also 
from the Sharia law enforced by the (often foreign) factions the MNLA had 
associated with earlier. The organisation had to face allegations of war crimes 
committed by its members and was linked to those committed by members of 
the Islamist factions it was now fighting against. The MNLA was forced to step 
up its efforts to provide a legitimating narrative to constituencies in the 
international community. It found itself in a spiral of legitimacy crisis. 
Although the aim of an Azawad homeland provided a strong base for 
legitimacy, among its Tuareg core constituencies, a lack of performance 
became painfully clear, when the MNLA lost control of the main northern 
cities. At the same time, the strict enforcement of Sharia law by its former 
associates weakened popular support at home, while allegations of war crimes 
further diminished the already weak bases of legitimacy that secessionists 
usually have in international constituencies.  
In an attempt to overcome this legitimacy crisis, and forced by the self-referral 
by the government, the MNLA had to change its narratives, to regain the 
legitimacy it had lost among the Tuareg home constituencies, but, also to 





create, at least, some belief in the justness of its causes and actions among 
various international constituencies. In the weeks after the OTP started its 
preliminary investigation, the MNLA claimed to have been ‘misunderstood by 
the international community’, and its spokesperson said that it did not feel 
threatened by the ICC.406 The MNLA spokesperson in Europe, Mossa Ag 
Attaher, actively sought support from the international community for the 
Azawad state. In an interview, Ag Attaher denied an agreement with Ansar 
Dine, claiming that the MNLA had ‘no pact with the devil’ and that the 
situation was misunderstood, as a result of the Western media’s ‘simple 
explanations of a very complex reality’, and not taking the time or effort to 
understand Azawad's problems in depth.407 Emphasising that the MNLA was 
now fighting the Islamists, Ag Attaher claimed that the MNLA had backed out 
of every form of cooperation, when it realised that the main objective of Ansar 
Dine was to impose Sharia law.408 But, he also warned that the Western World 
now had the choice between letting the situation in Mali ‘explode in their face’, 
which would threaten the entire region or they would ‘take the MNLA by the 
hand, a movement that shows all interest to fight terrorists and that knows the 
terrain; we are the only ones fighting against them’.409 
On 12 October 2012, the (Dutch) lawyers of the MNLA wrote to the President 
of the UN Security Council stating that:  
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[T]he MNLA is deeply concerned that innocent civilians may have been 
subjected to attacks and protected monuments may have been destroyed in the 
course of the current armed conflict in Mali. Furthermore, the MNLA is 
determined to take all necessary and reasonable measures to ensure that its 
members continue to respect the relevant laws and customs of war.410 
The MNLA also submitted an ‘Action Plan: Respecting the Laws of War’, in 
which it expressed the desire for an investigation ‘into mass human rights 
abuses committed in Mali since the Rome Statute came into force in July 2002 
(as opposed to the present investigation that follows the referral by the Malian 
Government and only investigates events that took place after 1 January 
2012).411 The MNLA expressed its willingness to cooperate with the ICC, in its 
preliminary examination into alleged crimes committed in Mali, and 
announced that it would engage with, and submit deeds of commitment to 
Geneva Call, an organisation with the aim to persuade non-State actors 
‘towards compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law’.412 Furthermore the ‘Action Plan’ affirmed that the MNLA 
was determined to ensure that its members respected international 
humanitarian law and that it would investigate any credible allegation of mass 
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human rights abuses committed by MNLA troops and take the appropriate 
action.413  
The MNLA had already been forced out of all the major northern cities, by 
Ansar Dine and MOJWA, and had retreated to rural areas, making the chances 
of its statehood project’s succeeding increasingly small. Furthermore, on the 
same day that the MNLA expressed its commitment to international law to the 
UN Security Council, that same Council adopted Resolution 2071, further 
diminishing the chances of a successful Azawad state. Although the resolution, 
in itself, did not authorise the use of force yet, it foresaw the deployment of 
ECOWAS troops in Mali.414 Security Council Resolution 2085, adopted 
unanimously on 20 December 2012, authorised the deployment of the African-
led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), organised by ECOWAS. 
Following the resolution, and after the Malian government requested military 
intervention, from France, as the Islamist were advancing south, France 
launched operation Serval, on 11 January 2013.  
Only a few days after the Prosecutor announced the beginning of an official 
investigation into the situation in Mali, French and Chadian troops overran 
Islamist strongholds in the north. The MNLA offered support to the French 
troops and entered Kidal, when the French had ousted Islamists from their last 
stronghold. The French, in turn, refused to disarm MNLA members, and kept 
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the Malian Army away from Kidal to avoid clashes with the MNLA.415 France 
made it clear that it was fighting Islamist factions and wisely demanded that 
the Malian government sort out its statehood issues with the MNLA, at peace 
talks, taking place in Burkina Faso.  
On 13 February 2013, the MNLA published a declaration, in which it called for 
the immediate opening of negotiations with the Malian government ‘to 
establish the conditions for exercise of authority, administration and 
development of Azawad’. 416 Some interpreted the MNLA statement that it 
would not ‘undermine the internationally recognised borders of Mali while 
recalling clearly the existence of Azawad as a whole’ as renouncing its 
declaration of independence, something that was later denied by the MNLA.417 
But, what is especially relevant, was that the MNLA continued to use the 
narrative of international criminal justice, by denying responsibility for what it 
called the ‘unfortunate Aguelhoc events in January 2012’, but also by 
expressing support for the ICC and requesting investigations into crimes it 
alleged to be committed by the Malian state institutions.418  
Despite the talks between Bamako and the MNLA, in Burkina Faso, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and international justice continued to be part 
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of the discourse of both parties in the conflict. While talking about peace they 
continued to accuse each other of war crimes, summary executions and ethnic 
violence, a narrative that had to be seen as mainly aimed at outside 
constituencies.419 The MNLA wanted to send a message that, without an 
Azawad state, the safety of the Tuareg people could not be guaranteed, hoping 
for international support for its causes. At the same time, the Malian 
government aimed for international interference to restore its authority in its 
entire territory, instead of only ousting the Islamist factions and leaving the 
Tuareg that were fighting for statehood to be dealt with. The most relevant 
international actors, however, France, ECOWAS and the AU, and the UN 
Security Council, who had so far wisely made a distinction between the 
statehood issues of the MNLA and those of Islamists aiming for Caliphates and 
Sharia law. In June 2013, negotiations led to the MNLA signing a peace deal 
with the Malian government, in preparation for the election that followed a 
month later.420 Both the loss of legitimacy internally, in their constituencies 
that were opposed to the Islamic norms forced upon them by the MNLA’s 
former allies, and the international condemnation, might have played a role in 
the MNLA making peace with the government.  
Intervention in Mali, by ECOWAS, France, the AU and later the UN, had the 
characteristics of classic anti-insurgency missions. However, as a contingent 
effect of international criminal justice, these foreign interventions can be 
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packaged as stabilisation missions. Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 
April 2013, establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) included in its mandate: ‘To 
monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations 
of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law’, and to 
‘support, [...] to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional 
authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the 
International Criminal Court’.421 It is clear that the opening of an investigation 
changed the dynamic, and as a contingent effect made military intervention 
possible, or at least easier to justify.   
The self-referral of Mali shows, that, despite heavy criticism of the ICC from 
within Africa, and while the Court often lacked support in words and deeds 
from the UN Security Council, the Malian government expected ICC 
involvement to have a delegitimizing effect on its QSE adversaries. Mali was 
not the first state government that used narratives of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity to boost its legitimacy, while simultaneously delegitimising 
its opponents. Nor was it the first government to attempt to use international 
criminal procedures to boost these kinds of narratives. Mali believed that the 
ICC would be able to provide a narrative of international criminal justice, by 
which it could brand one party as the violator of universal norms, an enemy of 
humanity, while cooperation with the Court would convey messages of 
                                                      




defending those norms and of being a friend of the international community. 
However, this meant that the Court faced the possibility of becoming a ‘court 
of convenience’, a tool employed by states in attempt to delegitimise their 
quasi-state adversaries, and the Court acted more wisely than it did in earlier 
self-referral cases and also opened an investigation into alleged crimes 
committed by Malian government forces. The military intervention by France, 
although prompted by concerns for ungoverned territory in northern Mali that 
would serve as a safe haven for terrorists, was easier to justify after 
international criminal justice narratives entered the equation.. Together with 
the accusations of war crimes it had to face, international involvement further 
diminished the chances of the MNLA’s reaching its objective of an 
independent Azawad State. The ICC forced the MNLA to distance itself further 
from Ansar Dine, AQIM and MOJWA, organisations with which it had worked 
together, and that were also deemed responsible for horrible crimes. The 
opening of an investigation by the OTP also forced the MNLA to vow 
commitment to the norms of international criminal law, and to work together 
with the ICC investigation, in an attempt to overcome a crisis of legitimacy, 




CHAPTER VII.                                                                            
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the course of just two decades international criminal justice went from a 
distant memory of the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo to being firmly established as a functioning system of international 
judicial mechanisms to prosecute those individuals most responsible for the 
most heinous crimes. However, the enormous development of international 
criminal tribunals also gave rise to high expectations regarding the outcome of 
the proceedings before them. Yet, despite these high hopes, the money and 
means invested, and the extensive research done into the effectiveness of 
international criminal justice, it often remains unclear how far prosecuting 
individuals for violations of humanitarian law had an effect in line with the 
various objectives and justifications that were attributed to international 
criminal tribunals. In the introduction, I posed the question: What is the impact 
of international criminal justice on the capacity of quasi-state entities to 
maintain and create legitimacy for their actions and institutions? 
As I have shown, and suggested at the outset, the direct answer to this question 
is that international criminal justice can present critical challenges that affect 
the legitimacy of quasi-state entities, directly or indirectly, thereby affecting 
their prospects of success. As international judicial attention to QSEs and their 
conflicts spread, as I have shown, it is evident that legal procedures against 




which those individuals were involved. At the same time, these judicial 
procedures also affected their opponents’ ability to create and maintain 
legitimacy – one way, or another. The shifting of legitimacy, and the changes 
in narratives aimed at creating legitimacy, which I have explored in this study, 
reveal the impact of international criminal justice. As I have argued, by 
assessing the influence of international criminal justice on the capacity of 
QSEs to create and maintain legitimacy – an essential requirement for their 
success – it is possible to distinguish the discrete impact of international 
tribunals on the outcome of conflicts and the political and social conditions for 
QSE success. I have shown this in relation to three QSEs (the KLA, Hezbollah, 
and the MNLA), in three different conflicts (Kosovo, Lebanon, and Mali), 
which were a focus of interest for three different types of international judicial 
bodies (the ICTY, the STL, and the ICC).  
This conclusion will draw together the concepts of critical legitimacy and 
QSEs with international justice. First, it considers the entanglement of 
international criminal justice and international politics. Then, the impact of 
international criminal justice on the legitimacy of QSEs in the three examples 
discussed in depth in this dissertation will be briefly re-assessed. Beyond this, I 
shall offer reflection on what can be learned from looking at these concepts in 
conjunction with each other, and, before this, on QSEs and legitimacy as 
success. Finally, I conclude that although legitimacy is hard to gauge, this can, 
in part, be negotiated by looking at critical legitimacy crises resulting from 
international criminal justice, revealing the impact these judicial proceedings 




legitimacy crises and international criminal justice. It can be noticed that trials 
do not only impact on the individual prosecuted, but also on the entities and 
societies they represent. Although, it is more appropriate to assess effects than 
effectiveness, some outcomes of international criminal justice are 
immeasurable altogether, and one has to realise that international proceedings 
can have many contingent effects. One should keep in mind that international 
criminal justice narratives are effective because the acts committed are 
abhorred, and that the more horrible the crimes, the greater the outrage, the 
deeper the accompanying impact the narratives of justice for the victims have 
on legitimacy. This dissertation, in several places made clear that timing is 
everything in relation to the potential effect of international criminal justice, 
and that impact will depend on the legitimacy of the tribunal itself. Importantly 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity entered the narratives of all 
conflicts and of entities claiming legitimacy in them. There use has changed 
the political reality of contemporary conflict. While they do not depend 
entirely on the existence of a court that has the ability to apply, and develop, 
international criminal law, they are very greatly enhanced by the existence of 
such a body, the discouse that surrounds it, the documentation, testimony and 




POLITICS, JUSTICE, POLITICS 
Reflecting on international criminal justice, critical legitimacy moments caused 
by international criminal justice and the capacity of QSEs to create and 
maintain legitimacy, several observations can be made. First, international 
criminal law could only come into existence because of the unique 
circumstances, in the early 1990s, which simultaneously called for the 
prosecution of those responsible for violations of international criminal law 
and created an international political environment that made establishing 
international criminal courts and tribunals feasible. The huge steps that were 
taken in the field of international criminal justice should therefore be viewed in 
the wider political and diplomatic environment in which it could flourish. Not 
only was the establishment of international criminal tribunals was a political 
decision, but, international criminal justice also remained a set of legal tools, 
wedged between the political considerations in the establishment of courts (or 
referrals of the UN Security Council to the ICC), on one side, and the political 
outcomes of prosecuting individuals for violations of humanitarian law, on the 
other. That the ICC had a structural shortage of people and means was the 
outcome of political processes, as was the inability of the Security Council to 
refer situations that called for international judicial intervention to the Court 
(the prime example of this would be Syria). For states, to become party to the 
Rome Statute, or to cooperate with the ICC in investigations and the 
apprehending of suspects, were all political decisions. International relations 
and politics are intrinsically intertwined with international law and criminal 




depending on each other, and should all be taken into consideration, when 
assessing the impact of international criminal justice. Conversely, the 
(potential) impact of international criminal justice should be considered, when 
assessing the situations in which violations of humanitarian law are committed. 
Although intrinsically interwoven with one another, international criminal 
justice and politics moved completely out of tune with each other. While, 
according to Harold Wilson, ‘a week is a long time in politics’, in international 
criminal justice, 20 years is a fairly short period of time. The difference in pace 
was not only problematic for maintaining attention for something that was so 
surrounded by (international) politics, it also further complicated the, already 
difficult, process of assessing the impact of international criminal justice, as a 
whole. Despite the fact that international criminal law was nothing new, in 
itself, international criminal justice in its current incarnation was a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Consequently, the number of completed cases that could 
provide empirical evidence for the impact of international criminal proceedings 
on QSEs was limited. Criminal procedures, at international tribunals, are very 
time consuming, expensive, and, consequently, only a limited number of cases 
that would merit prosecution end up in an international court. This further 
limits the number of cases that could provide empirical evidence for this thesis. 
Although conflicts over statehood tend to drag on for a long time, and reaching 
a final status often takes decades, the discrepancy between the pace of legal 
procedures and the pace of (international) politics means that conflicts in which 
the violations of humanitarian law were committed are often over, by the time 




1994, and announced its first indictments in December 1995, while the 
genocide in Rwanda, generally, was considered to have ended in July 1994. 
Moreover, criminal procedures tended to take a long time to come to an end, 
even more so when suspects remained at large. The trials of Radovan Karadžić 
and Ratko Mladić at the ICTY, began in 2011 and 2012, respectively, while the 
last alleged war crimes they were accused of were committed in 1995. In some 
cases, not only did the conflicts end by the time the violations of humanitarian 
law were addressed in a court, but the entities to which the individuals facing 
prosecution were connected with no longer existed. The Khmer Rouge, for 
instance, was dissolved, in 1996, while international criminal procedures 
against its senior members only started ten years later, in 2006, more than 30 
years after the beginning of its campaign of gross human rights violations. 
With regard to the ICC, in particular, one may, therefore, argue that it was too 
early in its existence to be able to see a systematic and constant impact on the 
ability to create and maintain legitimacy in various constituencies of those 
entities whose members were suspected, or convicted, by the Court. However, 
with the establishment of the ICC − and its readily available expertise and 
investigating capacity − the threat of prosecution for violations of humanitarian 
law became more nigh. Its establishment took away the need for the Security 
Council to establish a court before there was even a possibility of commencing 
prosecutions of war crimes. Moreover, the establishment of the ICC took the 
decision to prosecute out of the realm of international politics and made it a 
legal decision. Yet, the case of Mali demonstrated that, even when the Court 




belligerents moved on, and alternated peace talks with fighting the next 
conflict.  
To have an effect and to maintain and create legitimacy for their own 
institutions and verdicts, courts need to come to final verdicts. However, it is 
not only convictions that have an impact on legitimacy. This dissertation 
assessed three examples, where the impact of international criminal justice 
could be seen through changing narratives and legitimacy crises. However, in 
two of the examples, it so did at an early stage, and in the other, the main 
suspect died before he could be convicted. The Milošević indictment and its 
impact on the legitimacy of the KLA and its Kosovo statehood project was 
examined because the war in Kosovo occurred while the ICTY was up and 
running. Nevertheless, that did not mean that the approach used in the present 
thesis, could not be developed and tested, in relation to the war in Bosnia. 
Moreover, the indictment of Ramush Haradinaj also had an impact on the 
Kosovo statehood project, albeit in a very different way than the indictment of 
Milošević had, six years earlier. Additionally, especially in the light of the way 
Haradinaj handled his indictment, further exploration of the Haradinaj case 
would, likely, shed more light on the workings of international criminal justice 
narratives and the complicated process of legitimation.  
The situation in Mali, was especially relevant to seeing how the ICC 
functioned, as the circumstances in which it operated changed significantly, 
between opening, its first investigations, and later developments under Chief 




Mali, no indictments were published, at the time of writing, and, although the 
STL had indicted five individuals, it had yet, to start proceedings, in the 
absence of the accused. Notwithstanding the fact that the full impact of these 
procedures on the legitimacy of both state and quasi-state entities, whose 
members were accused, will be revealed as these cases progress and as the 
political situations, in which these crimes were committed, progress, they 
already proved pivotal in changing legitimacy. The threat of prosecution 
influenced the actions and statements of QSEs. Indictments and arrest warrants 
limited the freedom to travel of those indicted. Investigations sent a clear 
message to all relevant constituencies. Because the ability to commit crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes, depended upon an individual's power and 
position within a state, or QSE, prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment 
were not always necessary to have a delegitimising effect on the individual, or 
entity, to the point that he was no longer as ready to commit such crimes.  
Even statements by actors, other than prosecutors and judges, can have an 
impact on legitimacy. Most obviously, the UN Security Council, when it asks 
for an investigation into possible war crimes, but accusations made by NGOs, 
states, or influential individuals, could also have an impact on legitimacy, in 
certain constituencies. Implied and explicit messages that influenced the 
success of parties seeking legitimacy were sent, in every possible way, by 
statements but also with actions, not only by the actors seeking legitimacy but 
also those of other actors and international organisations like the ICC, the UN 
or NGOs. Moreover, the international community was susceptible to normative 




international organisations, and especially by courts, even when they did not 
involve convictions, merely accusations. Once charged with crimes against 
humanity, or genocide, it became unlikely for that individual leader and the 
entity it represented would regain legitimacy, in the international community. 
QUASI STATE ENTITIES  
This dissertation focuses on QSEs as one of the main actors in contemporary 
armed conflict. The rise of QSEs, in armed conflict, was not only fully 
revealed by the same changing circumstances in international politics that 
made international criminal justice a possibility, but also, at the same time, 
their role and the atrocities they committed in armed conflict created an 
environment that called for international mechanisms to prosecute those 
responsible for these crimes. The collapse of the bipolar structure, in which 
both blocks supported proxies revealed a multitude of dormant, or suppressed, 
internal conflicts. In the 1990s, the main threat to international stability no 
longer came from states waging war against each other, but from conflicts 
fought within states. These intrastate conflicts also fully revealed new 
dominant paradigms in warfare, wars were no longer fought for a decisive 
military victory, but, were fought for, what Rupert Smith calls ‘the will of the 
people’ and ‘amongst the people’, and, usually, at least one of the belligerents 
was a QSE. These entities usually revolved around a shared ethnicity, religion, 




many forms and went by many monikers, but, they all challenged the 
legitimacy of an existing state. What QSEs have in common is that the goals 
they seek to attain all have to do with statehood. They not only aspire to 
change the state, but often carry out functions usually associated with 
statehood.  
In these statehood conflicts, the unprecedented capacity of QSEs to commit 
large-scale atrocities meant that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even 
genocide were by no means uncommon. To attain their (statehood) goals, 
QSEs sometimes committed the most horrendous atrocities, as did their state 
adversaries, in order to maintain the status quo. Sometimes, violations of 
humanitarian law were part of the strategy of one or more parties to a conflict, 
or even inherent in the aims of one of the belligerents. For instance, when 
changing the ethnic make-up of a territory was the goal, in itself, as could be 
seen, in the Kosovo case.  
The War in Yugoslavia and the Genocide in Rwanda, gave rise to the outrage 
and condemnation that contributed to the establishment of the first 
international courts. Especially because in these conflicts QSEs and state 
entities employed a strategy of war crimes, or attempted to change the ethnical 
make up of a territory. But, although the rise of international criminal justice 
had to be seen in the light of the changing interpretation of sovereignty and the 
practical consequences attached to that principle, the international community 
remained firmly dominated by states, a community that proved vigilant in 




remained the Holy Grail, contemporary conflicts were essentially statehood 
conflicts. These conflicts were about changing the borders of an existing state, 
its ethnic make-up, or its system. These entities developed quasi-state 
institutions or fulfilled statehood functions to a greater or lesser degree. They 
had the capacity and willingness to employ organised, restrained coercive 
violence. They operated in a state centred environment. In many ways, they 
behaved like states., but they lacked the status of sovereign statehood. I have 
argued, therefore, a more appropriate term to capture this type of actor, or 
entity, would be ‘quasi-state entities’ or QSEs.  
Although, at any one time, what these entities are might overlap with being a 
rebel army, a nationalist movement or de facto state, and while these entities, 
and the conflicts they fight in, evolve, many of the labels attached to them 
might change, there is a constant in what these entities are, QSEs, a concept 
importantly and conceptually distinct from, for instance, nationalist 
movements, de facto states and rebels or insurgents. The use of the term ‘quasi-
state entity’ is useful for understanding that the nature of these entities, and the 
nature of the conflicts they are involved in, make creating and maintaining 
legitimacy for their actions and institutions a prerequisite for their success. It 
emphasises what these conflicts are about, but also that these entities lack the 
privileges that come with full sovereign statehood. QSEs are not part of the 
international political process that establishes Courts. They have no say in 
international organisations, they are not parties to the Rome Statute and cannot 
refer situations to the ICC. But, they might be covered by the ICC, their 




sidelines of, at least, one of the political dimensions that border on 
international criminal justice. Because QSEs lack a solid basis of legitimacy in 
the international community of states, QSEs are arguably more affected by 
changing discourse and by legitimacy crises brought about by international 
criminal justice. As, for instance, the case of shifting legitimacy in Kosovo, 
and the position of the KLA vis-à-vis Milošević and the Serbian state, showed, 
the impact of international criminal justice on the capacity of states to create 
and maintain legitimacy for their aims and institutions is significant. Moreover, 
these changes in legitimacy can be seen by the same method: detecting critical 
legitimacy moments, or legitimacy crises, and narratives changing under the 
pressure of international criminal justice.  
LEGITIMACY AS SUCCESS  
Legitimacy is a useful concept with which to gauge impact. It is useful, despite 
the difficulties in establishing its existence, its complexity as a concept, its 
constantly changing nature and the fact that it differs among various relevant 
constituencies. First and foremost, this is because, in contemporary ‘statehood’ 
conflict, the ability to create and maintain legitimacy is a prerequisite for 
success for both states and QSEs alike. Even the party that is able to deploy 
superior military means, in order to alter the boundaries, or system, of an 
existing state, or maintain the status quo, needs legitimacy. Both QSEs and 




institutions within their core constituencies − among the people they claim to 
represent, those who fight for them, and among the political elite of the group 
with which they identify themselves. But, they also need the ability to create 
and maintain legitimacy in other relevant constituencies − among the 
secondary Clausewitzian triangle of people, military and political elite of other 
local constituencies and regional allies; they need to influence their opponents’ 
triangle, and they need a certain level of legitimacy among members of various 
constituencies in the international community. However, this dissertation 
demonstrated that legitimacy is not a constant quality that an entity has, or its 
institutions have. On the contrary, it depends on many different internal and 
external factors and can be gained, or lost, almost overnight. Moreover, the 
ability of entities to engage in the constant process of legitimation, in multiple 
constituencies simultaneously, is, therefore, extremely hard to gauge. At best, 
legitimacy is tangible in its absence, and, by observing the (in)ability to 
overcome legitimacy crises, its existence, and its workings, can be detected. It 
is in the critical test of legitimacy, the moment the possibilities and means to 
regain legitimacy are retracted at the same time as these means are needed the 
most, that legitimacy can best be noticed. This dissertation argues that, 
although both the effects of international criminal justice and the outcomes of 
legitimisation are independently very hard to gauge, it is possible to detect both 
the intended and unintended effects of international criminal justice on QSEs 
by analysing legitimacy crises, the point where international criminal justice 




THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS ON QUASI-
STATE ENTITIES 
The newfound ability of the Prosecutor at the ICTY, at the height of the War in 
Kosovo and the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, to collect evidence 
of crimes committed in Kosovo led to the indictment of Milošević and four 
other senior Serbian leaders by the ICTY for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Only days later Milošević gave in to the demands of NATO, 
ensuring a victory for the Alliance and putting Kosovo under UN authority, but 
the resistance of Western politicians and NATO diplomats to (publishing) the 
indictment demonstrates that the outcomes of ICTY involvement were wholly 
unexpected. Nevertheless, the indictment turned out to be a turning point in the 
conflict, but also in future statehood issues surrounding Kosovo. It transformed 
the position of the KLA, from a QSE without chances to enforce its statehood 
objectives militarily and lacking the legitimacy it needed, to be successful, 
(especially in the various constituencies in the international community), into a 
victorious combatant, on a path to statehood, which legitimacy was supported 
by those who, a year earlier, had defended Serbia’s territorial integrity.  
The indictment of Milošević was a pivotal moment in the chain of events that 
led to the de facto independence of Kosovo, in that it inverted the bases of 
legitimacy and revolutionised the environments of support. First, for Milošević 
it a created critical legitimacy moment that forced him to make choices under 
the pressure of international criminal justice. It catalysed a spiralling 




which, until then, there had been, at least, some legitimacy for maintaining the 
territorial integrity of Serbia. This forced Milošević to salvage what was left of 
his power in Serbia and to give in to NATO demands. Not least, this was 
because the indictment against Milošević cum suis added to the legitimacy of 
NATO bombardment. The indictment added weight to the human rights 
narratives used by NATO, aimed at creating legitimacy for its actions, in its 19 
home constituencies − a sufficient level of legitimacy, beyond that in the wide 
international community, and, contrary to Serbia’s expectations, managed to 
maintain that legitimacy, when the air campaign lasted much longer than 
expected. It helped in finding a narrative to justify the severe means NATO 
used to reach its aim of ending, and preventing further, ethnic cleansing. 
Investigations by the ICTY prosecutor and evidence of humanitarian disaster 
and ethnic cleansing presented in the indictment could not be discarded, as 
NATO, or Kosovar propaganda. At the same time, Serbia lost what Freedman 
called the ‘game of comparative victimology’. The indictment made victims of 
human rights violations of those the KLA represented, and turned the KLA into 
a force fighting an enemy of the international community. It changed beliefs in 
various constituencies, especially the West, about the legitimacy of Serbian 
leadership and, conversely, increased beliefs in the justice of a Kosovar 
statehood project. The indictment, plus narratives that included international 
criminal justice, transformed the legitimacy of the KLA, and, thereby, the 
chances of success for its statehood project.  
Although narratives of international criminal justice were ubiquitous in 




2007, identifying the impact of the Court on the legitimacy of Hezbollah and 
other Lebanese actors remains complicated. First, this is because the STL was 
the odd one out among international criminal tribunals. The STL was 
established to prosecute the murder of Rafik Hariri, a crime that had an effect 
on international peace and security, according to the Security Council. This 
very limited jurisdiction was reflected in its objectives as described in the 
Statute of the STL. Although it was also implied that one of the aims of the 
Tribunal was to contribute to ending impunity for political assassinations, in 
Lebanon, this was not part of its explicit justifications. Nor was the STL’s 
design and jurisdiction capable of ending impunity for political violence in 
Lebanon. The limited jurisdiction of the STL could be seen in the narrative that 
the STL offers, which was more easily met by a counter narrative, and 
generated less outrage than narratives of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide. Moreover, the rather technical indictments, against members of 
Hezbollah, did not make for a powerful delegitimizing narrative, compared to 
the images of streams of refugees and mass graves the ICTY investigations 
provided. The timing of the establishment of the tribunal further cast doubt on 
the political motivation for its foundation; arguably, the STL was established to 
challenge further the legitimacy of Syria, in Lebanon, and to get the most out 
of the Hariri assassination (for the Sunni and Western powers). When it turned 
out that it would not be Syrian intelligence operatives who would be indicted, 
but that it would be members of Hezbollah, the opponents of Hezbollah at 
times refrained from using international criminal justice narratives, out of fear 




time that leaks allowed Hezbollah to develop counter-narratives, meant that the 
impact of the indictments themselves was more limited than might have been 
the case otherwise. The ability to overcome legitimacy crises demonstrated by 
Hezbollah is such that it provides a model for success in contemporary armed 
conflict. Its strong bases in Shia constituencies, further strengthened by a 
growing Sunni-Shia rift in Lebanese politics, meant that, in that constituency, 
the impact of the STL on Hezbollah’s legitimacy was limited. The narrative 
Hezbollah offered about who killed Hariri, and about what the STL was, had 
more appeal to its core constituents than the narratives its opponents offered, 
even when those were backed up by the findings of the prosecutor of the STL. 
Nevertheless, the shifting beliefs of what Hezbollah is, and what it ought to be 
can clearly be seen in various constituencies. Moreover, although other factors 
in Lebanese politics simultaneously shifted beliefs about the legitimacy of 
Hezbollah, in various constituencies inside and outside Lebanon, the influence 
of the establishment of the STL, its investigation and the indictments published 
by the Tribunal on these changes in legitimacy in Lebanon could be clearly 
noticed. This impact could be seen in the critical legitimacy moments that 
forced Hezbollah to make choices, from the establishment of the Tribunal 
onwards. Especially being implicated in the case by the STL made it 
increasingly difficult for Hezbollah to balance its legitimating narratives and 
actions, in a way that appealed to the various constituencies it needed to 
influence. The message Hezbollah had been trying to get across was aimed 
simultaneously at maintaining legitimacy, in its core Shia constituencies, while 




regional and even international constituencies. The rumours of an indictment 
and, later, the indictment itself forced Hezbollah to choose between showing 
loyalty to its fighters, by attacking the Tribunal, and preventing distrust in non-
Shia constituencies, by distancing themselves from its members facing 
indictment. As in the previous serious legitimacy crisis Hezbollah had to 
overcome, it focused on its core constituency. It thereby rekindled its image as 
an Iranian/Syrian tool among non-Shia, in the region and beyond, and lost the 
capacity to project the image of a resistance against Israel it needed to 
legitimise its arms, in the eyes of many Lebanese and in the region. In this 
instance, the mere promise of possible international criminal prosecution 
seemed to have influenced the capability to create and maintain legitimacy, and 
the conduct; of this QSE. This is not to say that the STL cannot have a stronger 
effect on the ability of Hezbollah to maintain legitimacy in the future; 
especially if the STL reached a verdict, and thereby provides a more 
convincing narrative about the events and culpability surrounding Hariri’s 
assassination and connected cases.  
The self referral letter of 13 July 2012 to the Prosecutor of the ICC, in which 
the government of Mali alleges that gross human rights violations and war 
crimes have been committed in the country since 1 January 2012, especially in 
its northern regions, demonstrates, in the first place, that the government of 
Mali believed the ICC was to have an effect on legitimacy. Despite increasing 
and intensifying criticism on the functioning of the ICC from within Africa, 
and while the Court often lacked backing up in words and deeds from the UN 




have an effect, and that it would benefit from its involvement. Mali was not the 
first state government that attempted to use international criminal procedures to 
boost its legitimacy, or to delegitimise the institutions and actions of QSE 
opponents. They seek to benefit from the ability of the ICC to provide a 
narrative of international criminal justice, by which it could brand one party as 
the violator of universal norms, an ‘enemy of humanity’, while cooperation 
with the Court conveys a message of defending those norms and of being a 
friend of the international community. This ability of the ICC to shift 
legitimacy, especially in the various relevant constituencies in the Western 
world, led to the self-referral by states of situations to the ICC but also put the 
Court at risk of becoming a ‘court of convenience’, a tool employed by states 
to delegitimize their quasi-state adversaries. In the case of Mali, the impact of 
the self-referral and the opening of an investigation by the ICC can be seen to 
have shifted legitimacy. But, the Court acted more wisely than it did in earlier 
self-referral cases and prevented itself from being used by the state to keep the 
MNLA from reaching its statehood goals. Significant in this was that the ICC 
opened an investigation into acts committed by the MNLA, but also into 
whether acts, allegedly committed by Malian Army troops, constituted war 
crimes. Nevertheless, the use of international criminal justice narratives 
probably made it easier for Western countries, especially France, to justify 
intervening in Mali. The states that compose the international community had a 
natural reflex towards protecting the territorial integrity of Mali, against any 
statehood project of the Tuareg, and it did so in the case of the unilaterally 




international community and motivations for international intervention had to 
do more with the prospect of a failed state’s providing a safe harbour for 
Islamist organisations like AQIM, Ansar Dine and MOJWA. The opening of 
an ICC investigation created a critical legitimacy moment, in that it forced the 
MNLA further to distance itself from the Islamist factions it had cooperated. 
More important, the crimes the crimes allegedly committed in Mali led to 
expressions of concern among members of the international community and 
expressions of outrage from international NGOs and humanitarian 
organisations. When being implicated in those crimes, the MNLA had to 
express commitment to the norms of international criminal law and the ICC 
investigation in an attempt to prevent, or halt, a legitimacy crisis. The self-
referral, and thereby introduction of international crimes and justice to the 
discourse, was intended as a tool to create legitimacy for the government while 
delegitimising its opponents. The changing narratives of the MNLA, in an 
attempt to end up on the right side of the ICC, showed that its involvement 
created withdrawal of legitimacy. Together with the international military 
involvement and strife between the MNLA and its former allies, the ICC 
investigation prevented the MNLA from attaining some, or all, of its statehood 
objectives, or at least it further diminished the chances of a successful Azawad 
State. Despite talks between the MNLA and the Malian government, and 
despite both the Malian Army’s and the MNLA’s being subject to ICC 
investigations, both parties continued to use narratives accusing each other of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in attempts to gain legitimacy for their 




THE ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL LEGITIMACY MOMENTS TO GAUGE THE 
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
When assessing the impact of international criminal justice, one has to take 
into account that changing abilities of actors in contemporary conflict, the rise 
of international criminal tribunals, and the changes in international relations 
and politics were intrinsically interwoven. It has to be taken into consideration 
that sovereignty is the Alpha and Omega of the international order, and that the 
ability to create and maintain legitimacy in various constituencies 
simultaneously is both the beginning and the end of success for both states and 
for QSEs in reaching their statehood objectives. Yet, even then, the effects of 
international criminal procedures on the outcomes of statehood clashes remain 
complicated to gauge.  
First, legitimacy in its positive form is extremely difficult to distinguish, it is at 
most seen when and where it is questioned. Therefore, in order to learn 
something about legitimacy, its workings, and how and when it is lost and 
gained, one has to interpret the signs of legitimacy crisis. But, even before that 
critical moment is reached, that moment when an entity is fighting for survival, 
the indicators of crisis management already can be detected. The effect that 
international criminal justice can have on the capacity of entities successfully 
to claim legitimacy is significant. The changing discourse is a function of the 
impact of international criminal justice. For instance, the use of an international 
criminal justice narrative by those implicated by international criminal 




accused might be identified. To gauge how, and how far, international criminal 
justice influences legitimacy, one can assess the changing discourses that 
reveal critical legitimacy moments. By analysing whether international 
criminal justice creates critical legitimacy moments in certain constituencies, 
and, then, by assessing the ability of State entities and Quasi-State Entities to 
overcome such crises resulting from international criminal justice, one can 
detect the impact these proceedings have. 
Second, once it has been identified that an entity has to deal with a legitimacy 
crisis, in a certain constituency, at a certain time, a causal link between the 
‘critical legitimacy moment’ and international criminal justice should be 
established. This may encounter some of the same difficulties as gauging 
legitimacy itself did. However, in legitimacy crises the counter-narratives 
provided by opponents and aimed at de-legitimisation are telling. So are the 
questions asked in the constituency in which legitimacy is lost. In line with the 
dictum: ‘that which is not in question is legitimate’; when question marks are 
raised about the legitimacy of an entity or its actions, looking at the questions 
asked about its legitimacy is revealing towards answering the question why 
legitimacy is failing. Moreover, evidence of a causal link can often be found in 
the narratives provided by the entity that has to overcome a legitimacy crisis. 
For instance, the impact of international criminal proceedings can be seen 
when a QSE attempts to de-legitimise a court, or starts denying war crimes, or 




International criminal courts and tribunals, the threat of international legal 
proceedings, or even the statements of third parties, that an individual should 
be prosecuted, send messages to the same constituencies that QSEs have to 
influence, in order to be successful. ‘International criminal justice narratives’ 
can have an interruptive effect on the narratives of QSEs. But, where their 
antagonists in ‘statehood clashes’ have to face international criminal justice, 
QSEs may benefit from incorporating international criminal justice in their 
own messages, from the narratives of third parties, and from the actions of 
courts. International criminal justice can bolster their legitimacy. Using an 
international criminal justice narrative provides the opportunity to brand 
opponents as enemies of mankind, while presenting the entity itself a as a good 
citizen of the international community, even when entities do not possess full 
citizenship of that community. Legitimacy is not a zero sum game, but, when 
one narrative loses its attractiveness in a certain group, the entity offering the 
opposing narrative will typically gain legitimacy. 
Third, International criminal tribunals prosecute individuals and not states, 
QSEs, or other organisations, yet, the crimes they are accused of are usually 
part of an organised activity. They are committed as part of a ‘plan or policy’ 
or a ‘widespread or systematic attack’, and are, at least in practise, only 
feasible when committed in an organisational framework, usually that of a state 
or QSE. Sometimes, these crimes are even an integral part of the strategy of an 
entity. In theory, international criminal justice may remain silent on the 
culpability of the QSE and state, or it may not always become immediately 




relevant what evidence exists of a connection between an individual and an 
entity; if in a certain constituency it is believed there is a connection, it will 
influence the legitimacy of that entity. Moreover, during a trial it usually 
becomes clear what the organisational and command structure is, especially 
when the accused uses the ‘superior orders defence’ or is convicted for taking 
part in a joint criminal enterprise. Even when there is a chance for an entity to 
distance itself from the accused individual(s), QSEs are not always willing to 
do so, as the example of Hezbollah and its members indicted by the STL 
illustrates.  
Fourth, this dissertation looked at effects, rather than effectiveness. This does 
not mean that the effects that are observed do not work towards the aims of 
international criminal justice. It is difficult, however, to set a benchmark for 
success. Is it the absence of all crimes under international law? Or, is it when 
perpetrators of these crimes are caught? This also illustrates that it is difficult 
to determine a hierarchy between various goals of, and justifications for, 
international criminal justice. The effectiveness of international criminal justice 
depends, in the first place, on what one considers being the aims and 
justifications of international criminal tribunals. Different stakeholders hold 
different opinions on these justifications. However, whether one considers 
post-conflict state building, retribution, ending impunity, or general and special 
prevention of future atrocities, to be the principal aim of international justice, 
the effectiveness of any legal proceeding, or court, remains hard to measure. 




sense of justice has been sufficiently restored, for instance, or the effectiveness 
of retribution.  
By looking at the effects, rather that the effectiveness, of international criminal 
justice, the contingency of international criminal justice intervention also 
becomes apparent. It became clear that many of the consequences of opening 
investigations, publishing indictments and starting procecutions were 
unexpected. However, while some consequences, although unintended, may 
work towards the objectives used to justify international criminal justice in the 
widest sense, other consequences do not. The contingent effect of international 
criminal justice can, for instance, include making outside military intervention 
more feasible, but it can also unexpectedly strengthen legitimacy of a certain 
entity in a certain constituency. Studying the effects of previous international 
criminal justice interventions might provide more insight to provide for 
possible contingencies in the future.  
Fifth, the narratives of international criminal justice depend on the narratives of 
the crimes they investigate and the atrocities for which they prosecute the 
perpetrators. It was no coincidence that the Yugoslav War both led to the first 
international criminal tribunal and marked the beginning of an era in which 
television was ubiquitous in war. The impact of the moving images of 
atrocities was instrumental in the outrage and the calls for the punishment of 
the perpetrators, especially among Western audiences, that contributed to the 
foundation of the first international Courts. Moving images of the 




legitimacy of the individuals that committed them, and the entities in whose 
name they are committed, than when these crimes were less visible. The spread 
of Internet use made (moving) images of war and its horrible consequences 
even more readily available, to an even wider public than twenty years ago, 
and in the competition to get legitimating narratives accepted, images, and, 
especially, moving images, play a central role. International criminal justice 
narratives are effective because the acts are abhorred by the members of the 
relevant constituencies. The more horrible the crimes, the greater the outrage, 
the deeper the accompanying impact the narratives justice for the victims have 
on legitimacy.  
Sixth, the timing of the moment international criminal justice narratives enter 
the discourse is pivotal in the effect international criminal justice has. This not 
only the case in terms of the vulnerability of those affected by them. Milošević, 
for instance, was already dealing with a spiral of legitimacy loss, in many 
relevant constituencies, when he was confronted by the indictment. It is also 
important in terms of whether an indictment comes as a surprise, and whether 
the QSE, or state, whose operatives are indicted had time to provide counter-
narratives. A prime example of the latter would be Hezbollah that had time to 
prepare for the indictment of it members by the STL. But also, the longer the 
gap between a crime, or crimes taking place and an indictment being 
published, a trial taking place, or a verdict’s being rendered, the lesser the 




Seventh, the impact of the actions and statements of an international tribunal 
and the threat international criminal justice poses will, in part, depend on the 
legitimacy that a court has in a certain constituency, and in how far norms of 
international criminal law are internalised within that constituency. In Western 
constituencies, international criminal law is often an integral part of the 
existing norm set, and, therefore, it can be expected that international criminal 
justice will have a stronger impact on the beliefs held in these constituencies. 
This is one of the reasons that the impact of the ICC is somewhat negated 
within home constituencies of the perpetrators, for instance. Yet, more 
important, it also makes the narratives against the ICC, which are increasingly 
heard in Africa, so relevant, as well as the limited support the ICC receives 
from the Security Council and the fact that three of its five permanent members 
did not ratify the Rome Statute. 
The mandate the ICC was given might not always be sufficient to live up to the 
high ambitions it is burdened with − to punish crimes that are unforgivable − 
and to the possibly even higher hopes that are vested in it − to end impunity 
that without interference could go on endlessly. Yet, the potential impact of the 
ICC on the legitimacy of QSEs can come about in different ways. An 
investigation, indictment, or conviction of a member of a QSE, potentially, can 
have impact on the capacity of that QSE to create and maintain legitimacy, in 
certain constituencies. Or, conversely, when the capacity to claim legitimacy of 
a state entity in certain constituencies is affected by international criminal 
justice, it will be easier for its QSE adversaries successfully to create 




This is illustrated by the belief of State Parties to the ICC that such an impact 
exists. Although unexpected, the most common basis for jurisdiction of the 
Court turned out, not to be the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, or 
referrals of situations on the territory of another State Party, nor a referral by 
the Security Council but, self-referral. Four of the eight situations officially 
investigated by the ICC were due to a self-referral of a State Party to the Rome 
Statute. Safely presuming that state governments only self-refer situations if 
they are confident they will gain something from it, this is an indication that 
the ICC investigation has either a positive impact on their legitimacy in certain 
constituencies, or a negative one on the capacity of their quasi state adversaries 
to create and maintain legitimacy. This is so, despite the fact that, at the same 
time, when ‘one of their own’ (e.g. President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir) is 
involved, many African states rather stay away from a narrative of war crimes 
and crimes against humanities. Nevertheless, the lack of support from the 
Security Council, and the intense criticism from African leaders and limited 
means with which to open cases, in situations where the most horrendous 
crimes are committed on a massive scale, both endanger the capabilities of the 
ICC.  
Finally, ‘The Hague’ has entered the jargon of international politics and the 
vocabulary of both international human rights organisations and local activists, 
around the world, as a call for international criminal justice, whenever the 
norms of international criminal law are believed to have been violated. What 
changed is that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity entered the 




to claim legitimacy and to counter legitimacy. International criminal justice 
changed the political reality of contemporary conflict. It is a factor to be 
reckoned with. The ICC, despite its shortcomings, limited cases, and all the 
obstacles that have been put in its way, is a prerequisite for this. Without a 
permanent international criminal court, narratives of international criminal 






African Union, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of 
the Sudan, Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII), February 1-3, 2009  
African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) 
Rev.1 July 1-3, 2009. 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Cote d'Ivoire, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2006, 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71297.html> (accessed 30 October 
2012) 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Niger, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148711.htm (accessed 30 October 2013)  
Bush, George H.W. (1990) Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on 
the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit (11 September 1990) 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&
month=9 (accessed 22 October 2013)  
Cassese, Antonio (1994) President of the ICTY, Address to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (14 November 1994), 
http://www.un.org/icty/rapportan/genas-94.htm (Accessed 25 March 2013) 
Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945  
Coulibaly, Malick, Le Ministre de la Justice, Garde des Seaux Republique du 
Mali, Lettre a Madame la Procureure pres la Cour Penale Internationale, 
‘Renvoi de la situation au Mali’, Bamako 13 July 2012. 
ECOWAS Press Release, no. 084/2012, 28 March 2012, Abidjan – Cote d' 
Ivoire, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=084&lang=en&annee=2012 
(accessed 20 October 2012) 
ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Commission Declaration Following the Declaration of 
Independence of Northern Mali by the MNLA’, Abuja 6 April 2012, H.E. 
Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo President of the Commission. 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 
Gorbachev Mikhail (1988) Address at the 43rd U.N. General Assembly 
Session, December 7, 1988. 
http://isc.temple.edu/hist249/course/Documents/gorbachev_speech_to_UN.htm 




ICC (2011)‘Elements of Crimes’, Published by the International Criminal 
Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf Art. 7 
ICC Press Release, ‘ICC – Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Hague, 19 April 2004 ICC-OTP-
20040419-50. 
ICC Press Release, ‘ICC- Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central 
African Republic’, The Hague, 7 January 2005, ICC-OTP-20050107-86  
ICC, ‘Decision Assigning the Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of 
the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic, and the Kingdom of Cambodia to Pre-
Trial Chamber I’, The Presidency, 5 July 2013, ICC-01/13 
ICC, ‘Situation in Mali’, Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013, §§ 5-7 
ICC, Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on the Malian State 
referral of the situation in Mali since January 2012, The Hague, 18 July 2012, 
ICC-OTP-20120718-PR829 
ICC, Press Release, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, The Hague, 29 January 2004, ICC-
20040129-44. 
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 3 October 2011, ICC-
02/11-14 
ICC, Situation in The Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 March 2010 ICC-01/09 
ICC, Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, 4 August 2006, ICC-
ASP/5/6 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision 
on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility 
of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”’, 30 August 2011, ICC-
01/09-02/11 O A. 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of 
the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), Trial Chamber II, 16 June 2009, ICC 
01/04-01/07, §§ 77-80 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga And Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 




the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), Trial Chamber II, 16 June 2009, ICC 01/04 
-01/07, §77 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir"), 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 
March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir"), 
Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 12 July 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 10 August 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2901 
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 
ICJ, ‘Arrest Warrant of 1 April 2000’ (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, § 61 
ICJ, Judgment, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, 
(Belgium v. Senegal) 20 July 2012. 
ICJ, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1949, p. 179 
ICTR, Agenda items 144 and 145, Financing of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Financing of the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. Statement by Ms. María Eugenia Casar Assistant Secretary-
General Controller, 13 December 2011; Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res. 4, 21 
December 2011 
ICTY Registry, ‘President Milosevic and four other senior FRY Officials 
Indicted for Murder, Persecution and Deportation in Kosovo’, Press Release by 
the Registry of the ICTY, The Hague, 27 May 1999, JL/PIU/403-E 
ICTY, Agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands Concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991, New York, 27 May 1994  
ICTY, President of the ICTY, Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/49/342, 
29 August 1994 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, 24 March 
2000.  
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic Case No. IT-96–22-T, Sentencing Judgment of 




ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, ‘Sentencing 
judgement’, 24 December 1996, 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-02- 60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 
59 n. 106 (2 December 2003); 
ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Tadic, Case N0: IT-94-1-A and A bis, Appeals Chamber, 
26 January 2000 
ICTY, Prosecutor's Statement Regarding the Tribunal's Jurisdiction over 
Kosovo, The Hague, 10 March 1998, CC/PIO/302-E. 
ICTY, The Prosecutor Of The Tribunal vs. Slobodan Milosevic, Milan 
Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, ICTY 
Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment of 22 May 1999 
ICTY, Trial Transcript, Wednesday, 9 February 2005, 050209IT, pp. 35946-9. 
Online. Available at: 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/050209IT.htm> 
(accessed 15 January 2013. 
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Rambouillet, 
France, 23 February 1999. (Rambouillet Agreement), 
Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011, Final Results, http://esk.rks-
gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=2,1 (accessed 15 July 2013) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo, Countries that have 
recognised the Republic of Kosovo, http://www.president-
ksgov.net/?page=2,54 (accessed 15 January 2014)  
MNLA, ‘Action Plan: Respecting the Laws of War’, submitted by the 
Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad to the United Nations Security 
Council, 12 October 2012. 
MNLA, Communiqué N° 52 / Déclaration du MNLA, Kidal, 11 February 
2013, Le Secrétaire Général, Président du Conseil Transitoire de l’Etat de 
l’Azawad (CTEA), Bilal Ag Acherif. 
MNLA, Déclaration d'indépendance de l'Azawad, Gao 6 April 2012, Bilal Ag 
Acherif, http://www.mnlamov.net/component/content/article/169-declaration-
dindependance-de-lazawad.html (accessed 20 October 2012) 
Moreno-Ocampo, Luis, Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn 
undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, The Peace Palace The Hague, 
16 June 2003 
NATO Press Release (99) 12, 30 January 1999. 
NATO, Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North 




http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/comm99en.pdf (accessed 18 March 
2013) 
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 1, Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (London Charter), Art. 6  
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977;  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005), 20 October 2005, 
S/2005/662 (‘Fitzgerald Report’) 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 
July 2002, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2187, no. 38544. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Amendments on the crime of 
aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 
11 June 2010, Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-
b&chapter=18&lang=en (accessed 12 August 2013)  
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UN Doc. S/2006/893, 
15 November 2006 
STL Press Release, ‘STL Appoints Investigator to Probe Unauthorised 
Disclosures’, The Hague, 2 July 2013, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-
releases/02-07-2013-stl-appoints-investigator-to-probe-unauthorised-
disclosures (accessed 10 October 2013) 
STL Press Release, ‘STL condemns media reports on alleged witness 
identities’, The Hague, 22 January 2013, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-
releases/22-01-2013-stl-condemns-media-reports-on-alleged-witness-identities 
(accessed 10 October 2013)  
STL, ‘Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging’, Case No. STL-11-01/I (16 
February 2011) § II A 
STL, Order Directing the Lebanese Judicial Authority Seized with the Case 




to Defer to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 19 August 2011, STL-11-
02/D/PTJ 
STL, Order on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Variation of the Order for Non-
disclosure of the Indictment, 28 July 2011, STL-11-
01/I/PTJ/F0026/20110728/R091381-R091384/EN/pvk 
STL, Press Release ‘Timeline Jamil El Sayed’, The Hague, 12 May 2011. 
STL, The Prosecutor v. Hassan Habib Merhi, Public Redacted Indictment, 5 
June 2013, STL-13-04, § 43. 
STL, The Prosecutor v. Hassan Habib Merhi, Public Redacted Indictment, 5 
June 2013, STL-13-04 
STL, The Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra, Public Redacted Amended 
Indictment, 6 February 2013, STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ, F08601 
AOIIPRV/201305281R 143331-R I 43372/EN/nc 
STL, The Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi & Assad Hassan Sabra, Decision To Hold Trial In 
Absentia, STL-ll-OI/I/TC FOl12/201202011RI09799-RI09846nEN/pvk 
STL, Warrant to Arrest Mr Assad Hassan Sabra Including Transfer and 
Detention Order, 28 June 2011, STL-11-
01/I/PTJ/F0016/Cor/20110816/R091956-R091962/FR-EN/pvk 
STL, Warrant to Arrest Mr Hussein Hassan Oneissi Including Transfer and 
Detention Order, 28 June 2011, STL-11-
01/I/PTJ/F0015/Cor/20110816/R091944-R091950/FR-EN/pvk |  
STL, Warrant to Arrest Mr Mustafa Amine Badreddine Including Transfer and 
Detention Order, 28 June 2011, STL-11-
01/I/PTJ/F0014/Cor/20110816/R091931-R091937/FR-EN/pvk |  
STL, Warrant to Arrest Mr Salim Jamil Ayyash Including Transfer and 
Detention Order, 28 June 2011, STL-11-
01/I/PTJ/F0013/Cor/20110816/R091919-R091925/FR-EN/pvk |  
Taif Agreement, signed on 22 October 1989 in Ta’if, Saudi- Arabia and 
ratified by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989, available at 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/lebanon/shared/documents/Constitution/T
he%20Taif%20Agreement%20%28English%20Version%29%20.pdf (accessed 
15 November 2013)  
The Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed 
by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories, 1991 – 1992, 
Charter: Decree No. 014 /P.CE/CJ/90, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-
commission-chad (accessed 8 August 2013)  




Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919.  
UN General Assembly Resolution 260, 9 December 1948. 
UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Resolution adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, 24 October 2005, (A/60/L.1) 
UN Secretary-General, Press Release, Office of the Secretary-General, 
Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo Ciampi of Italy and 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Videoconference, 
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8194 (11 April 2002)  
UN Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998 
UN Security Council Resolution 1207, 17 November 1998 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999 
UN Security Council Resolution 1315, 14 August 2000 
UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004 
UN Security Council Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005 
UN Security Council Resolution 1595, 7 April 2005 
UN Security Council Resolution 1644, 15 December 2005 
UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 11 August 2007 
UN Security Council Resolution 1757, 30 May 2007 
UN Security Council Resolution 1970, 26 February 2011 
UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011 
UN Security Council Resolution 2071, 12 October 2012 
UN Security Council Resolution 520, 17 September 1982 
UN Security Council Resolution 660, 2 August 1990. 
UN Security Council Resolution 661, 6 August 1990 
UN Security Council Resolution 678, 29 November 1990 
UN Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991 
UN Security Council Resolution 713, 25 September 1991 
UN Security Council Resolution 721, 11 December 1991 
UN Security Council Resolution 743, 21 February 1992 




UN Security Council Resolution 752, 15 May 1992 
UN Security Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1999 
UN Security Council Resolution 771, 13 August 1992 
UN Security Council Resolution 780, 6 October 1992 
UN Security Council Resolution 798, 18 December 1992 
UN Security Council Resolution 808, 22 February 1993 
UN Security Council Resolution 827, 25 May 1993 
UN Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 1994 
UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, at the 
conclusion of the 3046th meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of 
Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, S/25300 
UN Security Council, Press Release, 18 June 2000, ‘Security Council Endorses 
Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon as of 16 
June’, SC/6878, 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html> 
(accessed 12 July 2013) 
UNICEF, ‘Violence against children mounting in Mali’, 6 July 2012. 
United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome, Resolution adopted by the UN 
General Assembly, 24 October 2005, (A/60/L.1) 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/228 B of 22 May 2003, 
‘Khmer Rouge trials’ (A/RES/57/228 B) 
United Nations General Assembly, 23 November 2006. Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights, Council 
resolution S-2/1 26 
United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session, 3 May 2012, Follow-up 
to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, Enhancing the accountability, 
transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council, A/66/L.42/Rev.1 
United Nations Security Council Report of the Fact-finding Mission to 
Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and consequences of the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, S/2005/203, 24 March 
2005 
United Nations Security Council, 5122nd meeting, New York, 15 February 
2005, S/PV.5122 
United Nations Security Council, Sixty-seventh year, 6849th meeting, 17 




US Ambassador to the UN, Letter from US Ambassador to the UN John 
Bolton to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 6 May 2002’ (http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (accessed 5 August 2013) 
US House of Representatives, American Service-Members' Protection Act 
(ASPA), Title 2 of Pub.L. 107–206, H.R. 4775, 116 Stat. 820 SEC. 2008 
US House of Representatives, President Bush's address to a joint session of 
Congress on Thursday,20 September 2001 
US State Department, Telegram sent by the US Department of State to the US 
Embassy in Constantinople, 29 May 1915, containing Allied joint declaration 
of 24 May 1915  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, Article 18 
 
PERIODICALS 
BETA, ‘Kosovo and politics in FRY – A new round starts’, BETA 
Commentary, 9 June 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0609. 
Courrier International, Nama, Germain B., ‘Rebelles touaregs : “Pourquoi 
nous reprenons les armes”’, no. 1113, 1 March 2012, 
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2012/03/01/rebelles-touaregs-
pourquoi-nous-reprenons-les-armes (accessed 16 October 2013) 
Daily Star, Raad, Nada, ‘Opposition demands “intifada for independence”’, 19 
February 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/19/Opposition-
demands-intifada-for-independence.ashx#axzz2UDfhafhB (accessed 24 May 
2013) 
Haaretz, ‘Nasrallah: We wouldn't have snatched soldiers if we thought it 
would spark war’, 27 August 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/news/nasrallah-
we-wouldn-t-have-snatched-soldiers-if-we-thought-it-would-spark-war-
1.199556 (accessed 12 July 2013) 
Human Right Watch, ‘Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels’, 30 April 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/30/mali-war-crimes-northern-rebels 
(accessed 14 October 2013) 
Newsweek, Peraino, Kevin, ‘The Fox is Hunted Down’, 25 February 2008 
NRC Handelsblad, Lindijer, Koert, ‘Afrikaanse Unie eist immuniteit voor 
zittende leiders bij Strafhof’, 14 October 2013, p. 12 
Radio Netherlands Worldwide, Houttuin, Saskia, ‘Mali: MNLA's Struggle for 
Azawad Continues’, 20 July 2012, 





The Atlantic, Hamilton, Rebecca, ‘Inside Colin Powell's Decision to Declare 
Genocide in Darfur’, 17 August 2011 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/inside-colin-powells-
decision-to-declare-genocide-in-darfur/243560/ (accessed 19 August 2013) 
The Daily Star, Assaf, Nayla, 'Hariri assassins not Australian suspects', 19 
February 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/19/Hariri-
assassins-not-Australian-suspects.ashx#axzz2UDfhafhB (accessed 20 May 
2013) 
The Daily Star, Galey, Patrick, ‘STL not investigating false witnesses, says 
tribunal’s registrar on Twitter’, 8 December 2011, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Dec-08/156295-stl-not-
investigating-false-witnesses-says-tribunals-registrar-on-
twitter.ashx#ixzz2WtgCmi8I (accessed 3 July 2013)  
The Daily Star, Sakr, Elias, ‘Nasrallah: We will not allow arrest of fighters’, 12 
November 2010, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Nov/12/Nasrallah-
We-will-not-allow-arrest-of-fighters.ashx#ixzz2ZwxjM5uL (accessed 23 July 
2013)  
The Economist (2007) ‘How the mighty are falling: The beginning of the end 
of impunity for the world's once all-powerful thugs’ London, 5 July 2007 
The Economist (2012)‘Can the jihadists be stopped?’, , 10 November 2012 
The Economist, ‘How the mighty are falling: The beginning of the end of 
impunity for the world's once all-powerful thugs’, 5 July 2007. 
The Economist, ‘Terror in the Sahara: Getting the UN’s intervention plan right 
is more important than implementing it fast’, 10 November 2012 
The Economist, (1990), ‘New World Order Inc.’, London, 10 November 1990, 
Issue 7680, p.12 
The Economist, Annan, Kofi, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, 16 September 
1999 
The Economist, Mali and al-Qaeda: Can the jihadists be stopped?’ 10 
November 2012 
The Financial Times, Manson, Katrina, ‘ICC rules Kenyatta can miss part of 
trial’, 18 October 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c2391306-3814-11e3-a493-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2j7KqKZeO (accessed 28 October 2013)  
The Guardian, Dakroub, Hussein, ‘Hezbollah denies report about Hariri 
assassination’, 24 May 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8523548 (accessed 15 July 2013) 
The Guardian, Hirsch, Afua, ‘Mali signs controversial ceasefire deal with 





insurgents-aid (accessed 24 October 2013) 
The Guardian, Rice, Xan, ‘Annan hands ICC list of perpetrators of post-
election violence in Kenya’, 9 July 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/09/international-criminal-court-
kofi-annan (accessed 18 August 2013) 
The Independent, Fisk, Robert, ‘Lebanon's vast web of corruption unravels’, 6 
December 1998 
The New York Times, ‘Senegal Detains Ex-President of Chad, Accused in the 
Deaths of Opponents’, 30 June 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/africa/senegal-detains-ex-
president-of-chad.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-
nytimes&_r=1&(accessed 8 August 2013) 
The New York Times, Bakri, Nada, ‘Tribunal Names 4 in ’05 Killing of 
Lebanese Leader’, 30 June 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01lebanon.html?pagew
anted=all&_r=0 (accessed 30 May 2013)  
The New York Times, Nossiter, Adam, ‘Jihadists' Fierce Justice Drives 
Thousands to Flee Mali’, 18 July 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/africa/jidhadists-fierce-justice-
drives-thousands-to-flee-mali.html (accessed 16 October 2013) 
The New York Times, Simons, Marlise, ‘International Criminal Court Issues 
First Sentence’, 10 July 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/international-criminal-
court-issues-first-sentence.html?_r=1& (accessed 10 August 2013) 
The New York Times, Tutu, Desmond, ‘In Africa, Seeking a License to Kill’, 
10 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/opinion/in-africa-
seeking-a-license-to-kill.html?_r=0 (accessed 28 October 2013) 
The New York Times, Vargas, Jose Antonio, ‘Spring Awakening: How an 
Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook’, 17 February 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-
revolution-began-on-facebook.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 12 
February 2014) 
The New York Times, Worth, Robert F., ’Hezbollah Looks for Shield From 
Indictments’ Sting’, 24 July 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/middleeast/25lebanon.html?_r=0 
(accessed 15 July 2013) 
The Washington Post, Albright, Madeleine, ‘We won't let war criminals walk; 




The Washington Post, Kessler, Glenn and Lynch, Colum, ‘U.S. Calls Killings 
In Sudan Genocide, Khartoum and Arab Militias are Responsible, Powell 
Says’, 10 September 2004, p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html (accessed 19 August 2013) 
The Washington Post, Morley, Jefferson, ‘The Branding of Lebanon's 
“Revolution”’, 3 March 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A1911-2005Mar2.html (accessed 23 May 2013)  
The Washington Post, Politician Killed in Lebanon’, 22 June 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/AR2005062100390.html (accessed 10 July 
2013) 
The Washington Post, Wright, Robin ‘Inside the Mind of Hezbollah, 16 July 
2006, p. B01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401401_pf.html (accessed 16 May 
2013)  
The Washington Times, ‘Killing seen as bid by Damascus, Tehran to hit U.S. 
role in Mideast’, 22 November 2006 
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/22/20061122-120508-
9270r/> (accessed 10 July 2013) 
Think Africa Press, Morgan, Andy, ‘The Causes of the Uprising in Northern 
Mali’, 6 February 2012 
Time, Crumley, Bruce, ‘Terror Threat in N. Africa: Kidnapping Foreigners’, 6 
February 2010, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1960444,00.html (accessed 
20 October 2013)  
Time, Waller, Douglas,‘Senator William Proxmire: A Personal Appreciation by 
Douglas Waller’, 15 December 2005 
V.I.P. Daily News Report, no. 1521, June 4, 1999, p. 5 
 
ONLINE MATERIAL 
Affa'a-Mindzie, Mireille, ‘The Malian “Twin Crisis”: More Collaboration 
Needed from Unlikely Partners’, Global Observatory, Wednesday 22 August 
2012, http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/340-the-malian-twin-crisis-
more-collaboration-needed-from-unlikely-partners.html (accessed 16 October 
2013) 
AFP, ‘Tuareg rebels ask ICC to probe Mali army “crimes”’, 5 March 2013. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/66189/World/International/Tuare








(accessed 20 October 2012) 
AFP, Yazbeck, Natacha, ‘Lebanon on edge after Hezbollah revelation’, 23 July 
2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111138579772871.html 
(accessed 15 July 2013) 
African Union, ‘AUC News: The Newsletter of the African Union’, April 2012, 
www.au.int (accessed 19 October 2013)  
Al Jazeera, ‘ECOWAS agrees to Mali intervention force’, 11 November 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/11/20121111192710305682.html 
(accessed 13 November 2012)  
Al Jazeera, ‘Hezbollah urges Hariri case boycott’, 28 October 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/10/2010102819122690558.ht
ml (accessed 23 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘ICC case against Kenyan leader suffers blow’, 18 July 2013, 
http://m.aljazeera.com/story/2013718163424230569 (accessed 31 October 
2013)  
Al Jazeera, ‘L. Andoni ‘Border skirmish a “fire douser”’, 4 August 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/08/201084142939589511.html (accessed 
20 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Lebanon Shia ministers end boycott’, 2 February 2006, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/200841012161236825.html 
(accessed 12 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Lebanon summons general on comments’, 16 September 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/09/2010916145846926793.ht
ml (accessed 5 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Making sense of Mali's armed groups’, 17 January 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html 
(accessed 16 October 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Mali court meets to choose interim president’, 9 April 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124914524561479.html, 
(accessed 25 October 2012) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Malian rebels and Islamic fighters merge’, 27 May 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/05/201252623916484555.html 




Al Jazeera, ‘Nasrallah concedes election defeat’ 9 June 2009, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009681835910848.html 
(accessed 20 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Nasrallah implies Israel behind Hariri murder’, 2 July 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/07/201172183540290278.ht
ml (accessed 31 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Nasrallah unveils “Hariri proof”’, 10 August 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/08/2010891991920480.html 
(accessed 2 July 2013) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Tuareg rebels attack fifth town in Mali’, 26 January 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/201212614823523986.html 
(accessed 20 October 2012) 
Al Jazeera, ‘Tuaregs claim “independence” from Mali’, 6 April 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html 
(accessed 20 October 2012) 
Al Jazeera, Andoni, Lamis, ‘Border skirmish a “fire douser”’, 4 August 2010 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/08/201084142939589511.html (accessed 
20 July 2013) 
Alakhbar Mauritanian independent News Agency, ‘Sahel: MUJAO à la 
conquête des “jeunes de l'Afrique noire”’, 28 April 2012. 
http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/Mali,305/War-Crimes-in-North-Mali-12660 
(accessed 18 October 2013) 
AMDH-FIDH (The International Federation for Human Rights /Association 
Malienne des Droits de l'Homme), ‘War crimes in North Mali’, 20 December 
2012. http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/Mali,305/War-Crimes-in-North-Mali-
12660 (accessed 20 October 2013) 
Amnesty International (2006) ‘Israel/Lebanon – Deliberate Destruction or 
'Collateral Damage'? Israeli Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure’, 23 August 
2006, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4517a71c4.html (accessed 18 June 2013) 
Amnesty International, Striffolino, Kathryn R.,‘3 Things You Should Know 
about Mali and the International Criminal Court’, 17 January 2013, 
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/africa/3-things-you-should-know-about-mali-and-
the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 12 October 2013)  
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Graham Blewitt speaks to Tony Jones, 
Broadcast: 14 July 2008, Transcript. 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2008/s2303594.htm (accessed 15 
January 2014)  
Balkan Insight, ‘Jeremic: Kosovo will join UN “over my dead body”’, 12 July 
2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-will-not-join-un-during-




BBC Africa, Chothia, Farouk,‘Africa's Fatou Bensouda is new ICC chief 
prosecutor’, 12 December 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
16029121 (accessed 18 August 2013)  
BBC Monitoring, Metcalf, Steve,‘Iyad Ag Ghaly – Mali's Islamist leader’, 17 
July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18814291 (accessed 16 
October 2013) 
BBC News Muir, Jim, Deep divisions haunt Lebanese politics, 22 September 
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11392034 (accessed 18 
September 2013) 
BBC News, ‘African Union in rift with court’, 3 July 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8133925.stm (accessed 18 August 2013) 
BBC News, ‘African Union urges ICC to defer Uhuru Kenyatta case’, 12 
October 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24506006 (accessed 
14 october 2013) 
BBC News, ‘Amnesty for Lebanese ex-warlord’, 18 July, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4693091.stm (accessed 18 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Assad pledges Lebanon withdrawal’, 2 March 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4310699.stm (accessed 23 May 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Beirut bomb targets top minister’, 12 July 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4674441.stm (accessed 10 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Darfur war crimes suspect rebel Jerbo “killed in Sudan”’, 24 April 
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22277099 (accessed 16 August 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘DR Congo: Bosco Ntaganda appears before ICC’, 26 March 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21933569 (accessed 17 June 2013)  
BBC News, ‘EU's Solana meets Hezbollah in Beirut’, 13 June 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8099074.stm (accessed 16 May 2013) 
BBC News, ‘Explosion kills former Lebanon PM’, 14 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4263893.stm (accessed 20 May 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Hezbollah and allies topple Lebanese unity government’, 12 
January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12170608 
(accessed 24 July 2013) 
BBC News, ‘Hezbollah leader Nasrallah rejects Hariri indictments’, 3 July 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14004096 (accessed 23 




BBC News, ‘Hezbollah ministers quit cabinet’, 12 November 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6139730.stm (accessed 10 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Hundreds mourn Beirut journalist’, 4 June 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4609329.stm (accessed 10 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘In quotes: World reacts to Hariri death’, 14 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4264975.stm (accessed 12 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Islamists vow to smash every mausoleum in Timbuktu’, 1 July 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18665522 (accessed 30 
October 2012)  
BBC News, ‘Kenya MPs vote to leave ICC over poll violence claims’, 23 
December 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12066667 (accessed 
17 August 2013)  
BBC News, ‘Lebanese leaders agree on cabinet’, 19 July 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4697587.stm (accessed 12 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Mali “thief's” hand amputated by Islamists in Ansongo’, 9 August 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19195985 (accessed 16 
October 2013) |  
BBC News, ‘Mali army clashes with separatist MNLA rebels’, 5 June 2013, 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22791147 (accessed 20 October 2013) 
BBC News, ‘Mali army kills 16 at Segou checkpoint in Diabali’, 9 September 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19538018 (accessed 17 
October 2013) 
BBC News, ‘Mali crisis: Key players’, 12 March 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909 (accessed 16 October 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Mali Tuareg rebels control Timbuktu as troops flee’, 2 April 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17576725 (accessed 16 October 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘Mali unwed couple stoned to death by Islamists’, 30 July 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19053442 (accessed 16 October 
2013) 
 BBC News, ‘Mali's Ansar Dine Islamists “split and want talks”’, 24 January 





BBC News, ‘Otti “executed by Uganda rebels”’, 21 December 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7156284.stm (accessed 16 August 
2013)  
BBC News, ‘Syria looks to Riyadh for support’, 3 March 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4315107.stm (accessed 23 May 
2013)  
BBC News, ‘Syrian troops leave Lebanese soil’, 26 April 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4484325.stm (accessed 12 July 
2013) 
BBC News, ‘US warns Syria over Lebanon role’, 14 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4269351.stm (accessed 20 May) 
BBC News, ‘Will Africa pull out of the ICC?’, 11 October 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24452288 (accessed 14 October 
2013) 
BBC News, Muir, Jim, ‘Lebanon tense as fingers point over Hariri killing’, 25 
November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11837816 
(accessed 22 May 2013)  
BBC News, Silverman, Jon, ‘Ten years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost 
too much?’, 14 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946 
(accessed 20 June 2012) 
CBC News, ‘Lebanese president gives full backing to Hezbollah’, 31 July 
2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2006/07/28/lahoud-
interview.html> (accessed 10 July 2013); 
CIA-The World Factbook, Mali, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ml.html (accessed 8 August 2012)  
CIA-The World Factbook, Niger https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ng.html (accessed 8 August 2012)  
Columbia University Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Rondot, Maryne, 
‘The ICC’s Investigation into Alleged War Crimes in Mali’, American Non-
Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court’, 
April 2, 2013 http://www.amicc.org/icc/mali (accessed 20 September 2013) 
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘May Chidiac, Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation Attacked’, 25 September 2005, http://cpj.org/2005/09/lebanon-
1.php (accessed 10 July 2013) 
CSDG Niger, Conflict, Security & Development Group, 16 April 2009, 
http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/index.php?option=com_content&view





ExpressO, Jenks, Chris,‘Notice Otherwise Given: Will In Absentia Trials at the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights?’ (2009),  
<http://works.bepress.com/chris_jenks/2> (accessed 3 July 2013)  
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Berti, Benedetta (2011) ‘Middle East Media 
Monitor- Hezbollah On Trial: Lebanese Reactions to the UN Special Tribunal's 
Indictments’, August 2011, 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201108.berti.hezbollah.html (accessed 30 
May 2013) 
Fox News, ‘Barak: Israel's Presence in Lebanon Produced Hezbollah’, 
(transcript from Hannity & Colmes) 25 July 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/hannity/2006/07/26/barak-israels-presence-
lebanon-produced-hezbollah#ixzz2Ui2bzEWL (accessed 29 May 2013) 
Geneva Call, ‘About Us’, http://www.genevacall.org/about/about.htm 
(accessed 20 October 2013) 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Mali: Islamist Armed Groups Spread Fear in North’, 25 
September 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/25/mali-islamist-armed-
groups-spread-fear-north (accessed 14 October 2013) 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during 
the 2006 War’, vol.19, no. 5(E) September 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06_09_07_hrwlebanon.pdf 
(accessed 24 October 2013) 
Human Rights Watch, Dicker, Richard and Evenson, Elizabeth, ICC Suspects 
can hide – and that is the problem, 24 January 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/24/icc-suspects-can-hide-and-problem 
(accessed 10 August 2013)  
Human Rights Watch, The International Criminal Court at Ten’, July 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/node/108162 (accessed 22 July 2013) 
ICC, ‘Financial Regulations and Rules’. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D4B6E16A-BD66-46AF-BB43-
8D4C3F069786/281202/FRRENG0705.pdf) (Accessed 17 July 2012) 
ICC, ‘Preliminary Examinations’, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20
prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.a
spx (accessed 18 August 2013) 
ICC, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20
cases.aspx (accessed 8 August 2013) 
ICTR, ‘About ICTR’, General Information 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx 




ICTY, ‘About the ICTY’, The Cost of Justice. http://www.icty.org/sid/325 
(accessed 20 June 2012)  
ICTY, ‘Developing International Law’, available at: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/324#developing (accessed 15 November 2013)  
ICTY, ‘Timeline’, available at: http://www.icty.org/action/timeline/254 
(accessed 15 November 2013) 
Institute for Security Studies Analysis, Maunganidze Ottilia Anna and 
Antoinette Louw, ‘Mali: Implications of Another African Case As Mali Self-
Refers to the ICC’, 24 July 2012. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201207240748.html (accessed 15 August 2013) 
Jeune Afrique, ‘Rébellion du MNLA au Mali: Ag Najem, ou la soif de 
vengeance’, 27 January 2012, 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2663p010-012.xml1/ (accessed 13 
May 2013) 
Jeune Afrique, Ouazani, Cherif, ‘Rébellion du MNLA au Mali: Ag Najem, ou 
la soif de vengeance’, 27 January 2012, 
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2663p010-012.xml1/> (accessed 13 
May 2013)  
Justice in Conflict, Kersten, Mark, ‘The ICC in Mali: Just Another ICC 
Intervention in Africa?’, 19 July 2012, 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/07/19/the-icc-in-mali-just-another-icc-
intervention-in-africa/ (accessed 25 August 2013) |  
Justice in Conflict, Wegner, Patrick, ‘Arguing for a Department for Impact 
Assessment Within the ICC, 2 September 2011 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/09/02/arguing-for-a-department-for-impact-
assessment-within-the-icc/ (accessed 17 July 2013) 
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Mali, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Mali.pdf (16 October 2013) 
Middle East Online, ‘Tuareg to Ansar Dine: Yes to Islam but no to sharia’, 2 
June 2012, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=52613 (accessed 
30 October 2012) 
Muhanna, Elias (2008) ‘Conspiracies’, Qifa Nabki: News and commentary 
from the Levant, 30 September 2008, http://qifanabki.com/beirut-conspiracy-
chronicles/ (accessed 2 November 2013) 
Peter, Fabienne (2010) ‘Political Legitimacy’, in: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition) 





PhD Studies in Human Rights, Schabas, William A., ‘Mali Referral Poses 
Challenge for International Criminal Court’, 19 July 2012 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/mali-referral-poses-
challenge-for.html (accessed 25 August 2013) |  
Philpott, Dan (2010), 'Sovereignty', in: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/>. (accessed 
17 June 2013)  
Reuters, ‘Congo warlord jailed for 14 years in landmark case, 10 July 2012 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/uk-warcrimes-lubanga-
idUKBRE8690C120120710 (accessed 10 August 2013)  
Reuters, ‘Hariri says was wrong to accuse Syria over killing’, 6 September 
2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/06/us-lebanon-hariri-
idUSTRE68510420100906 (accessed 23 July 2013) 
Reuters, Karouny, Mariam, Hariri tribunal to accuse Hezbollah members, 22 
July 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/22/us-lebanon-hezbollah-
idUSTRE66L5GK20100722 (accessed 15 July 2013) 
Reuters, Ladki, Nadim, ‘Hezbollah says Beirut government declares war’, 8 
May 2008, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSL08466882._CH_.2400
> (accessed 16 August 2013)  
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Overview, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (accessed 10 August 2013) 
Sharro, Karl ‘The Forensic Alternative to the Truth: Thoughts on the Nasrallah 
Speech and the Difficulty of Writing History in Lebanon’ Karl ReMarks, 9 
August 2010, http://www.karlremarks.com/2010/08/forensic-alternative-to-
truth-thoughts.html (accessed 15 May 2013) 
Sharro, Karl,‘‘The Indictment’: A Thriller lacking in action. The STL 
Predicament’, Karl ReMarks, 30 June 2011, 
http://www.karlremarks.com/2011/06/indictment-thriller-lacking-in-
action.html (accessed 16 May 2013)  
ShiaTV, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Speech: The Victory of May, 25 May 2009 
at 7 minutes and from 63 minutes onwards. 
http://www.shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=84099441f2a95ebfce8d 
(accessed 20 June 2013) 
SPIEGEL Online, Follath, Erich, ‘Breakthrough in Tribunal Investigation: New 
Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder’, 23 May 2009. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/breakthrough-in-tribunal-
investigation-new-evidence-points-to-hezbollah-in-hariri-murder-a-




STL, Why is the tribunal based in the Netherlands and not in Lebanon? < 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/ask-the-tribunal/why-is-the-tribunal-based-in-the-
netherlands-and-not-in-lebanon> (accessed 6 June 2013) 
The Daily Star, ‘Timeline of explosions and targeted assassinations from 2004 
to 2012’, 20 October 2012. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-20/192095-timeline-of-
explosions-and-targeted-assassinations-from-2004-to-
2012.ashx#axzz2VQdBb0wE (accessed 12 July 2013)  
The New York Times Opinionator, Jacobs, Frank, ‘All Hail Azawad’, 10 April 
2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/all-hail-azawad/ 
(accessed 12 October 2013) 
Twitter, Alyahya, Mohammed K. (@7yhy), 11 June 2013, 
https://twitter.com/7yhy/status/344546058438848513 (accessed 23 June 2013) 
Voice of America News, Neumann, Jeff, ‘Hariri Assassination Still Clouds 
Lebanese Politics’, 25 October 2011, http://m.voanews.com/a/173296.html 




Aguirre, Mariano and Ferrándiz, Francisco (2002) The Emotion and the Truth: 
Studies in Mass Communication and Conflict (Bilbao: University of Deusto)  
Akhavan, Payam (1995) ‘Enforcement of the Genocide Convention’, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, vol. 8, no. 1, 1995, pp. 229-258 
Akhavan, Payam (1996) ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment’, The American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 90, pp. 501-510 
Akhavan, Payam (2001) ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities?’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 
95, pp. 7-31 
Akhavan, Payam (2005) ‘Developments at the International Criminal Court: 
The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court’, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 99, no. 2, pp. 403-421 
Akhavan, Payam (2010) ‘Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal 
Court: Are States the Villains or the Victims of Atrocities’, Criminal Law 
Forum, vol. 21, pp. 103-120  
Al-Saud, Abdullah Bin Khaled & Gow, James (2013) ‘Religion, Radicalization 




Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, politics and radicalisation 
(London: Routledge) pp. 15-42  
Alagha, Joseph Elie (2006) The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious 
Ideology, Political Ideology and Political Program. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press) 
Albright, Madeleine (2003) Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: 
Miramax) 
Alexander, James F. (2009) ‘The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact’, Villanova Law 
Review, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1-56 
Alford, Roger P. (2000) ‘Proceedings of the Annual Meeting’, American 
Society of International Law, vol. 94, pp. 160-165 
Ambos, Kai (2011) ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: 
IsThere a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 24, no. 3, pp 655-675 
Anderson, Kenneth (2009) ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended 
and Unintended Consequences’, The European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 331–358 
Ansell, C. K. (2001) Legitimacy: Political, in: Smelser, Neil J. and Baltes, Paul 
B. (eds.) (2001) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier) pp. 8704–8706 
Arbour, Louise (1997) ‘Progress and Challenges in International Criminal 
Justice’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 21, pp. 531-540  
Arendt, Hannah (1958) The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press) 
Arendt, Hannah (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil (Revised edition 1994) (New York: Penguin)  
Arendt, Hannah (1969) On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 
Inc.)  
Armatta, Judith  (2005)‘Milosevic's Propaganda War’, Institute for War & 
Peace Reporting, TRI Issue 301, 22 February 2005 
Arsanjani, Mahnoush H. and Reisman, W. Michael (2005) ‘The Law-in-Action 
of the International Criminal Court’, The American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 99, no. 2, pp. 385-403 
B 
Baldo, Suliman (2010) ‘Sudan: Impact of the Rome Statute and the 




Barria, Lilian R. & Roper, Steven D. (2005) ‘How Effective are International 
Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 349-368.  
Bartelson, Jens (1995) A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
Bartelson, Jens (2006) ‘The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited’, The European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 7, pp. 463-474 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif (2000) ‘The Evolution of International Humanitarian Law 
and Arms Control Agreements’, in: Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed.) (2000) A 
Manual on International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements, 
International & Comparative Criminal Law Series, (Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY: 
Transnational Publishers)  
Bassiouni, M. Cherif (2003) ‘Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing 
Accountability over Realpolitik’, Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, vol. 35, pp. 191-204 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif (2010) ‘Perspectives on International Justice’, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 269-323 
Baumann, Hannes (2012) ‘The “New Contractor Bourgeoisie” in Lebanese 
Politics: Hariri, Mikati and Fares’, in: Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael (eds.) 
(2012) Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & Co.) pp.125-
145 
Beetham, David (1991) The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: MacMillan) 
Bellamy, Alex J (2002) Kosovo and International Society (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan) 
Bellot, Hugh H.L. (1916) War Crimes: Their Prevention and Punishment, 
Problems of the War, vol. 2, pp. 31-55  
Bierstedt, Robert  (1964) ‘Legitimacy’, in Gould, R. Julius and Kolb, William 
L. (eds.) (1964) Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press) 
Blanford, Nicholas (2006) Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assasination of Rafik 
Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East (London: IB Tauris)  
Blanford, Nicholas (2011) Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year 
Struggle Against Israel (New York: Random House)  
Boas, Gideon (2012) ‘What’s in a Word: The Nature and Meaning of 
International Criminal Justice’, in: Boas, Gideon, Schabas, William A. and 
Scharf, Michael P. (eds.) (2012) International Criminal Justice: Legitimacy 
and Coherence (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) pp. 1-24 
Boelaert-Suominen, Sonja (2000) ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the 




CroixRouge/ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 82, no. 837, pp. 217-
252 
Bregman, Ahron (2000) Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947 (Second edition 
2002) (Abington: Routledge) 
Broomhall, Bruce (2003) International Justice and the International Criminal 
Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press)  
Brunborg, Helge (2002). Report on the size and ethnic composition of the 
population of Kosovo, Oslo, 14 August 2002.  
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics (London: MacMillan) 
Burke-White, William W. (2005) ‘Complementarity in practice: the 
International Criminal Court as part of a system of multi-level global 
governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 557–590 
Burke-White, William W. (2008) ‘Proactive Complementarity: The 
International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice’, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 49, no.1, pp. 
53-108 
Büthe, Tim (2003) ‘Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors 
in World Politics’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 281-290 
C 
Cassese, Antonio (1998) ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution 
and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 9, pp. 2-17 
Cassese, Antonio (1998) Reflections on International Criminal Justice, The 
Modern Law Review, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 1-10 
Cassese, Antonio (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals 
and the Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 25, no. 2, June 2012, pp. 491-501. 
Charlick, Robert B. (2007) Niger: Islamist Identity and the Politics of 
Globalisation, in: Miles, William F. S. (ed.) Political Islam in West Africa 
(Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner) pp. 22-23. 
Chayes, Abram & Chayes, Antonia (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press) 





Ciezadlo, Annia (2007) Sect Symbols, The Nation, 24 February 2007 
Cingranelli, David L. & Richards, David L. (1999) Respect for Human Rights 
after the End of the Cold War, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 
511-534 
Clapham, Andrew (2009) ‘Non-State Actors’ In: Chetail, Vincent (ed.) 
Postconflict Peace-Building: A Lexicon, pp. 200-212 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
Clapham, Christopher (1998) Degrees of Statehood, Review of International 
Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 143-157 
Claude Jr., Inis L. (1966) Collective Legitimiation as a Political Function of the 
United Nations, International Organization, vol. 20, no.3 pp. 367-379 
Clausewitz, Carl von (1832) On War (Original Title: Vom Kriege, Translation 
by J.J. Graham, edition 1997) (London: Wordsworth) 
Cocozzelli, Fred (2009) ‘Critical junctures and local agency: how Kosovo 
became independent’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, no.1-
2, pp. 191-208 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, Report of the Commission on the Preliminary Peace 
Conference, 29 March, 1919, Reprinted in: American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 14, no. 1, 1920, pp. 95-154  
Cordesman, Anthony H., Sullivan, George and Sullivan, William D. (2007) 
Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War (Washington DC: CSIS Press)  
Creveld, Martin van (2000) Through the Glass Darkly: Some Reflections on 
the Future of War, Naval War College Review (Autumn 2000) pp. 25-44 
Cryer, Robert (2005) Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the 
Internationsl Criminal Law Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
Cryer, Robert (et. al.) (2007) An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
Currie, Rob (2011) Côte d’Ivoire and the ICC: A New Kind of "Self-
Referral"?, International & Transnational Criminal Law Update, Chapter 4, 20 
May 2011  
D 
Dallaire, Romeo (2003) Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of 
Humanity in Rwanda (London: Random House) 
Damaska, Mirjan R. (2008) ‘What is the Point of International Criminal 




Dandeker, Christopher & Gow, James (1999) ‘Military culture and strategic 
peacekeeping’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 10, no. 2 pp. 58-79 
Deng, Francis M.; Kimaro, Sadikiel; Lyons, Terrence; Rothchild, Donald; and 
Zartman, I. William (eds.) (1996) Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict 
Management in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press) 
Dickinson, L. A. (2003) ‘The relationship between hybrid courts and 
international courts: The case of Kosovo’, New England Law Review, vol. 37, 
no. 1059. 
Dijxhoorn Ernst (2009) Hezbollah as a Model for Success in Contemporary 
Armed Conflict, MA Dissertation, August 2009. 
Dijxhoorn, Ernst (2013)‘International Criminal Justice and Kosovo: Critical 
Legitimacy and Impact on a Quasi-State Entity’, in: James Gow, Rachel Kerr 
and Zoran Pajic (eds.) (2013) Prosecuting War Crimes: Lessons and Legacies 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (London: 
Routledge) 
Doyle, Michael W. & Sambanis, Nicholas (2006) Making War and Building 
Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press)  
Dunning, Tristan (2008) ‘Mind Forged Manacles’: Hamas, Hezbollah and 
Orientalist Discourse. (Refereed paper delivered at Australian Political Studies 
Association Conference 6 - 9 July 2008 Hilton Hotel, Brisbane, Australia) 
E 
Early, Brian R. (2006) 'Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State: Locating 
Hezbollah's Place within Lebanon's State and Society', World Affairs, vol. 168, 
no. 3 (Winter 2006), pp. 115-128  
Easton, David (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley) 
Economides, Spyros, Ker-Lindsay, James and Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2010) 
'Kosovo: Four Futures', Survival, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 99-116 
El-Tom, Abdullahi (2003) ‘The Black Book of Sudan: Imbalance of Power and 
Wealth in Sudan’, Journal of African National Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 25–35 
Elberling, Björn (2008) ‘The Next Step in History- Writing through Criminal 
Law: Exactly How Tailor- Made is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon?’ Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 2008, pp. 529-538 
F 
Falk, Richard (1993) ‘Sovereignty’ in Krieger, Joel (ed.) (1993) The Oxford 





Falk, Richard. A.(1999) ‘Kosovo, world order, and the future of international 
law’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 847-857 
Fassbender, Bardo (2007) ‘Reflections on the International Legality of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 
5, pp. 1091-1105 
Fedorova, Masha, Verhoeven, Sten, & Wouters, Jan (2009) ‘Safeguarding the 
Rights of Suspects and Accused in International Criminal Proceedings’, 
Institute for International Law Working Paper, no. 27, June 2009 
Fenrick, William. J. (2001) ‘Targeting and proportionality during the NATO 
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia’, European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 489-502 
Fifoot, Paul (1992) ‘Functions and powers, and inventions: UN action in 
respect of human rights and humanitarian intervention’ In: Rodley, Nigel S. 
(ed.) (1992) To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in 
Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey’s) pp. 133-164. 
Fisk, Robert (2002) Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (4th ed.) (New 
York: Thunder's Mouth Press) 
Fitzpatrick, Joan (2002) ‘Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the 
Ambiguous War on Terrorism’, The American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 96, no. 2, pp. 345-354 
Fleming, Colin M. (2009) ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian 
Future’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 213-241 
Forges, Alison des (1999) Leave No One to Tell the Story: Genocide in 
Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch)  
Freedman, Lawrence (2000) ‘Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo 
War’, Review of International Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 335-358  
Freedman, Lawrence (2006) 'Networks, Culture and Narratives', Adelphi 
Papers, vol. 45, no. 379, pp. 11-26 
Freedman, Lawrence (2006) ‘War evolves into the fourth generation: A 
comment on Thomas X. Hammes’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 26, no. 
2, pp. 254-263 
Freeland, Steven (2008) ‘The effectiveness of International Criminal Justice’, 
ALTA Law Research Series, no. 16, pp. 1-9 
Fukuyama, Francis (1989) ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, 
Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.  
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man (New York: 




Futamura, Madoko and Gow, James (2013) ‘The Strategic purpose of the 
ICTY and international peace and security’, in: Gow, James; Kerr, Rachel, and 
Pajić, Zoran (2013) Prosecuting War Crimes (London: Routledge) pp. 15-28 
G 
Gaeta, Paola (2007) ‘To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In 
Absentia before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 1165-1174 
Galbraith, Jean (2009) ‘The Pace of International Criminal Justice’, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, vol. 31, pp. 79-155 
Glahn, Gerhard von (1992) Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law (New York: Macmillan) 
Goldsmith, Jack (2003) ‘The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court’, The 
University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 89-104 
Gow, James (1992) Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: 
Pinter Publishers) 
Gow, James (1997) Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and 
the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst & Co)  
Gow, James (2003) The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War 
Crimes (London: Hurst & Co.)  
Gow, James (2005) Defending the West (Cambridge: Polity) 
Gow, James (2006) ‘Strategic Pedagogy and Pedagogic Strategy’, 
International Relations, vol. 20, pp 393-406 
Gow, James (2006) ‘The Ghost in the Machine’, Ethnopolitics, vol. 5, no. 1, 
pp. 49-65 
Gow, James (2008) ‘The ICTY, War Crimes Enforcement and Dayton: The 
Ghost in the Machine’, in: Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.), 
Internationalized State-Building After Violent Conflict: Bosnia Ten Years After 
Dayton, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 47-64. 
Gow, James (2009) ‘Kosovo – the final frontier? From transitional 
administration to transitional statehood’, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 239-257 
Gow, James (2013) War and War Crimes: The Military, Legitimacy and 
Success in Armed Conflict (London: Hurst & Co)  
Gow, James. ‘Viable political communities’, Unpublished Paper. 
Gowan, D. (2000) ‘Commentary: Kosovo: The British Government and 




Greppi, Edoardo (1999) ‘The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
under International Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, no. 835, 
September 1999 
Grono, Nick and Courcy Wheeler, Anna de (2012) ‘The deterrent effect of the 
ICC on the commission of international crimes by government leaders’, 
Presentation for the conference The Law and Practice of the International 
Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges at the Peace Palace, 
the Hague, 26 September 2012. 
Groot, Hugo de (1625) De iure belli ac pacis (ed. B.J.A. de Kanter-van 
Hettinga Tromp 1939) (Leiden: Brill)  
Groot, Hugo de (1625) The Rights of War and Peace (De iure belli ac pacis) 
(edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, 2005 edition, from the 
edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005) 
H 
Habermas, Jürgen (1973) Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann)  
Habermas, Jürgen (1976) Communication and the Evolution of Society 
(London: Heinemann)  
Haddad, Simon (2006) ‘The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon's 
Hezbollah’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 21-34 
Hammes, Colonel Thomas X. (2006) The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 
21st Century (Minneapolis: Zenith Press) 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar (2004) In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press) 
Hayner, Priscilla (2007) ‘Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the 
Possibility for Justice’, HD Report, (Geneva: Henry Dunant Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue/ The International Center for Transitional Justice, 
November 2007, pp. 1-31 
Heller, Kevin Jon (2007) ‘Situational Gravity Under The Rome Statute’, in: 
Stahn, Carsten and Van den Herik, Larissa (eds.) (2007), Future Directions in 
International Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Higgins, Rosalyn (1994) Problems & Process: International Law and How We 
Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press)  
Hirsch, Andrew von (1976) Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments. Report 
of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press)  
Hobbes, Thomas (1651) Leviathan (2002 edition, edited by W. E. Krul) 




Hosmer, Stephen, T. (2001) Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did 
(Santa Monica / Arlington: RAND)  
Howard, P.N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W. & Mazaid, M. 
(2011) Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During 
the Arab Spring? (Seattle: PIPTI) 
Human Rights Council (2013) ‘Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, Human Rights Council, 
Twenty-third session, 4 June 2013, A/HRC/23/58 
Human Rights Watch (2006) Fatal Strikes: Israel’s Indiscriminate Attacks 
Against Civilians in Lebanon, vol. 18, no. 3 (August 2006) 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 
Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.  
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster) 
Hurd, Ian (1999) ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, 
International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 379-408 
I 
International Crisis Group, ‘Mali: Avoiding Escalation’, Crisis Group Africa 
Report, no. 189, 18 July 2012 
Ishaq, Ashfaq (2001) ‘On the Global Digital Divide’, Finance & Development 
A quarterly magazine of the IMF, vol. 38, no. 3 
J 
Jaber, Hala (1997) Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia 
University Press) 
Jackson, Robert H. (1990) Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations 
and the third world. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Jarvis, Christopher J. (1999) The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in 
Albania, (Washington: IMF Working Paper) 
Jordash, Wayne and Parker, Timothy (2010) ‘Trials in Absentia at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon: Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law’, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8, no.2, pp. 487-509 
Judah Tim (1999) ‘Kosovo's road to war’, Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 5-18 
Judah Tim (2000) Kosovo, War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University 
Press) 
Judah, Tim (2008) Kosovo: What everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford 




Judt, Tony, with: Snyder, Timothy (2012) Thinking the Twentieth Century 
(London: Heinemann)  
K 
Kalshoven, Frits and Zegveld, Liesbeth (2001) Constraints on the Waging of 
War (Geneva: ICRC)  
Kant, Immanuel (1887) Metaphysics of Morals: Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice, Pt.1 (Hackett Classics) edited by John Ladd (1999) (London: Hackett)  
Kapur, Amrita (2010) The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and 
Unitended Consequences: A Reply to Ken Anderson, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1031-1041 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2009) Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the 
Balkans (London: I.B. Tauris) 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2009) ‘From autonomy to independence: the evolution of 
international thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005’, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 141-156 
Kerr, Michael (2012) ‘Before the Revolution’ in: Knudsen, Are & Kerr, 
Michael (eds) (2012) Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & 
Co.) pp. 23-38  
Kerr, Rachel (2004) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
Kerr, Rachel (2013) ‘Introduction: Trials and tribulations at the ICTY’, in: 
James Gow, Rachel Kerr and Zoran Pajic (eds.) (2013) Prosecuting War 
Crimes: Lessons and Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (London: Routledge) pp. 1-14 
Kerr, Rachel (2013) ‘Lost in Translation: Perceptions of the ICTY in the 
former Yugoslavia’, in: James Gow, Rachel Kerr and Zoran Pajic (eds.) (2013) 
Prosecuting War Crimes: Lessons and Legacies of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (London: Routledge) pp.102-114 
Kerr, Rachel and Mobekk, Eirin (2007) Peace & Justice: Seeking 
Accountability After War (Cambridge: Polity)  
Kerr, Rachel; Gow, James, and Pajic, Zoran (eds.) (2013) Prosecuting War 
Crimes: Lessons and Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (London: Routledge) 
Khan, Madiha Inara (2013) ‘Historical record and the legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, In: Gow, James, 
Kerr, Rachel & Pajic, Zoran (eds.) Prosecuting War Crimes: Lessons and 
Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 




Khondker, Habibul Haque (2011) ‘The Role of the New Media in the Arab 
Spring’, Globalizations, vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 675-679 
King, Charles (2001) ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s 
Unrecognized States’, World Politics, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 524–552 
King, Henry T. (1996) ‘Nuremberg and Sovereignty’, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, vol. 28, pp. 135-40  
Kingsbury, Benedict (1998) ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 599-625 
Klarin Mirko (2009) ‘The impact of the ICTY trials on public opinion in the 
former Yugoslavia’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, no.1, pp 
89-96  
Knudsen, Are (2007)‘The Law, the Loss and the Lives of Palestinian Refugees 
in Lebanon’, CMI Working Paper, no.1 
Knudsen, Are (2012) ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Homage to Hariri?’ in: 
Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael (eds) (2012) Lebanon: After the Cedar 
Revolution (London: Hurst)  
Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael (2012) ‘Introduction: The Cedar Revolution 
and Beyond’, in: Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael (eds) (2012) Lebanon: After 
the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & Co.) pp. 3-23 
Kolossov, Vladimir & John O’Loughlin (1999) ‘Pseudo-States as Harbingers 
of a New Geopolitics: The Example of the Transdniestr Moldovan Republic 
(TMR)’, in David Newman (ed.) Boundaries, Territory and Post- modernity 
(London: Frank Cass) pp. 151–176.  
Kolstø, Pål (2006) The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-
States, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 723-740 
Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge (2008) 'Living with Non-recognition: State- 
and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states', Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 483-509 
Kramer, Alan (2006) ‘The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials: 
Istanbul and Leipzig’, European Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 441-455 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press) 
Krieger, Heike (ed.) (2001) The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An 
Analytical Documentation 1974-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
Kritsiotis, Dino (2000) ‘The Kosovo crisis and NATO’s application of armed 
force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, The International and 




Ku, Julian and Nzelibe, Jide (2006) ‘Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter 
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?’ Washington University Law Review, 
vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 777-833 
L 
Lake, David A. (2003) ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 
International Studies Review, vol. 5, pp. 303–323. 
Laursen, A (2002) ‘NATO, the war over Kosovo, and the ICTY investigation’, 
American University International Law Review, vol. 17, no. 4, Article 3 
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics 
(2nd ed. 1983) (London: Heinemann)  
Llewellyn, J.J. and Raponi, S. (1999) The protection of human rights through 
international criminal law: a conversation with Madame Justice Louise Arbour, 
Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, vol. 
57, no. 1, pp. 83–99 
Lyck, Majbrit (2007) ‘International peace enforcers and indicted war criminals: 
The case of Ramush Haradinaj’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 3, pp 
418-432 
Lynch, Dov (2002) ‘Separatist States and Post- Soviet Conflicts’, International 
Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 831–848 
M 
Maktabi, Rania (1999) ‘The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who Are the 
Lebanese?’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 219-
241 
Malcolm, Noel (2002) Kosovo: A Short History (2nd ed.) (Basingstoke: Pan 
Macmillan) 
Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya (2004) War Crimes and Realpolitik: International 
Justice from World War I to the 21st Century (London: Lynne Rienner)  
Marshall, Katherine A. (2010) ‘Prevention and Complementarity in the 
International Criminal Court: A Positive Approach’, Human Rights Brief, vol. 
17, no. 2, pp. 21-26 
Mayall, James (1990) Nationalism and international society, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations: 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press)  
Mayall, James (1999) 'Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination’, 




Mazower, Mark (2012) Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New 
York: The Penguin Press)  
Mégret, Frédéric (2008) 'A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN Security 
Council and the Emancipation of International Criminal Justice', Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 21, pp. 485-512 
Merelman, Richard M. (1996) ‘Learning and Legitimacy’, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 548-561 
Meron, Theodor (1998) War Crimes Law Comes of Age (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press)  
Merquior, J.G. (1980) Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of 
Legitimacy (London: Routledge) 
Metz, Steven (2007) Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle, Pensylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute) 
Michalski, Milena and Gow, James (2007) War, Image and Legitimacy: 
Viewing Contemporary Conflict. (Abington: Routledge) 
Milanovic, Marko (2007) ‘An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International 
Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, vol. 5, pp. 1139-1152 
Milošević, Slobodan (1989) ‘Speech delivered at the central celebration 
marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, held at Gazimestan on 
28 June 1989’.  
Mosely Lesch, Ann (1998) The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Oxford: 
James Currey)  
Mulisch, Harry (1962) De Zaak 40/61: Een Reportage (Amsterdam: De Bezige 
Bij) 
N 
N’Diaye, Boubacar (2009) ‘Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion (YOVEX) in 
West Africa: Mali Country Report’, CSDG Papers, Number 25, April 2009, 
Natali, Denise (2010) Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in 
Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press)  
Neff, Stephen (2006) ‘A Short History of International Law’, in: Evans, 
Malcolm (ed.), International Law, (2d ed.) pp. 29–55. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
Neier, Aryeh (1998) War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the 




Neier, Aryeh (2012) ‘International Criminal Justice: Developing into a 
Deterrent’, Openspace, 5 March 2012, Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa. pp 6-10 
Noe, Nicholas (ed.) (2007) Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayed 
Hassan Nasrallah (London: Verso)  
Nollkaemper, Andre (2010) ‘Systemic Effects of International Responsibility 
for International Crimes’, Santa Clara Journal Of International Law, vol. 8, 
no. 1 pp. 313-352 
Norton, Augustus Richard (1999) Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. 
Mundane Politics (New York: Council on Foreign Relations) 
Norton, Augustus Richard (2007) ‘The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese 
Domestic Politics’, The International Spectator, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 475-491 
Norton, Augustus Richard (2007) Hezbollah: A short History (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press) 
Norton, Augustus Richard (2012) Foreword to Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael 
(eds) (2012) Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & Co.) pp. 
xv-xviii 
Nouwen, Sarah & Werner, Wouter (2010)‘The Law and Politics of Self 
Referrals’, In: Smeulers, Alette (ed.) (2010) Collective Violence and 
International Criminal Justice: an Interdisciplinary Approach, (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia) pp. 255-271 
Nouwen, Sarah M. H. & Werner, Wouter G. (2011) Doing Justice to the 
Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, The 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 941-965 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2008) ‘Smart Power and the “War on Terror”’, Asia-Pacific 
Review, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-8 
O 
Oppenheim, Lassa F.L. (1905) International Law, vol. 1: Peace (London: 
Longmans, Green and Company) 
Orentlicher, Diane F. (1991) ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 100, no. 8, 
pp. 2537-2615 
Overy, Richard. (2003) ‘The Nuremberg trials: international law in the 
making’, in Sands Philippe. (ed.) (2003) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The 






Palmer Harik, Judith (2004) Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (2nd 
ed. 2006) (London: I.B. Taurus) 
Pape, Robert (2005) Dying to win: the strategic logic of suicide terrorism 
(New York: Random House) 
Pegg, Scott (1998) International Society and the De Facto State. (Aldershot: 
Ashgate) 
Pejic, Jelena (1998) ‘Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The 
Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness’, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 
29, pp. 291-354 
Pettifer, James (2012) The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to 
Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001 (London: Hurst) 
Plesch, Dan (2008) ‘How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the 
Peace’, Global Society, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 137-158 
Plesch, Dan (2011) America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World 
War II and Forged Peace (London: I.B. Taurus) 
Pons, Niccolo (2010) ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand 
over the Accused’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 
1307-1321 
Portmann, Roland (2010) Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 
Potter, Evan H. (ed.) (2002) Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press) 
Q 
Qassem, Naim (2005) Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi) 
R 
Ranstorp, Magnus (1997) Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western 
Hostage Crisis (New York, St. Martins Press) 
Rauschenbach, Mina and Scalia, Damien (2008) ‘Victims and international 
criminal justice: a vexed question?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
vol. 90, no. 870, pp. 441-459 
Reus-Smit, Christian (2007) ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, International 
Politics, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 157-174 
Richardson, Henry J. (2012) ‘African Grievances and the International 




Nmehielle V.O. (ed.) (2012) Africa and the Future of International Criminal 
Justice, (The Hague: Eleven international publishing) pp. 81-123 
Roberts, Adam (1999) ‘NATO’s Humanitarian War over Kosovo’, Survival, 
vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 102-123. 
Roscini, Marco (2005) ‘Targeting and contemporary aerial bombardment,’ 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 411-444 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2003) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press) 
Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2003) When States Fail (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press) 
Roth, R. and Henzelin, M. (2002) The Appeal Procedure of the ICC, in: 
Cassese, Gaeta and. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, A Commentary. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)  
Ryngaert, Cedric (Ed.) (2009) The effectiveness of International Criminal 
Justice (Antwerp: Intersentia)  
Rywkin, Michael (2006) 'The Phenomenon of Quasi-states', Diogenes, vol. 53, 
no. 210, pp. 23-28 
S 
SaCouto, Susana and Cleary, Katherine (2007) ‘The Gravity Threshold of the 
International Criminal Court’, American University International Law Review, 
vol. 23, no.5, pp. 807-854 
Sands, Philippe (ed.) (2003) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of 
International Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)  
Schaar, John H (1984) ‘Legitimacy in the Modern State', in Connolly, William 
(ed.): Legitimacy and the State, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 
Schabas, William A. (2006)‘First Prosecutions at the International Criminal 
Court’, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 25-40 
Schabas, William A. (2007) An introduction to the International Criminal 
Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
Schabas, William A. (2010) ‘Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" At The 
International Criminal Court’, The John Marshall Law Review, vol. 43, pp. 
535-552 
Schachter, Oscar (1991) ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 85, no.3, pp. 452-473 
Scharf, Michael P. (2003) ‘The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the 
Major Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade: 




Scharf, Michael P. (2003) ‘The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial’, New England 
Law Review, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 915-934 
Scharf, Michael P. (2007) ‘The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in 
International Justice?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 5 no.2, 
pp. 258-263  
Scharf, Michael P. (2011) Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark 
Ruling on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of Participation, ASIL Insights, 
vol. 15, no. 6, 4 March 2011.  
Scharf, Michael. P. (1998) ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an 
International Criminal Court’, ASIL Insights, August 1998 
Scheffer, David J. (2002) ‘Killing fields and “Kangaroo” Courts: Symposium 
on an emerging international criminal justice system’, Davis Journal of 
International Law & Policy, vol. 45, no. 9, pp. 45-52  
Scheffer, David J. (2002) ‘Should the United States Join the International 
Criminal Court’, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, vol. 9, pp. 
45-52 
Scheffer, David J. (2002) Staying the Course with the International Criminal 
Court, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 35, no. 1 (November 2001 - 
February 2002), pp. 47-100 
Schiff, Benjamin N. (2008) Building the International Criminal Court 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Schneckener, Ulrich (2006) ‘Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and 
Security Governance’, In: Bryden, Alan & Caparini, Marina (Eds.) (2006) 
Private Actors and Security Governance (DCAF: Geneva) 
Schrag, Minna (2004) ‘Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 427-434 
Schreuer, Christoph (1993) ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a 
New Paradigm for International Law?’, European Journal of International 
Law, no. 4, pp. 447-471 
Schulz, Dorothea (2010) ‘Sharia and National Law in Mali’, In: Otto, Jan 
Michiel (ed.) Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal 
Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden 
University Press) 
Seeberg, Peter (2007) ‘Fragmented loyalties: Nation and Democracy in 
Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution’, Centre for Contemporary Middle East 
Studies University of Southern Denmark: Working Paper Series, no. 8, 
February 2007 
Shaw, Martin (2005) The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its 




Shinoda, Hideaki (2002) ‘Peace-Building by the Rule of Law: An Examination 
of Intervention in the Form of International Tribunals’, International Journal 
of Peace Studies, vol. 7, pp. 41-58 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1993) ‘International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 87, 
no. 2, pp. 205-239 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1995) ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 503-538 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1997) ‘The Real New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 183-197 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Tulumello, Andrew S. and Wood, Stephan (1998) 
‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 
no. 3, pp. 367-397 
Sloane, Robert (2006) ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’, 
Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 06100 
Smith, Rupert (2005) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern 
World (London: Penguin Books) 
Song, Sang-Hyun (2012) ‘From Punishment to Prevention: Reflections on the 
Future of International Criminal Justice’, Speech by Judge Sang-Hyun Song, 
President of the International Criminal Court, Wallace Wurth Memorial 
Lecture, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 14 February 2012  
Stepanova, Ekaterina (2011) ‘The Role of Information Communication 
Technologies in the “Arab Spring”’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 159 
Stromseth, Jane E. (2003) ‘Goals and Challenges in the Pursuit of 
Accountability’, in: Stromseth, Jane E. (ed.) (2003) Accountability for 
Atrocities: National and International Responses (Ardsley, N.Y.: 
Transnational Publishers)  
Stryder, R. (2001) 'Legitimacy', In: Smelser, Neil J. & Baltes, Paul B. (eds.) 
(2001) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier) pp. 8700–8704 
Suchman, Marc C. (1995) ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches’, The Academy of Management Review, vol. 20, no. 3 pp. 571-610 
T 
Tallgren, Immi (2002) ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal 
Law’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 13 no. 3, pp. 561–595 
Triffterer, Otto (2001). ‘The Preventive and the Repressive Function of the 




(2001)The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge To 
Impunity (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing) pp. 137-175. 
V 
Ventura, Manuel J. (2011) ‘Terrorism According to the STL’s Interlocutory 
Decision on the Applicable Law: A Defining Moment or a Moment of 
Defining?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 1-22 
Victoroff, Jeffrey Ivan (ed.) (2006) Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological 
Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press) 
Vine, Victor Le (2010) Mali: Accommodation or Coexistence? In: Miles, 
William F. S. (ed.) Political Islam in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner) 
p. 85-91. 
Vloeberghs, Ward (2012) ‘The Making of a Martyr: Forging Rafik Hariri’s 
Symbolic Legacy’ in: Knudsen, Are & Kerr, Michael (eds.) (2012) Lebanon: 
After the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & Co.) pp. 163-184 
W 
Waldmann, Peter (2006) The Radical Community: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Social Background of ETA, IRA, and Hezbollah. (Amsterdam: IOS) 
Weber, Max (1919) Politics as a Vocation’, Originally a speech at Munich 
University, 1918, 'Politik als Beruf,' in: Gesammelte Politische Schriften 
(Munich: Duncker & Humblodt) pp. 396-450. From :H.H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills (Translated and edited) (1946) Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New 
York : Oxford University Press) pp. 77-128. 
Weber, Max (1946) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Translated, 
Edited, and with an Introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 249. 
Weber, Max (1947). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited with an 
introduction by Talcott Parsons. (New York: Free Press) 
Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology (eds. Roth, Guenther & Wittich, Claus) (Berkley: University of 
California Press) 
Weller, Marc (2000)‘The Kosovo indictment of the international criminal 
tribunal for Yugoslavia’, The International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 4, 
no. 3-4 
Wet, Erika de (2004) 'The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security 
Council' vol. 3 in Studies in International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing)  
Williams, P. (2001) ‘Crime, Illicit Markets and Money Laundering’, in 




Lessons Learned, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2001) pp. 106–150  
Wippman, David (1999) ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of 
International Justice’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
473- 488  
Y 
Yacoubian, George S. Jr. (1998) ‘Sanctioning Alternatives in International 
Criminal Law: Recommendations for the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia’, World Affairs, vol. 161, no. 1, pp. 48-54 
Yacoubian, George S. Jr. (2003) ‘Evaluating the efficacy of the international 
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: implications for 
criminology and international criminal law’, World Affairs, vol.165, no.3, 
pp.133-141 
Yun, Janice (2010) ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Tribunal of an 
International Character Devoid of International Law’, Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 181-196 
Z 
Zartman, I. William (ed.) (1995) Collapsed States: The Disintegration and 
Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) 
 
